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Introduction 
 
 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis 
have revealed detrimental feedback effects between sovereign risk and risks in the financial 
sector. 
The risk transmission from the financial to the public sector was fueled by the government 
bailouts of “too big to fail” financial institutions (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014). 
While the bailouts aimed at mitigating contagion and preventing a credit crunch, the costs of 
these bailouts put a strain on government finances in a situation with already high public debt 
levels in many countries. The macroeconomic costs of the global financial crisis such as 
reduced growth and employment burdened the fiscal situation of many countries by lowering 
tax income and increasing expenditures for social benefits (Ball, 2014; Mourougane, 2017). 
Overall, these developments increased government debt ratios markedly since the onset of the 
financial crisis. For example, European Union (EU) member states’ general government debt 
relative to GDP rose on average from 58% in 2007 to 84% in 2016, although with notable 
variation between countries (Eurostat, 2017). Government bond yield spreads in Europe 
started to widen after a period of subdued differences in government interest rates that had not 
reflected differences in fiscal and macroeconomic fundamentals (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). 
The rise in sovereign risk premia for vulnerable countries, in turn, affected the financial 
system through several channels, most importantly through the government bond portfolios of 
financial institutions (CGFS, 2011). For one, the increase in sovereign risk immediately 
lowered the market value of banks’ holdings of risky government bonds which deteriorated 
the banks’ capital position (at least when bonds were marked-to-market) and increased banks’ 
default risk premia (Acharya et al., 2014; De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens and Vander 
Vennet, 2013). Also, the rise in sovereign risk affected the use of government bonds as 
collateral in banks’ funding and hedging operations (CGFS, 2011). In addition to these direct 
effects, banks also faced higher credit risks stemming from their private loan portfolio since 
the adverse effects of sovereign risk on economic growth and investment increased the default 
risk of domestic financial and non-financial firms (Ciocchini, 2002; Durbin and Ng, 2005). 
Whereas academics and policymakers focused on the vulnerability of banks, non-bank 
financial intermediaries including insurance companies were also exposed to the rise in 
sovereign risk through their government bond portfolios. While some countries, such as 
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Germany, experienced a flight to safety effect, banks’ and non-banks’ holdings of foreign 
risky government debt induced cross-border spillovers of risks (Buch, Koetter, Ohls, 2016; 
Duell, Koenig, Ohls, 2017). In sum, the increase in sovereign risk became a threat to financial 
stability in Europe. 
A destabilizing feedback loop, the so-called “sovereign-bank-nexus”, emerged as the 
elevated risks in the financial system increased the contingent liabilities of the sovereigns 
from (implicit or explicit) bail-out guarantees for domestic banks which triggered further 
increases in sovereign risk premia of vulnerable countries (Acharya et al., 2014). 
Policymakers have implemented a number of changes to the institutional and regulatory 
framework in order to address the sovereign-bank-nexus. So far, more progress has been 
made in mitigating the spillover effects from the banking system to the sovereign than the 
other way around (European Commission, 2015). For instance, the establishment of the 
Banking Union with its Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), complemented by the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), aimed at facilitating a bank’s resolution without 
relying on taxpayers’ money.  Furthermore, the resilience of the financial system was 
strengthened by increasing banks’ capital and liquidity buffers and developing new 
macroprudential tools to address systemic risks. Going forward, the effectiveness of these 
policy reforms need to be evaluated to understand their (desired and undesired) effects and 
how they interact with each other. For example, in an integrated world, national regulatory 
measures may spur cross-border spillovers calling for an international coordination of 
prudential measures. 
Progress in containing the spillovers from the sovereign sector to the financial system 
seems more limited. While the fiscal rules in the European Union have been reinforced, the 
regulatory treatment of sovereign risk has not been changed yet. Instead, banking and 
insurance regulations continue to grant a preferential treatment to domestic public relative to 
private debt (ESRB, 2015a). With respect to capital requirements, European banking 
regulation applies a zero risk weight and an exemption from large exposure rules to 
government debt issued by EU member states in domestic currency (Article 114(4) and 
Article 400 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)).1 Similarly, European insurance 
regulation exempts government debt issued by European Economic Area (EEA) member 
                                                          
1 While the zero risk weight applies in the in the standardized approach, banks that use the internal rating based 
approach (IRB) may opt for the “permanent partial use” with respect to sovereign exposures and follow the rules 
of the standardized approach (Article 150 CRR). With respect to liquidity requirements, domestic sovereign 
exposures count towards high quality liquid assets (HQLA) in the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in Basel III and 
the European CRR. 
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states in domestic currency from the spread and concentration risk modules in the standard 
formula (Solvency II, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35). Banks’ investments into home 
government debt, in particular, have been shown to play a prominent role in increasing the 
vulnerability of the financial system to sovereign risk in stressed euro area countries (Acharya 
et al., 2014; De Bruyckere et al., 2013). Policymakers and academics have therefore been 
striving for a better understanding of banks’ incentives to hold government debt. 
Against this backdrop, the thesis addresses research questions on the transmission of 
sovereign risk to the financial system, on banks’ incentives to hold home and foreign 
government debt, and on cross-border effects of regulatory measures. Thereby, it contributes 
to an improved understanding of the “sovereign-bank-nexus”, underlines the relevance of 
political factors in banking and contributes to the evaluation of regulatory reforms.  
Chapter 1 complements the literature on banks’ government bond portfolios - which 
mainly focuses on the countries directly affected by the sovereign crisis - by analyzing 
German banks’ home and foreign government bond holdings and the implications of these 
holdings for bank risk. Chapter 2 sheds light on German banks’ incentives for holding 
regional home government bonds and shows that the ownership structure of banks plays a 
special role in banks’ investment decisions. Chapter 3 compares the vulnerability to sovereign 
risk between banks, insurance companies and non-financial firms and takes a closer look at 
the channels through which sovereign risk transmits to insurers. Finally, Chapter 4 studies 
cross-border effects of bank regulation through German banks’ local and global lending 
activities. Thereby, it contributes to policy questions on the international coordination of 
prudential measures. 
The remainder of this introduction discusses the contribution, empirical approach and 
results of each chapter in more detail. 
Understanding the determinants and implications of banks’ investments into government 
debt is a key issue for academics and policymakers. Chapter 12 addresses these questions 
from the point of view of German banks. The existing empirical literature focuses on large 
banks and on the period since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis only (see, for 
instance, Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Also, previous studies assume that banks’ government 
bond holdings are exogenous to bank risk (Acharya et al., 2014; De Bruyckere et al., 2013), 
                                                          
2 Chapter 1 is based on the published article Buch, C.M., Koetter, M., and Ohls, J. (2016). Banks and sovereign 
risk: A granular view. Journal of Financial Stability, 25, pp. 1-15.The copyright of the original article is with 
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier B.V. 
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which gives rise to endogeneity concerns if banks’ risk preferences determine their 
government bond holdings. 
Chapter 1 contributes to the literature in several ways. The methodology explicitly controls 
for the self-selection of banks into holding government bonds and addresses endogeneity 
concerns by using predicted instead of observed government bond holdings when analyzing 
bank risk. To this end, the empirical methodology proceeds in two steps. First, a Heckman 
(1979) selection model is used to study banks’ volume of government bond holdings from a 
particular issuer (outcome equation), conditional on the banks’ decision to hold any bonds 
from this issuer (selection equation). Next, the predicted government bond holdings are 
aggregated per bank and quarter into three risk categories and included as explanatory 
variables in fixed effects regressions explaining bank risk. Using the predicted rather than 
observed government bond holdings is in the spirit of an instrumental variable approach, with 
the macroeconomic country variables serving as instruments. 
The analysis provides empirical evidence on large as well as small German banks and 
crisis as well as tranquil times (Q4:2005 to Q3:2013). The comprehensive panel dataset is 
based on the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Amann et al., 2012, 
Bade et al., 2016), bank supervisory data and macroeconomic and market data providers 
(Centralised Securities Database, MarkIT, and the OECD). The dataset includes the end-of-
quarter government bond holdings on the issuer level (29 OECD countries) for each German 
bank (1,970 banks, excluding foreign-owned and special-purpose banks) and the time period 
Q4:2005 to Q3:2013. 
Chapter 1 has three main findings. First, not all German banks hold government bonds. In 
fact, around 15% of German banks did not invest into government bonds at all between 
Q4:2005 and Q3:2013. Another 25% of all German banks always hold some government 
bonds. The remaining banks enter and exit government debt markets frequently. Banks that 
are larger, have a lower capital ratio (and in this sense riskier banks) and banks that are more 
active in capital markets (i.e. have a larger securities portfolio or more securitized liabilities) 
are more likely to hold government bonds and hold a larger volume of these bonds. 
Second, German banks did not differentiate much between countries based on 
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions prior to the 2008 financial crisis. This finding is in line 
with de Grauwe and Yi (2012), who argue that sovereign risk in the euro area was 
underpriced in the bond market before the crisis. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
macroeconomic factors began to matter. With the outbreak of the European sovereign debt 
Introduction 
5 
crisis, German banks held fewer bonds of highly indebted and high yield sovereigns. This 
finding stands in contrast to the “search for yield” of large European banks documented by 
Acharya and Steffen (2015), but is in line with a “flight to safety” and a “flight home” by 
German banks (Hildebrand et al., 2012). 
Third, the default risk of German banks increases with larger holdings of risky government 
bonds (rated BBB or worse). This result is driven by commercial banks and the sovereign 
debt crisis period mainly. Before 2010, only market based, not accounting based measures of 
bank risk respond to the banks’ holdings of risky government bonds which might reflect the 
widespread absence of marking to market at the onset of the crisis. Finally, larger holdings of 
low risk government bonds (rated AAA) decrease the risk of savings and cooperative banks 
during the whole sample period but to a much smaller magnitude. 
Overall, Chapter 1 stresses that banks’ revealed risk preferences change over time and 
finds that German banks are not insulated against credit risk stemming from their government 
bond portfolio. This stands in contrast to the treatment of government bonds in current 
banking regulation that allows a zero risk weight and the exemption from large exposure 
limits for European government debt. 
Whereas Chapter 1 analyses the overall government bond portfolio of German banks, 
Chapter 23 focuses on German state (“Länder”) bonds to test the hypothesis that state 
governments use moral suasion on “home” banks (i.e. banks located in the state). The idea of 
moral suasion (Romans, 1966) is that governments - by means of explicit or implicit threats or 
through the banks’ anticipation of the political will - persuade home banks to hold more home 
government debt than banks would do due to other incentives. Recent theoretical and 
empirical studies have argued that moral suasion is one driver behind European banks’ large 
holdings of home government bonds during the sovereign debt crisis (Chari, Dovis and 
Kehoe, 2016; De Marco and Macchiavelli 2016; Ongena, Popov, and van Horen, 2016). 
Chapter 2 complements these cross-country papers by studying the moral hypothesis at the 
regional level in Germany. The regional setting mitigates the differences in the institutional 
and regulatory framework that may have affected the earlier studies. Furthermore, the analysis 
is the first to account for the impact of moral suasion on the decision of banks for holding 
home government bonds at all and to control for unobserved time-varying bank-specific 
incentives for holding state bonds. 
                                                          
3 Chapter 2 is based on Ohls, J. (2017) Moral suasion in regional government bond markets. Deutsche 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series, 33/2017. 
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The empirical approach in Chapter 2 uses differences in the fiscal conditions between 
states and over time as reported by the German Stability Council to identify differences in the 
states’ incentive to use moral suasion. The banks’ incentives to collude are captured by the 
location and ownership structure of banks (e.g. state ownership of Landesbanken and regional 
development banks) or membership of politicians in banks’ supervisory boards. 
Similar to Chapter 1, the baseline empirical model follows Heckman (1979) to study the 
impact of moral suasion on a bank’s decision whether to hold any home state bonds (selection 
equation) and on the volume of a bank’s home state bond holdings (outcome equation). In 
addition, the importance of a bank’s holdings relative to the outstanding state bonds is 
estimated using a fractional logit model as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and 
fixed effects regressions. The latter allow controlling for unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity on the bank level and on the issuer level as well as for an unobserved bank-
specific structural preference for a particular issuer (identification through heterogeneity). 
The main component of the dataset is the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (Amann et al., 2012, Bade et al., 2016), that gives the end-of-quarter bank 
holdings of 2,078 German state bonds of 2,024 banks (excluding foreign-owned banks)4 over 
the time period Q4:2005 to Q2:2014. In addition, the German Stability Council provides 
information on the states’ fiscal strength along four criteria, which is used to construct an 
indicator on the number of stability criteria that a state breaches.5  
The results are in line with moral suasion on home (state-owned) banks by state 
governments. Home banks (i.e. banks located in the state that issues the bond) are more likely 
to hold and hold more home state bonds than “out-of-state” banks (i.e. banks located in 
another German state), especially when the state is in a weak fiscal condition and the home 
bank is directly owned by the state government (i.e. Landesbanken and regional development 
banks).  
State-owned banks located in weak states hold more home state bonds than other banks 
located in weak states and than state-owned banks located in strong states. The intensity of 
state control also matters. Banks that are owned by one instead of several states and banks 
with a larger share of bank equity owned by the home government hold a larger amount of 
                                                          
4
 In contrast to Chapter 1, special-purpose banks are included in the analysis in Chapter 2 in order to cover 
regional development banks. 
5
 The German Stability Council assesses the risk of an impending budgetary emergency of states and publishes 
its results annually. The stability criteria are the following: interest expense to tax income, outstanding state debt, 
structural net lending/borrowing, and the credit funding ratio. 
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home state bonds. Similarly, a larger share of state politicians on the bank’s supervisory board 
increases the preference for home state bonds. 
The findings remain in line with moral suasion after controlling for other (observed and 
unobserved) incentives of banks for holding home government debt, such as risk shifting 
(Farhi and Tirole, 2016), political endearing (Koetter and Popov, 2017), private lending 
opportunities (Gennaioli et al. 2014), and information asymmetries (Portes, Rey and Oh, 
2001). Also, the findings are robust to using different empirical specifications and measures 
of a state’s fiscal situation as well as to excluding the financial crisis period and specific types 
of states from the sample. 
Chapter 2 suggests that political factors are important to consider when studying bank 
decisions. Also, it sheds light on banks’ incentives to accumulate home government debt on 
their balance sheets and has implications for the effectiveness of fiscal institutions such as the 
German Stability Council in promoting market discipline. 
Chapter 36 extends the view beyond banks by studying the transmission of sovereign risk 
to insurance companies’ default risk. Insurers are large institutional investors managing 
roughly 12% of all global financial assets (IAIS, 2011) and European insurers invest about 
22% of their assets in sovereign bonds (J.P. Morgan Cazenove, 2014). Yet, there is only little 
research on the effects of sovereign risk on insurance companies.  
So far, the literature on the transmission of sovereign risk to the private sector has focused 
almost exclusively on either banks (Acharya et al., 2014; Altera and Schüler, 2012; Battistini, 
Pagano, and Simonelli, 2014) or (non-financial) firms (Ciocchini, 2002; Durbin and Ng, 
2005). One notable exception is Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, Merton, and Pelizzon (2013), 
who study the interconnections between banks’, insurers’, and governments’ default risk 
based on Granger causality and network models. They find that sovereign risk is more likely 
to Granger cause insurance risk than vice versa. Billio et al. (2013) do however neither 
estimate a causal effect of sovereign risk on insurers nor analyse the channels through which 
sovereign risk is transmitted, which is what Chapter 3 does.  
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, it estimates the effect of sovereign risk on the 
default risk of domestic insurance companies. Then, it tests whether the effect on insurers is 
different from the one on banks and on non-financial firms. Finally, the channels of risk 
transmission are investigated.  
                                                          
6 Chapter 3 is based on the published article Duell, R., Koenig, F., and Ohls J. (2017) On the exposure of 
insurance companies to sovereign risk - Portfolio investments and market forces. Journal of Financial Stability, 
31, pp. 93–106. The copyright of the original article is with Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier B.V. 
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The dataset covers a sample of sovereigns, insurance companies, banks and non-financial 
firms from nine countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) over the time period from 1 January 
2008 to 1 May 2013. Detailed panel data on sovereign bond holdings of individual insurance 
companies are collected from quarterly publications by JP Morgan Cazenove (2014) to test 
for the channels of risk transmission. 
In the baseline specification, the insurers’ credit default swap (CDS) spread is regressed on 
the home sovereign CDS spread and on control variables for economic growth, uncertainty 
and the banking sector’s default risk. The regression is performed in log changes to purge any 
unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity in the business model and risk preference of 
insurers. A similar specification has been applied by Acharya et al. (2014) to study risk 
spillovers between sovereigns and domestic banks. Chapter 3 also implements an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach as in Bedendo and Colla (2013) to address the potential concern that 
implicit guarantees for insurers might induce reverse causality in the baseline specification. 
Domestic sovereign and banking system risk are instrumented with average foreign sovereign 
and banking system risk respectively and the interbank lending rate serves as overidentifying 
restriction. 
The results suggest that a larger rise in sovereign risk leads to a larger rise in domestic 
insurers’ default risk significantly. This finding is robust to using stock prices or expected 
default frequencies instead of CDS spreads as measure for insurer risk. The sensitivity of 
insurers to a rise in domestic sovereign risk is not significantly different from the sensitivity 
of banks but larger than for non-financial companies. This result is not driven by any specific 
non-financial sector. The difference to non-financial companies can be attributed to those 
insurers that have later been classified as systemically important by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB). Chapter 3 further documents that the transmission of sovereign risk to domestic 
insurers is non-linear as it increases with the level of sovereign risk. Similar to Chapter 1, 
Chapter 3 highlights heterogeneity in market perceptions over time. Insurers’ CDS spreads 
did not respond to an increase in domestic sovereign risk before the outbreak of the recent 
financial crisis, but only thereafter. 
The analysis then makes use of the detailed portfolio data to test for the importance of the 
insurers’ sovereign bond holdings in sovereign risk transmission (portfolio channel). An 
increase in the credit risk of an insurer’s sovereign bond portfolio increases the market’s 
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expectation of the insurer’s default risk significantly, even after controlling for unobserved 
time-varying heterogeneity between countries.  
The findings of Chapter 3 have implications for the regulatory treatment of sovereign 
bonds. While market participants account for credit risk stemming from the government bond 
portfolio when assessing an insurer’s default risk, insurance regulation – similar to banking 
regulation - assumes that sovereign bonds are credit risk free. Solvency II, which came into 
effect in Europe in 2016, exempts sovereign bonds issued by EU member states from the 
spread and concentration risk modules when calculating solvency capital requirements. 
Furthermore, Chapter 3 addresses a gap in the academic literature which focused almost 
exclusively on banks and only recently accounts for the role of non-bank financial 
intermediaries such as insurers for financial stability.  
While the first three chapters of this thesis focus on banks’ demand for government debt 
and on the spillovers of sovereign risk to the broader financial system, Chapter 47 analyses 
the cross-border effects of regulatory changes through German banks’ local and global 
lending behavior. In response to the recent financial crisis, policymakers and regulators have 
developed macroprudential instruments that target the stability of the financial sector as a 
whole. In integrated banking markets, banks can respond to these regulatory changes in one 
country by shifting their activities between countries. This can weaken the effectiveness of 
national prudential instruments and create cross-border spillovers. The European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), which is responsible for the macroprudential oversight of the EU 
financial system, has therefore recommended an annual assessment of the cross-border effects 
of these measures (ESRB, 2015b). 
The empirical literature on cross-border effects of prudential measures is relatively new but 
has been growing recently. Typically, these papers are constrained either to one country and 
make use of detailed bank-level information to identify the effects of regulation (Aiyar, 
Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina Salas, 2012; 
Danisewicz, Reinhardt and Sowerbutts, 2015), or to aggregate country-level data in a cross-
country setting (Claessens, Ghosh, and Mihet, 2013; IMF 2011). 
                                                          
7
 Chapter 4 is based on Ohls, J., Pramor, M., and Tonzer, L. (2016) International Banking and Cross-Border 
Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series, 27/2016. The 
paper has been published in a shorter version as Ohls, J., Pramor, M., and Tonzer, L. (2017) International 
Banking and Cross-Border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany. International Journal of Central 
Banking, 13 s1, pp.129-162. The copyright of the original article is with the Association of the International 
Journal of Central Banking. 
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The analysis in Chapter 4 is part of the International Banking Research Network (IBRN)8, 
an initiative that addresses this trade-off between identification from micro data and cross-
country results in a two-step approach. First, research teams from national central banks apply 
a common methodology to their detailed but confidential bank-level datasets in separate 
country studies. Second, a meta-analysis (Buch and Goldberg, 2017) is conducted on the non-
confidential results from the country studies to draw conclusions that apply not only to one 
country, but more generally. Chapter 4 is the country study for Germany and is one of 15 
country studies (and one cross-country study) that evaluate the cross-border spillovers of 
regulation. 
It uses detailed micro-level data on the domestic and international lending activities of 
German parent banks, their foreign branches and subsidiaries taken from the External 
Position Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Fiorentino, Koch and Rudek, 2010) and on 
domestic lending activities by foreign affiliates located in Germany taken from the Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.9 The granular data are merged with the 
IBRN Prudential Instruments Database (Cerutti, Correa, Fiorentino and Segalla, 2017), a new 
cross-country database on changes in eight prudential instruments (e.g. general and sectoral 
capital requirements and loan-to-value ratios). 
The common methodology developed within the IBRN employs variation in banks’ 
exposure to foreign regulation through banks’ international activities and variation in banks’ 
balance sheet conditions to identify the effect of regulatory changes on local and cross-border 
loan growth. The bank-level data mitigate endogeneity concerns, since regulation is unlikely 
to respond to the behavior of an individual foreign bank. The baseline regressions are 
conducted in log changes and control for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank and at the time 
level. The prudential indicators are included contemporaneously as well as their first two lags 
to allow for sluggish adjustment of banks’ loan growth. 
The findings of Chapter 4 highlight that the direction and magnitude of the regulatory 
spillovers vary between instruments and types of banks. For instance, changes in foreign 
regulation affect lending to the German economy in two opposite ways. On the one hand, 
German-owned banks increase their domestic loan growth if foreign countries that they are 
exposed to tighten general capital requirements and loan-to-value ratios. On the other hand, 
foreign-owned affiliates located in Germany reduce their loan growth to the German economy 
                                                          
8 For more information on the IBRN please see https://www.newyorkfed.org/IBRN/index.html. 
9
 For more information on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, please see 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Service/Reporting_systems/monthly_balance_sheet_
statistics.html?https=1 
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if sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements and loan to value ratios are 
tightened in their home country. This withdrawal from the German lending market is less 
pronounced for foreign affiliates that are larger, have a higher capital ratio and more illiquid 
assets suggesting that these foreign affiliates are less prone to shift resources to the parent 
banks in response to higher regulatory pressure at home. 
In addition to the common regressions that are applied by all IBRN research teams, 
Chapter 4 also investigates the impact of German banks’ organizational structure on the 
regulatory spillovers across borders. Foreign subsidiaries of German parent banks are 
typically subject to host country regulation, while foreign branches are subject to home 
country (i.e. German) regulation. Chapter 4 shows that only foreign subsidiaries, not foreign 
branches respond to a tightening in regulation in the host country by reducing local lending. 
There is no evidence for regulatory leakages since foreign branches do not significantly 
increase their local lending in these situations. 
Chapter 4 highlights the need for evaluating cross-border spillovers of regulation when 
implementing national prudential measures. It shows that spillovers are state-dependent and 
are mitigated by higher capital and liquidity buffers of banks. 
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Chapter 1: Banks’ government bond holdings and 
bank risk1 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Banks are important investors on domestic and foreign government bond markets. During 
the European government debt crisis, the patterns of such investments have changed as banks 
have tended to withdraw from foreign markets. Changes in the investment patterns of banks 
have given rise to the debate on how the risk of banks and sovereigns are linked and how this 
“bank-sovereign nexus” affects financial stability in the Euro Area. Since the outbreak of the 
European government debt crisis, government bonds issued by periphery countries in the Euro 
Area (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) were reallocated from foreign investors 
towards domestic banks (Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2014). The mirror-image of this 
pattern is a withdrawal of foreign investors, including German banks, from risky European 
government debt, which is what we study. 
This chapter analyses the investment behavior of German banks by answering two 
questions. Why do banks invest into government bonds? And do holdings of government debt 
affect bank risk? Empirical work on these questions faces two challenges. First, sufficiently 
detailed information on government bond portfolios of banks are usually confined to the 
largest banks and to the period after the outbreak of the European government debt crisis. 
Second, banks do not hold government debt randomly. They actively choose whether, how 
much, and which government bonds to hold, conditional on banks’ assessments of the 
sovereign risk, on regulatory costs, and on bank-level characteristics. 
We analyse the relationship between government bond holdings and observed risk of all 
German banks while taking the selection of banks into holding government debt explicitly 
into account. Our analysis uses the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This database provides quarterly, granular data of the security portfolios of all 
German banks, including holdings of government bonds, bank-by-bank, and security-by-
security from Q4:2005 until Q3:2013 (Amann, Baltzer, and Schrape, 2012; Bade, Flory, and 
                                                 
1
 Chapter 1 is based on the published article Buch, C.M., Koetter, M., and Ohls, J. (2016). Banks and sovereign 
risk: A granular view. Journal of Financial Stability, 25, pp. 1-15.The copyright of the original article is with 
Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier B.V. 
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Schönberg, 2016). Thus, the data cover the pre-crisis period, the global financial crisis, and 
the government debt crisis in the Euro Area. We combine sovereign risk exposures with 
detailed micro-prudential supervisory and issuer-country data. Thereby, our model exploits 
the rich cross-sectional variation across commercial, savings, cooperative, and mortgage 
banks in Germany. The granular data employed in this chapter reveal the following stylized 
facts (for details, see Section 1.2.3.): 
First, a certain fraction of German banks, namely 15%, never hold government bonds 
during the entire sample period. Another 25% of all German banks always hold some 
government debt. Other banks actively move into and out of investments into government 
bonds. On average, two thirds of all German banks hold government debt in each quarter. 
Participation in government bond markets varies considerably across banking groups. 
Average government bond portfolios account for about 5% of total assets across all German 
banks. These shares are the lowest for commercial and cooperative banks (3.5%) and the 
largest (13%) for mortgage banks. But some of the larger banks hold up to 20% of their assets 
in the form of government debt. 
Second, savings and cooperative banks did not have a significant exposure to Euro Area 
peripheral debt to begin with. German mortgage banks, which specialize in the securitzation 
of public and private debt, continue to hold substantial volumes of risky government debt. 
During the government debt crisis, German commercial banks reduced their exposure to debt 
issued by governments in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, or Spain, and they largely replaced 
these investments with domestic German government debt. 
Analysing the drivers of these adjustments and the impact on bank risk is the purpose of 
this chapter. Our empirical model proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we analyse the 
determinants of government bond holdings of German banks. We specify a Heckman 
selection model to estimate the likelihood that banks hold certain government bonds and how 
much they hold conditional on this selection choice. In a second step, we assess the impact of 
government bond holdings on bank risk, measured through market-based (CDS spreads) and 
accounting-based measures (z-score).   
As regards the determinants of banks’ government bond holdings, several factors have 
been stressed in the literature. Banks may hold government debt to diversify asset portfolios 
(Rochet, 2008), as collateral for interbank refinancing operations (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011), 
or as a means to store liquidity (Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2014). Recent empirical papers 
explain the increase in domestic government bond holdings by Euro Area periphery banks 
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with a search for yield (Acharya and Steffen, 2015), moral suasion (Becker and Ivashina, 
2017; De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Horváth, Huizinga, and Ioannidou, 2015; Ongena, 
Popov, and van Horen, 2016), or gambling for resurrection (Ari, 2016; Horváth et al., 2015). 
Most of these studies are based on data released together with the stress test results of the 
European Banking Authority (EBA). 
The perspective taken in this chapter differs from previous work for two reasons. First, we 
study the investment behavior of German banks rather than the behavior of banks in (risky) 
peripheral countries. Second, we have granular data for all German banks, not only the large 
banks covered by the EBA stress tests. Our results show that accounting for heterogeneity 
across banks is indeed important. Large, weakly capitalized banks, and banks which are more 
active on capital markets2 hold more government bonds.  
With respect to country characteristics, we find that German banks did not respond much 
to macroeconomic risk factors before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Between 2008 
and 2010, German banks reduced their government bond holdings of small and high inflation 
countries that participated in an IMF programme. With the outbreak of the European 
government debt crisis, German banks reduced bond holdings of high indebted and high yield 
sovereigns. Also, domestic government bonds started playing a more prominent role. In 
contrast to evidence for the sample of the largest European banks (Acharya and Steffen, 
2015), we thus do not find a search for yield by the average German bank in government bond 
markets. Instead, our results indicate a “flight to safety” and to the home market akin to 
Hildebrand, Rocholl and Schulz (2012).  
The second part of our analysis focuses on the effects that government bond exposures 
have on bank risk. Given that German banks have withdrawn from risky markets during the 
crisis we expect, a priori, that increasing domestic government exposures have stabilized 
rather than destablized banks. Hence, the perspective taken in this chapter differs from 
previous work that focuses on the link between bank (in)stability and sovereign indebtness 
(Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014; Alter and Schüler, 2012), a reduced effectiveness of 
bank rescues and guarantees (König, Anand, and Heinemann, 2014; van der Kwaak and van 
Wijnbergen, 2014), and crowding out of private sector credit (Albertazzi, Ropele, and Sene, 
2014; Bedendo and Colla, 2015). Existing literature focuses on sovereign and/or bank CDS 
                                                 
2  Banks active on capital markets are those using market-based funding, having large security, and small customer loan 
portfolios. 
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spreads to provide evidence on the existence of a bank-sovereign risk nexus (Alter and Beyer, 
2014; De Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vander Vennet, 2013). 
In order to study the effects of government bond holdings on bank risk, we need to take 
into account that this choice is endogenous. We use predicted rather than observed bond 
exposures as a function of issuer country-specific macro factors and of bank-specific 
covariates to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Our main indicator of bank risk is the z-score. 
We find that a larger share of high-risk bonds is associated with higher bank risk for 
commercial banks but not for cooperative and savings banks after 2010. Holdings of low-risk 
bonds are associated with lower bank risk for savings and cooperative banks for the entire 
sample period. These risk effects are stronger when considering CDS spreads that are 
available for a subsample of (larger) banks as an alternative risk proxy. Holdings of risky 
government debt also increased banks’ CDS spreads during the entire sample period, not just 
after 2010. These risk effects were not visible based on the accounting-based risk measure 
before 2010, probably due to the widespread absence of marking to market at the time.  
In Section 1.2, we present and describe the data for German banks’ government bond 
holdings. In Section 1.3, we analyse the determinants of banks’ government bond holdings. In 
Section 1.4, we analyse the impact of these holdings on bank risk. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 Holdings of securities by German banks 
1.2.1 Banks included in the sample 
The data used in this chapter include 1,970 banks, which covers almost the entire 
population of German banks. Affiliates of foreign banks operating in Germany are omitted 
because we do not observe the government portfolios held by their foreign parent banks. 
Furthermore, we exclude special-purpose banks, such as regional development banks, since – 
unlike in Chapter 2 – we do not account for the political dimension in this chapter. 
The German banking system consists of three banking groups (commercial, savings, and 
cooperatives), which operate as universal banks, as well as specialized mortgage banks 
(Koetter, 2013; Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004).  
Commercial banks are privately owned, but only a few are stock market listed.  
Savings banks are owned by municipalities and own, in turn, their head institutions, the 
Landesbanken. Regional savings banks are de jure confined to stipulated local markets and 
focus on retail deposit taking and lending. Head institutions act as clearing house and 
gateways to international capital markets and to investment banking services for their owners.  
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Cooperative banks are mutually-owned by member-depositors. They pursue a de facto 
regional segmentation of banking markets and are the smallest universal banks. During the 
sample period, they featured two head institutions, which pursued activities roughly 
comparable to those conducted by the large commercial banks and the Landesbanken. Akin to 
the U.S. (Goddard, McKillop and Wilson, 2014), the cooperative and the savings bank sector 
faced substantial competitive pressure and exhibited substantial consolidation. Since the year 
1993, the number of cooperative and savings banks declined by 40% and 60%, respectively 
(Koetter, 2013).3  
Mortgage banks are specialized institutions that focus on long-term maturity 
transformation by originating real estate mortgages. They also specialize on issuing covered 
bonds (“Pfandbrief”), which are often collateralized by government bonds. The aggregate 
market share in terms of total assets of mortgage banks is around 8%.  
1.2.2 Data on government bond holdings  
Government bond holdings of German banks are reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank in 
the Securities Holdings Statistics by each bank located in Germany (Amann et al., 2012; Bade 
et al., 2016). Each bank reports its entire securities portfolio including government bonds on a 
security-by-security basis. We focus on investments in government bonds, defined as general 
government bonds rather than central government bonds only. Focusing on the general 
government level ensures comparability across different federal structures and consistency to 
studies based on EBA stress test data (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Aggregating across 
different federal levels might however also hide important variation as I show in Chapter 2. 
Therefore we test the robustness of our results for a restriction to central government bonds in 
Section 1.1.3.5. We exclude public covered bonds from the sample, which are mostly issued 
by mortgage banks and are collateralized by government securities, because we do not 
observe the identity of government bonds that are pledged as collateral.  
The Securities Holdings Statistics data are available to us on a quarterly basis as of 
Q4:2005 until Q3:2013 and cover around 9,540 government bonds at the end of the sample 
period. We make two sampling choices. First, we consider only banks’ own securities 
holdings (“Depot-A-Geschaeft”). Positions held on behalf of clients and the exposures of 
                                                 
3
  Similar to the U.S., where corporate or “central” credit unions were important holders of subprime debt, head institutions 
of both savings and cooperative banks differ considerably in size and scope of activities from their associated regional 
banks. 
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banks’ foreign affiliates are excluded. We cannot distinguish between held-to-maturity and 
available-for-sale holdings, which have been reported separately only since early 2014. 
Securities include all traded securities as well as repurchase agreements. For each security, we 
observe the ISIN number, currency, volume of investment, price, type of security, sector of 
the issuer, country, maturity, coupon type, frequency of coupon payments, and coupon 
payments.4  
Second, we use government bond holdings from OECD countries, which dominate the 
government bond portfolio of German banks. Securities denominated in foreign currency are 
converted at daily official Bundesbank exchange rates to Euros. Only 3.7% of government 
bonds held by German banks were not denominated in Euros as of Q3:2013. Because we are 
interested in the macroeconomic features that affect banks’ investments in certain government 
bonds, we aggregate the data per country. For issuers like France, for instance, we have a total 
of 812 different securities at each point in time, which differ in terms of maturity and return. 
We aggregate these securities into a composite French government bond and use the yield on 
the 10-year French government bond as a return measure. The average maturity in our sample 
is 11 years and thus fairly close to the 10-year benchmark yield. 
The data report notional and market values where the former equals the nominal value of a 
security multiplied by the number of securities held and the latter is multiplied with the price 
of the security as obtained from the Centralized Securities Database of the ESCB (Amann et 
al., 2012). We focus on market values to gauge possibly deteriorating bank profitability or 
increasing volatility.  
Different accounting standards and the treatment of losses from security trading may affect 
our analysis as well. Government bonds held for trading or available-for-sale are evaluated at 
fair value. Therefore, large price fluctuations will directly impact the level and the volatility 
of bank profits, and thereby also an accounting-based measure of risk, such as the z-score. In 
contrast, government bonds that are held-to-maturity are evaluated at amortized costs. We do 
not observe the trading book and the banking book separately during the estimation sample 
period. Our results thus show the average effect for both accounting categories and should be 
                                                 
4
  We sample coupon and zero coupon bonds. The latter are evaluated at purchase price plus accrued interest. Only 8% of 
all observations pertain to these bonds. The use of aggregate country-level data implies that short positions are mostly 
netted. Around 5% of all observations at the security level (ISIN) are short positions (as of Q3:2013), with large 
commercial banks (20%) and Landesbanken (11%) exhibiting the largest shares. But at the aggregate country level, this 
share is negligible (0.7% of observations as of Q3:2013). 
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higher for the (unobservable) subgroup of government bonds, which are marked to market. 
Robustness tests yield no sensitivity of regression results reported below for the choice of 
nominal versus market value of government bonds.  
1.2.3 Government bond portfolios of German banks 
The granular data from the Securities Holdings Statistics show that not all German banks 
hold government debt. Averaged over the sample period, around 15% of all German banks are 
never active in government bond markets whereas around a quarter are always active. Among 
the banks that never hold government bonds are primarily cooperative banks, while mortgage 
banks always hold government debt. Non-participating commercial banks tend to be better 
capitalized, much smaller, and more engaged in interbank lending compared to participating 
banks. These features may explain a reduced need for government bonds. The remaining 
banks enter and exit the government bond markets frequently.  
Figure 1.1 shows the different evolution of participation rates in government bond markets 
across banking groups. Differences in banks’ business models imply a different need for 
government bonds across these groups. Despite the variation participation rate levels, there is 
a common trend across banking groups towards a higher participation rate, which is consistent 
with the EBA (2015) data for large European banks.  
Table 1.1 provides a snapshot on the importance of the security portfolio in German banks’ 
balance sheets at the end of our sample (Q3:2013). On average, German banks held 18% of 
their total assets in securities, ranging from 11% for commercial banks to 27% for mortgage 
banks in Q3:2013 (Column 6). About 5% of total assets were invested in government bonds, 
ranging from 3.5% for commercial banks to 13% for mortgage banks in Q3:2013 (Table 1.1, 
Column 7). 
Figure 1.2 depicts the decomposition of the government bond portfolio as percentage share 
of total assets over time and per banking group. Since 2008, savings and cooperative banks 
increased their investments in government bonds. Starting from higher levels, mortgage banks 
decreased their government exposures from 2006 onwards. Across banking groups, portfolios 
were concentrated towards Germany and the Euro Area. Changes in the size of the 
government portfolio were primarily driven by adjustments in the German government bond 
holdings. Commercial banks withdrew from the Euro Area periphery countries (Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain) since the beginning of 2010 and reallocated their assets towards 
Germany and other core countries. Mortgage banks held an exceptionally high share of bonds 
issued by European periphery countries, namely 41% of their total government portfolio 
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(Q3:2013). Also, they increased their investment in other Euro Area countries and in OECD 
countries outside the Euro Area since the outbreak of the European government debt crisis. 
Hence, mortgage banks hold the most diversified government bond portfolios compared to 
other banking groups. While mortgage banks held government bonds of eight countries on 
average in Q3:2013, the other banking groups held exposures towards two (cooperatives) to 
three countries (commercial banks) only. However, the five largest (commercial) banks held 
government bonds in 25 countries on average. Thus, the sheer size of countries seems to be an 
important determinant for diversification strategies. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the evolution of aggregate German bank exposures to selected 
countries over time. After the fall of Lehman in Q3:2008, we observe a steep increase in 
German bond holdings and, to a lesser extent, in French bonds. This increase is accompanied 
by continuously declining positions vis-à-vis distressed Euro Area peripheral countries, which 
was amplified after the outbreak of the government debt crisis in Q2:2010. Thus, the data 
strongly suggest a pattern to increase holdings of domestic government bonds in line with the 
“flight to safety” effect in Hildebrand et al. (2012).  
In sum, the descriptive statistics reveal a couple of interesting patterns in the data. First, a 
significant fraction of German banks do not invest in government bonds at all. Second, with 
5% of the total, government bonds account for a relatively small share of banks’ total assets 
(Q3:2013). Third, in particular the government bond portfolios of smaller banks are not very 
diversified and a large share is held in Euro Area bonds. 
1.2.4 Country- and bank-level controls 
Table 1.2 shows descriptive statistics for both the macroeconomic variables (Panel A) and 
the bank-level variables (Panel B) with which we complement the Securities Holdings 
Statistics. Consider first the country-level information, which is drawn from the Centralised 
Securities Database (CSDB), MarkIT, and the OECD, to measure market size, returns, and 
risk.  
The left-hand panel pertains to 1,632,540 bank-country-quarter observations and the 
unconditional probability that bank i holds bonds issued by country j at time q is around 5%. 
The right-hand panel shows the sample with non-zero government bond holdings only. These 
data comprise 83,698 bank-country-quarter observations, corroborating the self-selection of 
banks into holding specific government bonds. The mean volume of government bond 
holdings of an issuer by a bank in the regression sample is 100 million Euros. 
Chapter 1: Banks’ government bond holdings and bank risk 
23 
To measure country size, we use log GDP, measured in constant and seasonally adjusted 
prices. To gauge expected returns and country risk, we include consumer price inflation. 
Higher inflation reduces real returns on outstanding government debt. Second, we specify 
bond yields to capture the compensation that banks receive for holding risky government 
debt. Third, we use the ratio of debt issued by the general government relative to GDP as an 
indicator of the indebtedness of a sovereign. Fourth, we specify an indicator variable if a 
country was part of a support program by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data are 
obtained from the homepage of the IMF and include Extended Fund Facilities, Extended 
Arrangements, and Stand-by-Arrangements. This indicator equals one as of the start dates of 
IMF programs.5 GDP, government debt and inflation data are all obtained from the OECD 
database and the average yield on a 10-year government bond is calculated from Markit data. 
Finally, there are several regulatory incentives for banks to hold government debt. We 
include an indicator variable equal to one for member countries of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) because prudential regulation in Europe favors banks’ investments in 
government debt issued by Euro Area governments. Government bonds denominated in Euros 
need not be backed by equity capital under the Credit Risk Standardized Approach (CRSA) of 
the regulatory framework.6 This treatment of government bonds is maintained under the Basel 
III regime.7 Also, investments in government bonds, that carry a zero risk weight, are exempt 
from large exposure rules. 
Since we include country fixed effects to capture structural differences between 
government issuers, the EMU dummy captures accessions to the Euro Area (Slovenia, Slovak 
Republic). Finally, we report the effect of the Germany dummy to capture the importance of 
the home market.  
Panel B in Table 1.2 depicts descriptive statistics for bank-specific control variables, which 
are generated from financial data reported to Deutsche Bundesbank, for the selection equation 
(left-hand panel) and for the outcome equation (right-hand panel). 
                                                 
5
  These OECD countries are Greece (Q2:2010), Hungary (Q2:2008), Ireland (Q4:2010), Mexico (Q2:2008), Poland 
(Q1:2013), and Portugal (Q2:2011). 
6
  Banks might use internal models instead of CRSA to gauge the risk and corresponding capital buffers for their exposures 
(Internal Ratings Based Approach, IRBA). For government bonds, IRBA banks may use the CRSA for government debt 
investments under certain circumstances (“permanent partial use”). 
7 
 See Brussels, 20 July 2011, COM(2011) 452 final, 2011/0202 (COD), Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, Article 109(4): 
“Exposures to Member States' central governments and central banks denominated and funded in the domestic currency 
of that central government and central bank shall be assigned a risk weight of 0%.” 
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We control for size with the logarithm of total assets because large banks were pivotal to 
absorb government bonds during the government debt crisis (Becker and Ivashina, 2017). 
Government debt has an important impact on the liquidity position of banks (Gennaioli et al., 
2014). We measure liquidity as the ratio of cash and overnight interbank lending relative to 
total assets. We control for bank asset structure because different degrees of retail versus 
financial market activities are characteristic for alternative business models (Boot and 
Ratnovski, 2012). On the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, we include the shares of 
customer loans (i.e. retail activities) and securities portfolios (i.e. wholesale activities) relative 
to total assets. We account for the funding structure of banks because wholesale funding 
reliance turned out to be more vulnerable during the crisis (Huang and Ratnovski, 2011). To 
this end, we include core capital and retail deposits, both scaled by total assets. We also 
include securitized liabilities relative to total assets as a proxy for the need for collateral. 
These liabilities may contain both funding obtained at the secured interbank market as well as 
from central bank operations. Bank profitability is measured by return on equity and by 
banks’ cost-to-income ratios. The impact on bank risk is ambiguous. More profitable and 
efficient banks should retain higher capital buffers and be better able to buffer shocks. 
Alternatively, higher profitability may also imply that banks search for yield and are willing 
to take on higher risks. We account for difference in the income structure across banks by 
including fee over interest income.  
  
Chapter 1: Banks’ government bond holdings and bank risk 
25 
1.3 Determinants of banks’ government bond holdings 
In this section we adress which factors determine banks’ investments in government bonds. 
The associated implications for bank risk are the subject of Section 1.4. 
1.3.1 Empirical Methodology 
We model the decision whether to invest in government bonds and which volume of bonds 
to hold using a Heckman (1979) selection model. First, we model whether a bank i holds 
government bonds of country j in period q (extensive margin, EXP). Second, we explain the 
size of exposures in terms of the Euro volume of government bonds (intensive margin, SOV). 
We specify a selection equation (1) and an outcome equation (2): 
Pr	 = 1 = Φ( +  + 	 + 	
′ + 	
′ )   (1) 
	 =  +  + 	 + 	
′ + 	
′ +  + 	  (2) 
In the selection equation (1), EXPijq is an indicator variable equal to 1 if bank i (1,970 
banks) holds government bonds of a specific country j (29 countries) in time period q 
(quarterly data from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013) and 0 otherwise. The estimation sample comprises 
1,632,540 bank-quarter-country observations. Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution 
function, Xiq-4 are bank-specific, and Xjq are country-specific control variables. We include 
dummies for banking groups, quarter, and country (α1g, α1j, α1t) in equation (1). In the 
outcome equation (2), we include fixed effects for bank, quarter, and country. We specify 
banking group instead of bank dummies in the selection equation (1) to avoid the incidental 
parameters problem in Probit estimations. Bank-specific variables are lagged by four quarters 
to alleviate simultaneity concerns. Country-specific variables enter the equations 
contemporaneously.  
Identification would ideally hinge on a variable that represents a valid exclusion 
restriction, i.e. variables W that correlate only with the likelihood of bond holdings in a given 
country in a given quarter, but not the volume of such an exposure. Because there are neither 
quantitative restrictions on specific government bond exposures nor changes in central bank 
eligibility for our sample and as existing regulations may affect both the extensive and the 
intensive margin, we cannot specify such variables W. Therefore, the model is identified 
based on functional form and on differences in the set of dummies as explained above. Based 
on the predicted likelihood of observing an exposure of bank i in country j at time q, we then 
calculate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). Together with the same bank-specific and country-
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specific control variables (Xiq and Xjq), the IMR is specified in the outcome equation (2) to 
explain differences across banks’ observed government debt exposure levels (SOV). The 
coefficient η indicates if self-selection bias of banks into holding government bonds is 
significant. 
1.3.2 Main results 
Column 1 of Table 1.3 shows the results for the intensive margin (i.e. outcome equation) of 
the Heckman model on the determinants of banks’ government bond holdings. Column 2 
shows the results for the extensive margin (i.e. selection equation). Column 3 provides 
marginal effects for the extensive margin. This model explains government bond holdings of 
German banks well. The adjusted R² of the outcome equation is 0.75. Even without bank, 
time, and country fixed effects, the adjusted R² still equals 0.55 (unreported). 
Consider first the importance to account explicitly for systematic selection by banks 
whether to hold bonds issued by a certain country in a given quarter. The inverse Mills ratio 
in column 1 is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the choice whether to invest in a 
particular market also affects the decision on the volume of investment. Our results based on 
this comprehensive sample comprising all German banks underpin the importance to analyse 
not only selected groups of systemically relevant banks, such as in the EBA stress tests, but to 
account for the non-random determinants of government holdings when assessing the 
implications for bank risk. 
1.3.2.1 Country-level determinants 
For the entire sample, virtually all country-level covariates exhibit a statistically significant 
impact on government bond holdings, both for the extensive and the intensive margin. 
With respect to macro covariates capturing expected return and risk, we find that banks 
hold more government debt from countries with high inflation, high government debt-to-GDP 
ratios and low bond yields, which contrasts expectations. Below we show that these aggregate 
effects are hiding important differences between pre- and post crisis periods. After the 
outbreak of the government debt crisis German banks hold more bonds of lowly indebted 
sovereigns, which pay a low yield. Hence, we do not observe a “search for yield” of German 
banks in government bond markets. Instead, the increasing sovereign risk that came with 
higher bond yields seems to have dominated the return effect. Due to multicollinearity we are 
not able to jointly include bond returns and CDS spreads in the regression. As a robustness 
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check, we replace returns with sovereign CDS spreads or ratings. The negative coefficient on 
risk remained unchanged and results are shown in Table 1.11 in the appendix. 
Banks withdraw from countries that are covered by an IMF program. In unreported tests, 
we check whether banks hold relevant exposures to these countries to begin with. German 
banks held 6-13% of total government exposure towards debt of IMF program countries prior 
to the start of the average program. In the quarter following the announcement of an IMF 
program, all banking groups reduce their exposures. Mortgage banks exhibit the most 
significant decline, namely by 22% of their exposure prior to the announcement.   
In addition to these macro variables, we also find a positive home (i.e. Germany) and Euro 
Area effect (Table 1.3). In order to capture time invariant country characteristics, we include a 
set of country dummies (not reported), defining Austria as the baseline category. The average 
volume of bonds in German banks’ government portfolios increases by 118% if it is the 
domestic country relative to the baseline country. Most other country dummies are 
significantly negative or smaller than the Germany dummy with a few exceptions for small 
and comparatively risky countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Slovenia, Slovak 
Republic).  
We also find a positive effect for Euro Area membership. The time variation in the Euro 
Area dummy variable is driven by accessions to the Euro Area during our estimation sample 
(Slovenia, Slovak Republic). The positive Euro Area effect may reflect the absence of 
exchange rate risk, the preferential regulatory treatment of government Euro Area bonds or 
eligibility for ECB refinancing.  
To interpret the size of the parameters in the selection equation, we calculate average 
marginal effects from the Probit model in column 3, Table 1.3. Inflation, country size, and 
membership in the Euro Area affect the probability of government bond holdings the most.  
Regarding the outcome equation, Euro Area membership, the government debt ratio and 
government bond yields are the determinants with the largest economic impact. We assess 
economic magnitudes by calculating the percentage increase in government bond holdings for 
an increase in the macroeconomic variable from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of its 
distribution. The average holding of government bonds (per bank and country) is 100 million 
Euros (see Table 1.2). For example, bond holdings of the average German bank is 22 percent 
or 22 mn € higher if the debt ratio of the sovereign is at the 75th percentile compared to the 
25th percentile. Similarly, an increase in GDP, CPI inflation and government bonds yields 
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the distribution would lead to a 4.4%, a 4.8% 
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and a -22.8% change in bond holdings by the average bank. The Euro Area membership is the 
most important indicator with an increase of roughly 200% in bond holdings, if a country 
joins the Euro Area. 
1.3.2.2 Bank-level determinants 
Correlations of proxies for business models of German banks and banks’ investments into 
government bonds are shown in the lower panel of Table 1.3. Results for the selection 
equation show that larger, less well capitalized banks, banks with larger securities portfolio, 
and banks with a low share of customer loans are more likely to hold government debt. The 
results for the outcome equation confirm these findings. The results are in line with Acharya 
and Steffen (2015), who find that larger banks and banks with lower capital ratios invest more 
in government bonds. The negative impact of the capital ratio could reflect a risk effect: banks 
with low capital buffers may invest more in safe assets.  
We find that banks with a larger share of liquid assets (i.e. cash and overnight interbank 
loans) are also more likely to invest in government bonds. This indicates that government 
bonds are not used as a substitute for other liquid assets but rather as an additional source of 
liquidity. The share of retail deposits does not affect the likelihood to invest in government 
bonds significantly, but it correlates positively with the volume of government bonds held. 
Furthermore, government bonds are an important source of collateral to obtain interbank 
funding. Thus, government bonds play a more important role for banks with a large share of 
securitized funding. 
We also assess the economic effects of these findings. The security portfolio to total assets 
is the most important variable. An increase by one standard deviation in the share of the 
security portfolio results in an increase of average government bond holdings by 60% or 60 
million Euros per bank and sovereign. An increase by one standard deviation in the 
securitized liabilities ratio and the core capital ratio results in an increase of 38% and a 
decrease of 8% respectively. 
1.3.3 Are determinants of bond holdings stable over time? 
So far, we assumed that the determinants of banks’ investments into government bonds 
remained unchanged over time. But during the crisis, perceptions of sovereign default have 
changed markedly, low interest rates induced a search for yield, and banks needed collateral 
to cushion liquidity shocks. 
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Table 1.4 shows three separate time periods: the pre-Lehman period (Q4:2005-Q2:2008), 
the period since then until the outbreak of the Euro Area sovereign crisis (Q3:2008-Q1:2010), 
and the period of the sovereign crisis (Q2:2010-Q3:2013). The impact of macroeconomic 
factors varies substantially over time, whereas the impact of bank characteristics remains 
rather stable. 
Prior to the financial crisis, macroeconomic factors had virtually no impact on banks’ 
government bond investments. Results reported in Table 1.3 for the full sample are thus 
largely driven by the period after 2008, which provide evidence of active restructuring of 
banks’ government debt portfolios. This result is in line with previous literature on the 
determinants of government bond spreads for the Euro Area countries, which attributes little 
explanatory power to macroeconomic factors before the crisis but considerable responses 
during the crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012).  
The impact of macro factors on German banks’ government bond holdings has changed in 
three significant ways. 
First, German banks became more risk averse in government debt markets with the start of 
the financial crisis. After Q3:2008 and until the outbreak of the European government debt 
crisis German banks hold less bonds of high inflation countries which take part in an IMF 
program. These effects reverse afterwards. While the government debt ratio is insignificant up 
until the outbreak of the government debt crisis, German banks strongly withdraw from 
highly indebted sovereigns since then. In line with expectations, high debt levels seem to 
serve as a signal of higher risk since Q2:2010. Below, we will show that (predicted) holdings 
of government debt in risky categories correlate positively with bank risk since the outbreak 
of the sovereign crisis.  
Second, high government yields increased the probability of holding a government bond in 
the financial crisis period, possibly reflecting a search for yield, coupled with regulatory 
incentives (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). This effect is mainly driven by cooperative and 
savings banks (Table 1.5). Since Q2:2010, all German banks have avoided high-yield 
government bonds potentially due to adapted expectations about sovereign default 
probabilities.  
Third, while Euro Area membership increased the government bond holdings of German 
banks before the European debt crisis, it becomes insignificant afterwards. Instead, the 
Germany dummy (home effect) becomes positively significant. A flight home effect has been 
observed in a wide range of European countries (EBA, 2015).  
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In sum, banks responded quite differently to macroeconomic factors before and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. Before that event, banks did not differentiate much between 
government debt on grounds of macro fundamentals. These factors became relevant 
afterwards, and much of the adjustment is in line with expectations as banks became more 
sensitive to underlying risk factors. Bank-level determinants of banks’ investments into 
government bonds, in contrast, have remained much more stable over time. 
1.3.4 Do banks’ business models matter?  
Next, we investigate differences within the four banking groups to account more explicitly 
for the heterogeneous business models. Our results from pooled regressions are not primarily 
driven by differences in business models between banking groups, but rather mirror 
differences in business models within banking groups.  
While the effect of macroeconomic factors varies over time, it remains rather similar 
between different banking groups. One exceptions are mortgage banks, which have the largest 
government bond exposures but are not much affected by macro factors except yields and 
inflation. Instead, investments by mortgage banks depend mostly on bank-specific factors.  
With respect to bank-level variables, two factors exert identical effects across banking 
groups: larger banks and banks with larger shares of security portfolios hold more government 
debt. The effects of other bank-level variables differ across banking groups. 
First, the result that weakly capitalized banks hold more government bonds is primarily 
driven by savings banks and mortgage banks. Capitalization does not play a role for 
cooperative banks, and it has an opposite effect for commercial banks since the government 
debt crisis. 
Second, the specialized mortgage banks and their predominant role in the covered bond 
segment do not drive the positive effect of securitization activity on bond holdings. In fact, 
privately owned universal banks, i.e. commercial and cooperative banks, drive this result, in 
particular after the outbreak of the government debt crisis. 
Third, for savings and cooperative banks, the effects of bank-level variables are rather 
stable over time. For commercial and mortgage banks, in contrast, signs and significant levels 
of bank-level variables change with the outbreak of the sovereign crisis, indicating that the 
turmoil of the government debt crisis affected the business models of these banks the most. 
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1.3.5 Robustness tests  
We test the robustness of our results from the Heckman model in several ways and show 
results in the appendix to this chapter. Overall, our main results regarding the impact of 
country and bank variables on banks’ government bond holdings remain robust. 
We use different measures for sovereign risk, the average country rating of Moody’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch and 5 year CDS spreads (Table 1.11). In Table 1.12 we 
constrain our sample to foreign government bonds in order to ensure that German bonds are 
not dominating the aggregate findings. In Table 1.13, we restrict our sample to bonds issued 
by the central government as opposed to the general government. While the overall results 
concerning the macroeconomic and risk factors remain very stable, the home effect reverses. 
German banks hold 90% of their domestic government bond exposure towards regional states 
and not the central government (as of Q3:2013). Excluding the regional states from the 
analysis therefore yields a negative Germany dummy. Chapter 2 investigates the incentives of 
German banks to hold state government bonds in greater detail.  
Furthermore, the results (not reported for the sake of brevity) are robust against different 
specifications and data cleaning approaches such as using the one year lags of macroeconomic 
and bank variables, using bankgroup instead of bank fixed effects in the outcome equation, 
winsorizing all covariates at the 1% and 99% quantiles and using notional instead of market 
values of banks’ government bond holdings. 
1.4 Do government debt exposures affect bank risk? 
1.4.1 Empirical Methodology 
Our second main research question is how banks’ government bond holdings affect bank 
risk. To this end, we estimate a fixed effects model for a panel of 1,612 banks for which we 
obtained annual micro-prudential supervisory financial accounts data between 2005 and 2012. 
Only banks that hold government bonds are included. Our main measure of bank risk is the z-
score, which is defined in the data appendix 1.A, and we estimate: 
 !"#$ =	 + $ + $ + &'($ + $,   (3) 
where αi and αt are bank- and year-fixed effects, Xit-1 is a vector of bank-level controls 
lagged by one year to avoid simultaneous correlation by construction, and  is a vector 
of predicted values of banks’ government bond exposures relative to total assets. We use 
clustered standard errors at the bank level.  
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We aggregate predicted government bond positions within three risk categories, thereby 
eliminating the country dimension from our data: all bond holdings of sovereigns rated AAA 
represent low risk government bond holdings. Bonds rated AA or A are intermediate risk 
holdings, and sovereigns rated BBB or worse fall into the high-risk category. The rating is an 
average rating of Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. We then take end-of-year values 
for the government bond holdings. Table 1.6 tabulates the sovereigns by risk category. Note 
that some countries “migrate” across categories over time. As we observe stocks of 
outstanding government debt rather than flows, changes in holdings of high-risk debt might 
thus be the result of a re-classification of some countries’ debt. 
Government bond exposures are scaled by total assets of banks to capture the relative 
exposure towards sovereign risk. This sample comprises 7,708 bank-year observations and 
summary statistics are very much in line with the bank-country-quarter sample shown in 
Table 1.2. 
The parameter of interest in equation (3) is β2, which indicates whether and to what extent 
government debt holdings influence bank risk.  
We use predicted rather than observed government bond holdings for two main reasons. 
First, conditional government bond holdings from the Heckman estimation account for the 
selection bias because banks systematically choose whether and which bonds to hold. Second, 
using predicted government bond holdings mitigates concerns arising from possible reverse 
causality. The risk appetite of banks, born out for example by different business models, may 
affect government bond holdings. Government bond exposures, in turn, are correlated with 
observable risk traits that are part of the risk measure. The use of predicted, aggregated 
exposures is thus in the spirit of an instrumental variable approach, with country specific 
macro factors Xjt being excluded in the second stage regressions on bank risk. In both stages, 
when explaining government debt holdings and bank risk, we use CAMEL covariates to 
control for the risk (appetite) of a bank.  
Because the dimensions of the selection model (bank-country-quarter) differ from those of 
the bank risk sample (bank-year), we cannot apply the conventional tests for the adequacy of 
“instruments”. But we conduct some plausibility tests. Country covariates predict the 
intensive margin SOV accurately and according F-tests for joint insignificance are rejected at 
the 1% significance level. A regression with country covariates only still yields a high 
adjusted R² of 0.341. At the same time, macro covariates should be uncorrelated with 
realizations of bank risk, that is country-specific factors should be orthogonal to the individual 
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German bank. This seems plausible, given that even banks with large foreign exposures only 
hold small fractions of individual issuer countries debt. Therefore, a shock in one particular 
issuer country should be fairly uncorrelated with banks’ realizations of risk on average.  
To test this, we use each bank’s bond portfolio share towards issuer country j in quarter q 
to generate exposure-weighted macro covariates per bank and year. With the exception of 
IMF measures, all of these variables are not significantly correlated with the z-score, our 
measure of risk. Correlations are weakly significant at the 10% level when using observed 
portfolio rather than predicted portfolio shares, but very small regarding magnitudes and, as 
argued above, possibly contaminated with neglected selection bias. Therefore, we use 
predicted government bond shares in the three risk-categories to analyse the relationship with 
bank risk.  
1.4.2 Measuring bank risk  
We measure bank risk using the banks’ z-score (Laeven and Levine, 2009), which is 
defined as the return on assets plus equity over assets, divided by the standard deviation of 
return on assets:  
  
where  is the capital-asset ratio, RoA denotes return on assets, and  denotes the 
standard deviation of RoA. Z-scores measure the extent to which bank equity is sufficient to 
cover losses. A higher z-score reflects a higher distance to default and thus lower risk. Given 
the definition of z-scores, we do not specify capitalization and profitability as explanatory 
variables. 
To obtain a bank-time specific measure for volatility of RoA, we regress RoA on bank and 
time fixed effects. The residuals of this regression give the volatility of RoA of bank i in year t 
that cannot be explained by bank or time common effects. The residuals are winsorized and 
taken in absolute terms as measure for . This methodology is in the spirit of Loutskina 
and Strahan (2015) who applied it to house price changes. As a robustness check, the standard 
deviation of RoA is calculated using a rolling window of seven years and results are very 
similar. We winsorize the z-scores at the 0.1% level to account for outliers. 
The use of z-scores as a measure of risk has the advantage that it is based on prudential 
supervisory data and therefore available for all banks, listed as well as non-listed ones. An 
important disadvantage is the backward looking nature of this measure, which is typical for 
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accounting-based risk measures. Therefore, we specify in addition two alternative measures of 
risk, the log of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads of each bank and an indicator equal to one 
if a bank was ranked in the top decile of distribution of non-performing loans (NPL) relative 
to total loans in a given year.8 We choose such a discrete indicator instead of continuously 
measured NPL shares because the definition of NPL changed during our sample period, 
giving rise to statistical breaks in the level of NPL (Koetter, 2013).  
Our main measure of bank risk, the z-score, varies across banking groups and over time 
(Table 1.8, Panel A). Commercial banks and mortgage banks are, on average, the most risky 
banking group. However, the standard deviation, and thus the heterogeneity of our risk 
indicator, is also highest within the group of commercial banks. Savings and cooperative 
banks are less risky and much more homogenous regarding their risk profile. Our alternative 
risk measures, the NPL indicator and CDS spreads confirm these trends (Table 1.8, Panel B 
and C). CDS spreads increased steadily from 2005 until 2012, but started to decline in 2013 
(not reported). 
1.4.3 Main results 
Table 1.9 presents the results for the risk equation using the (log) z-score as the dependent 
variable. Results are reported for the entire sample period in Panel A and seperately for the 
periods before the European sovereign crisis (Panel B) and since the sovereign crisis (Panel 
C). In addition to the results for the entire German banking system (Column 1), we estimate 
bank risk separately for commercial banks (Column 2), savings banks (Column 3) and 
cooperative banks (Column 4). Due to small sample size, we cannot analyse mortgage banks 
separately. 
Parameters on bank control variables are estminated but not reported for the sake of 
brevity. A full set of results for the full sample can be found in Table 1.14 in the appendix to 
this chapter. In this chapter, we focus on our main variables of interest, the predicted volumes 
of government bonds per risk category relative to total assets. For the entire sample period 
and the entire German banking system (Column 1 in Panel A of Table 1.9), we find no 
evidence of a statically significant relationship. But when we split our sample along the 
banking group and time dimensions, two important qualifications are noteworthy.  
                                                 
8
  Note that we define deciles on the basis of the entire population of banks, i.e. including those without sovereign 
exposures or missing data that precluded certain observations from the estimation sample. 
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First, the group of commercial banks is particularly affected by sovereign risk. After 2010, 
a larger share of intermediate-risk and especially high-risk government debt has a statistically 
and economically significant impact on the risk of commercial banks (Column 2 in Panel C of 
Table 1.9). For instance, the z-score of commercial banks decreases in the sovereign crisis 
period by 7.43% if the ratio of high government debt holdings to total assets increases by one 
standard deviation. Intuitively, losses on government bond portfolios did not affect German 
commercial banks before the government debt crisis, possibly in part because of the 
widespread absence of marking to market at the onset of the crisis and the preferential 
treatment of government debt in central bank operations and capital regulation.The risk of 
cooperative and savings banks, in contrast, is not affected by high-risk government bond 
holdings, possibly due to their low holdings of these bonds (Figure 1.2). 
Second, holdings of low-risk government bonds are associated with lower bank risk, i.e. a 
higher z-score, for savings and coopaertive banks in the entire sample period (Panel A of 
Table 1.9). This finding is consistent with the notion that safe government bonds serve as a 
liquidity buffer. It reflects the investment of German regional banks in German and other safe 
government bonds. 
The results (not reported) remain robust against an alternative aggregation method for the 
government bond holdings by taking the mean instead of the end-of-year values of a bank’s 
government bond holdings in each year and against winsorizing all covariates.  
1.4.4 Market- and credit-based measures of risk 
Our baseline measure for bank risk, the z-score, reflects only realized risks since it is 
accounting based. To address this concern, we change the measures of risk entirely and show 
the results in Table 1.10.  
First, we show in Panel A of Table 1.10 results of Probit regressions explaining the 
likelihood that a bank has non-performing loans in the highest decile in a given year. For the 
entire sample period, the effect of predicted government debt shares is qualitatively identical 
to those reported before. Low risk government bonds reduces bank risk whereas high-risk 
government bond holdings increases bank risk as measured by NPL ratios. 
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Second, we show in Panel B of Table 1.10 parsimonious regressions that explain the log of 
bank CDS spreads.9 This sample is smaller because CDS are available for only 24 German 
banks. The effect of predicted government bond holdings is reinforced. Over the entire sample 
period, larger predicted shares of low-risk government bonds reduced CDS spreads of banks 
whereas larger predicted shares of high-risk government bonds increased those spreads. The 
coefficient on high-risk government bonds is around 70 times larger compared to the 
coefficient on low-risk government bonds. Results show that market participants considered 
higher bank risk associated with larger shares of risky government bonds already before the 
outbreak of the government debt crisis. 
In sum, we confirm our main results that larger shares of risky government debt increase 
bank risk and larger shares of low risk government debt decrease bank risk for both, CDS as a 
market-based, forward looking measure of risk as well as the NPL indicator as a measure of 
relative credit risk.  
1.5 Conclusion 
The European sovereign debt crisis highlights the need to understand the determinants of 
banks’ government bond holdings and the impact of these exposures on bank risk. This 
chapter complements prior studies, which are mostly confined to a subset of large European 
banks and the period since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis. Our granular 
data allow studying the government bond holdings for all German banks during the pre-crisis, 
the financial crisis, and the European government debt crisis periods. The German case is of 
interest because it allows analyzing the investment behavior of banks outside the countries hit 
by the European government debt crisis.  
Our empirical approach takes the self-selection of banks whether, which, and how much 
government debt to hold explicitly into account. We then estimate the effects of predicted 
government bond holdings on German banks’ risks. Three main findings emerge.  
First, only about two thirds of all German banks invest in government bonds. The volume 
of bonds and the degree of diversification of government bond portfolios differ across 
banking groups. Larger, weakly capitalized (and in this sense riskier) banks, and banks that 
are more active on capital markets hold more government bonds. Bank-level determinants of 
                                                 
9
  Data on CDS spreads are available until Q4:2013 and we extend the regression sample period accordingly. 
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government exposures change over time, especially for German commercial and mortgage 
banks. 
Second, before the financial crisis, banks did not differentiate much between countries 
based on macroeconomic factors. Afterwards, German banks have restructured their 
government bond portfolios according to macroeconomic fundamentals. With the outbreak of 
the government debt crisis in 2010, German banks have decreased bond holdings from 
countries with high levels of government debt over GDP and high yields. 
Third, predicted holdings of government bonds affected the risk of German banks. We use 
three measures of risk, the z-score, CDS spreads, and non-performing loans, and find that 
larger holdings of low risk government bonds decrease risk of cooperative and savings banks 
during the entire sample period. Larger exposures to risky government debt however increase 
the riskiness of German commercial banks after the outbreak of the government debt crisis. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
1.A Data 
Data definitions and sources 
Government bond portfolios 
Exposure to government bonds EXP: this is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the 
bank i holds government bonds of country j in quarter t and zero otherwise. The information 
is based on the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Predicted volume of risk government bonds: this variable is used as a regressor in the 
equations explaining bank risk (Tables 1.10, 1.11, 1.14). It is the predicted value of banks’ 
investment in government bonds from the model for the intensive margin in Table 1.3. The 
data are aggregated at the bank level and measured relative to total assets. Government bond 
holdings are categorized into low, intermediate, and high-risk bonds according to the country 
classifications in Table 1.6. The risk measure is based on the average of the ratings by 
Moody's, Fitch and Standard and Poor's. Low risk is defined as AAA, intermediate risk is 
defined as AA and A, and high risk as BBB or worse. 
Government bond Holdings SOV: market value of a bank’s government bond holdings of 
country j in quarter t. Data are obtained from the Securities Holdings Statistics of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. Individual security data are aggregated to the issuer country level by 
summing up over all ISINs per country, bank and quarter. Issuers at all levels of the 
government - central, federal and municipal - are included. Only government bonds held on 
banks’ own accounts are included, covering both the banking book and the trading book.  
 
Bank-level variables 
Cash & overnight / total assets: ratio of cash and overnight interbank loans to total assets 
obtained from the annual financial statements submitted by banks to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This variable gauges the liquid assets of a bank, excluding government bonds.  
CDS spread: average quarterly quoted CDS spread on a bond with five-year maturity for 
senior unsecured debt with the complete restructuring clause and denominated in euro. The 
data are obtained from the data provider MarkIT. 
Core capital ratio: ratio of equity capital minus deficit to total assets obtained from the annual 
financial statements submitted by banks to the Deutsche Bundesbank. This variable reflects 
the risk-bearing capacity of banks. 
Cost-to-income ratio: ratio of total operating costs to total operating revenue obtained from 
the annual profit and loss statements of banks submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Customer loans / total loans: ratio of claims on customers to the sum of claims on customers 
and on banks obtained from the annual financial statements submitted by banks to the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. This variable reflects the degree of retail orientation of a bank. 
Fee income / interest income: ratio of net fee income over net interest income. Net interest 
income equals the difference between the interest income and expenses obtained from the 
annual profit and loss statements of banks submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
NPL ratio: the NPL ratio is an indicator equal to one if the bank belongs to the highest decile 
of non performing loans to total loans in a given year. Using such a relative measure avoids 
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contamination by statistical breaks in prudential definitions of NPL over time and are 
obtained from the annual financial statements submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Retail deposits / total assets: ratio of overnight deposits from household and non-financial 
firms to total assets obtained from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.  
Return on equity: ratio of total revenue to equity capital obtained from the annual financial 
reports and the annual profit and loss statements of the Deutsche Bundesbank.  
Securitized liabilities / total assets: ratio of securitized liabilities to total assets. Securitized 
liabilities include covered bonds, money market papers, and other securitized liabilities. 
Information is taken from the annual financial statements submitted by banks to the Deutsche 
Bundesbank.   
Security portfolio / total assets: ratio of bonds and stocks portfolio to total assets obtained 
from the annual financial statements submitted by banks to the Deutsche Bundesbank. This 
variable reflects the importance of securities trading in the business model of banks. 
Total assets: log of total assets of the bank. Data are taken from the Monthly Balance Sheet 
Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It is a measure for bank size. 
Z-score: z-score, defined as (return on assets plus capital over assets) divided by the volatility 
of return on assets. In order to obtain a bank-time specific measure for volatility of RoA, we 
regress RoA on bank and time fixed effects. The residuals of this regression give the volatility 
of RoA of bank i in year t that cannot be explained by bank or time common effects. The 
residuals are winsorized and taken in absolute terms as measure for . The z-score is a 
measure of the distance to insolvency of a bank and thus an inverse measure for bank risk. A 
higher z-score indicates less risk. The z-score is winsorized at the 0.1% and 99.9% level to 
account for outliers. The data are obtained from the annual financial reports and the annual 
profit and loss statements that banks submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 
  
σRoA
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Country-level variables 
CPI inflation: inflation is measured through the consumer price index (CPI). All items are 
included in the consumer price index and the change against the same quarter of the previous 
year is calculated in %. The quarterly time series is obtained from the OECD database. 
Euro Area bond: dummy variable which is equal to one if the country is a member of the Euro 
Area in the respective quarter and zero otherwise. This variable might capture preferential 
regulatory treatment of Euro Area government bonds as well as the absence of exchange rate 
risk. 
GDP: log of a country’s GDP. Data are in constant prices as of the year 2005 and are 
seasonally adjusted. The quarterly time series has been extracted from the OECD database. 
IMF measures: these data are obtained from the homepage of the IMF and include Extended 
Fund Facilities, Extended Arrangements, and Stand-by-Arrangements. We include a dummy 
variable which is equal to one from the time an IMF program has been started, i.e. for Greece 
(from Q2:2010), Hungary (from Q2:2008), Ireland (Q4:2010), Mexico (Q2:2008), Poland 
(Q1:2013) and Portugal (Q2:2011). 
Government bond yield: we take the average yield on 10-year government bonds (in %) 
obtained from MarkIT.  
Government debt ratio: percentage ratio of central government debt to GDP. The ratio is 
drawn from the OECD database and in quarterly frequency. 
 
List of 29 included issuer countries 
Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark 
(DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE),Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), 
Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Luxembourg (LU), Mexico (MX), 
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovak Republic (SK), 
Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH),United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US). 
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1.B Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1: Participation rates in the government bond markets by banking groups 
This Figure shows the percentage share of banks (within each banking group) which hold a government bond 
portfolio on their own accounts in the respective quarter. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the decreasing 
trend for cooperative and savings banks reverses. With the outbreak of the European sovereign crisis in 2010, 
the share of commercial banks engaged in government bond markets rises as well. Source: Securities Holdings 
Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations. 
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Figure 1.2: Share of government bonds in balance sheets of banks 
This Figure gives the average share of government bond holdings in total assets (in %) for each banking group. 
Government bond holdings are decomposed by issuer, i.e. German government bonds, government bonds 
issued by Euro Area periphery countries (GR, IT, IE, PT, ES), the remaining Euro Area and the rest of the 
world. Source: Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations. 
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Figure 1.3: Government bond holdings of all German banks 2005-2013 
This Figure plots data aggregated over all banks located in Germany. The scale of the vertical axis varies 
to highlight changes in sovereign risk exposures. The first vertical line marks the insolveny of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008 Q3, the second line the Greek rescue packages in 2010 Q2. Source: 
Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank; own calculations. 
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Table 1.1: Importance of the security portfolio in the balance sheet of German banks 
This Table shows in column 1 the number of banks in each banking group. Column 2 displays the mean total assets of each 
bank. Column 3 displays aggregate assets per banking group. Column 4 displays aggregate securities (including shares, 
bonds, etc). Column 5 shows aggregate government bonds held in the banking or in the market book. Column 6 shows the 
percentage share of the overall securities portfolio (weighted average) and column 6 the share of all government bonds in 
total assets (weighted average). The banking group savings banks comprises savings banks and Landesbanken. The banking 
group cooperative banks include cooperative banks and their head institutions. The row “all banks” comprises the aggregate 
German banking system. Data are for the third quarter of 2013. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Number 
of banks 
Average 
size 
Aggregate 
total 
assets 
Securities Government bonds Securities 
Government 
bonds 
  
  (billion €) (billion €) (billion €) (billion €) (% of total 
assets) 
(% of total 
assets) 
Commercial banks 167 15.97 2667.79 289.95 92.78 10.87 3.48 
Savings Banks 431 5.27 2270.88 486.43 116.89 21.42 5.15 
Cooperative banks 1093 0.95 1034.22 244.64 36.61 23.65 3.54 
Mortgage banks 18 26.18 471.29 129.34 60.74 27.44 12.89 
All banks 1709 3.77 6444.18 1150.36 307.03 17.85 4.76 
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for Heckman model estimations 
This Table shows in Panel A descriptive statistics for complete observations of macro variables in the selection and the 
outcome equations. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics for bank variables. All variables are defined in the data appendix 
1.A to this chapter. The sample covers the period from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. We 
include the 25th and 75th percentile of variables for the outcome equation in order to better assess the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients in the outcome equation.  
  
Selection equation Outcome equation 
1,632,540 83,698 
  Mean Stdv Mean  Stdv p25 p75 
Panel A: Country-specific variables 
Holding government bonds (0/1) 0.051 0.221 
    
Volume of government bonds (€ bn) 
  
0.1 0.65 0.002 0.02 
Ln GDP 0.56 1.92 0.31 1.76 -1.05 1.12 
Government debt ratio 0.59 0.36 0.62 0.27 0.41 0.71 
CPI inflation 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Government bond yield 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 
IMF measures (0/1) 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 
  
Euro Area bond (0/1) 0.47 0.5 0.77 0.42 
  
Panel B: Bank-specific variables 
Ln total assets 13.09 1.55 14.33 2.23 12.78 15.21 
Cash & overnight / total assets   0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Customer loans / total loans   0.8 0.16 0.77 0.17 0.7 0.89 
Security portfolio / total assets 0.23 0.12 0.28 0.12 0.19 0.35 
Core capital ratio   0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 
Retail deposits / total assets   0.24 0.48 0.22 0.56 0.14 0.29 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.13 0 0.07 
Return on equity   0.04 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.05 
Cost-to-income ratio   0.97 0.18 0.84 0.19 0.78 0.88 
Fee income / interest income   0.47 4.64 0.36 2.88 0.2 0.32 
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Table 1.3: Heckman model for extensive and intensive margin 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a 
Heckman model. The log of bank i’s government bond holdings of country j is the dependent variable in the outcome 
equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of country j is the dependent variable in the 
selection equation. Fixed effects for banking group, time and country are specified in the selection equation. In the outcome 
equation, fixed effects for bank, time and country are included. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive 
margin and corrects for self-selection. The sample covers the period from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013. Marginal effects are 
calculated for the extensive margin. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Standard errors are 
shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Intensive margin Extensive margin Marginal effects 
(Selection) 
  (Outcome) (Selection) 
Ln GDP 2.046*** 0.674*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.273) (0.072) (0.002) 
Government debt ratio 0.736*** 0.304*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.117) (0.030) (0.001) 
CPI inflation 4.776*** 1.710*** 0.045*** 
 
(0.789) (0.211) (0.006) 
Government bond yield  -11.390*** -0.025 0.001 
 
(0.612) (0.162) (0.004) 
IMF measures -0.350*** -0.166*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.042) (0.011) (0.000) 
Home bond 1.180** 0.450*** 0.011** 
 
(0.059) (0.158) (0.004) 
Euro Area bond 1.980*** 0.506*** 0.014*** 
  (0.1677) (0.0602) (0.001) 
Ln total assets 0.787*** 0.164*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.050) (0.002) (0.000) 
Cash & overnight / total assets 0.101 0.125** 0.003** 
 
(0.322) (0.049) (0.001) 
Customer loans / total loans 0.093 -0.086*** -0.003*** 
(0.138) (0.017) (0.000) 
Security portfolio / total assets 4.968*** 1.897*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.191) (0.018) (0.001) 
Core capital / total assets -2.670*** -1.019*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.646) (0.079) (0.002) 
Retail deposits / total assets 0.042** -0.000 0.000*** 
 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.000) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 2.900*** 1.040*** 0.028*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return on equity 0.163** 0.035* 0.001** 
 
(0.074) (0.020) (0.001) 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.042 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.060) (0.002) (0.000) 
Fee over interest income -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.000*** 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) 
Number of observations 83,698 1,632,540 1,632,540 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 3.106 
  
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0874 
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Table 1.4: Heckman model by time period 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a 
Heckman model and splitting the sample into the pre-Lehman (Q4:2005 to Q2:2008), the post-Lehman, pre-Sovereign Crisis 
period (Q3:2008 to Q1:2010) and the since sovereign crisis period (Q2:2010 – Q3:2013). The log of bank i’s government 
bond holdings of country j is the dependent variable in the outcome equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that 
bank i holds bonds of country j is the dependent variable in the selection equation. Fixed effects for banking group, time and 
country are specified in the selection equation. In the outcome equation, fixed effects for bank, time and country are included. 
The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self selection. The sample covers the 
period from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Before Lehman Post Lehman pre 
sovereign Since sovereign crisis 
 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
      Ln GDP 1.487** 0.920*** 3.191*** 1.231*** 0.384 -0.066 
 
(0.725) (0.276) (1.160) (0.350) (0.854) (0.209) 
Government debt ratio 1.252** 0.271 -0.795 0.001 -2.118*** -0.703*** 
 
(0.573) (0.219) (0.527) (0.160) (0.294) (0.072) 
CPI inflation 0.876 0.744 -11.721*** -3.253*** 14.768*** 3.678*** 
 
(1.292) (0.501) (1.973) (0.566) (1.829) (0.441) 
Government bond yield  -0.222 0.126 5.589 4.224*** -18.181*** -2.384*** 
 
(4.333) (1.675) (4.220) (1.282) (1.204) (0.285) 
IMF measures 
  
-0.770*** -0.346*** 0.353*** 0.100*** 
   
(0.135) (0.038) (0.070) (0.018) 
Home bond 1.845 0.158 -1.767 -0.811 4.518** 1.806*** 
 
(1.580) (0.603) (2.499) (0.762) (1.884) (0.459) 
Euro Area bond 0.974*** 0.082 0.824*** 0.286*** 3.642 0.964 
  (0.165) (0.060) (0.253) (0.072) (3.264) (0.799) 
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Ln total assets 0.391*** 0.196*** 0.682*** 0.180*** 0.544*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.095) (0.004) (0.181) (0.005) (0.129) (0.003) 
Cash & overnight / total 
assets 
1.459** 0.510*** -1.102 0.295** -0.520 -0.008 
(0.590) (0.094) (1.361) (0.121) (0.583) (0.069) 
Customer loans / total loans 0.141 0.187*** -1.430** -0.149*** -0.368 -0.201*** 
(0.312) (0.036) (0.658) (0.040) (0.331) (0.024) 
Security portfolio / total 
assets 
4.872*** 2.040*** 4.274*** 1.885*** 4.690*** 1.795*** 
(0.420) (0.035) (0.871) (0.043) (0.422) (0.024) 
Core capital / total assets -12.452*** -2.147*** -3.476 -2.058*** -0.103 -0.434*** 
 
(1.488) (0.179) (3.986) (0.243) (1.071) (0.097) 
Retail deposits / total assets -1.445*** 0.013 -1.263 -0.278*** 0.020 -0.001 
 
(0.483) (0.049) (0.876) (0.059) (0.023) (0.006) 
Securitized liabilities / total 
assets 
0.830 0.854*** 2.389 0.750*** 3.528*** 1.162*** 
(0.627) (0.072) (1.824) (0.088) (0.836) (0.067) 
Return on equity 0.224** 0.077*** 0.090 -0.142*** 0.309 0.003 
 
(0.092) (0.030) (0.175) (0.048) (0.221) (0.040) 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.961*** -0.266*** -0.713 -0.110* 0.057 -0.001 
 
(0.291) (0.057) (0.677) (0.063) (0.080) (0.001) 
Fee over interest income -0.018* -0.009*** 0.004 -0.004 -0.011*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.046) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Constant 10.046*** -2.236*** 6.488* -1.975*** 4.101 -2.508*** 
  (2.098) (0.379) (3.893) (0.393) (3.622) (0.607) 
Observations 24,522 601,911 15,794 364,127 43,382 666,502 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 2.191 
 
2.797 
 
3.462 
 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0961   0.177   0.158   
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Table 1.5: Heckman model by time period and banking group 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a Heckman model and splitting the sample into the pre-sovereign crisis 
period (Q4:2005 to Q1:2010) and the since sovereign crisis period (Q2:2010 – Q3:2013). The log of bank i’s government bond holdings of country j is the dependent variable in the outcome 
equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of country j is the dependent variable in the selection equation. Fixed effects for banking group, time and country are 
specified in the selection equation. In the outcome equation, fixed effects for bank, time and country are included. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and 
corrects for self selection. The sample covers the period from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
-- continued on next page -- 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Commercial banks Savings banks Cooperative banks Mortgage banks 
  
Before 
sovereign 
crisis 
Since  
sovereign 
crisis 
Before 
sovereign 
crisis 
Since  
sovereign 
crisis 
Before 
sovereign 
crisis 
Since  
sovereign 
crisis 
Before 
sovereign 
crisis 
Since  
sovereign 
crisis 
Ln GDP -1.888 1.862 1.269* -1.999 1.729** 1.426 1.351 -2.417 
 
(1.725) (3.080) (0.710) (1.400) (0.841) (1.275) (0.872) (2.141) 
Government debt ratio -1.163 -1.897* 1.082*** -2.774*** -1.901*** -2.028*** 0.206 -0.989 
 
(0.719) (1.031) (0.394) (0.485) (0.437) (0.446) (0.377) (0.779) 
CPI inflation -8.990*** 15.254** -4.175*** 18.012*** -3.984*** 11.704*** -2.708* 15.449*** 
 
(3.133) (6.462) (1.374) (3.000) (1.496) (2.750) (1.584) (4.687) 
Government bond yield  -5.732 -18.529*** 8.463** -20.950*** 29.750*** -17.769*** -11.414** -15.987*** 
 
(9.976) (4.198) (3.938) (2.029) (4.969) (1.787) (5.315) (2.968) 
IMF measures 0.372 0.790*** -0.615*** 0.419*** -1.403*** 0.261** 0.040 0.298 
 
(0.324) (0.281) (0.112) (0.117) (0.177) (0.102) (0.172) (0.185) 
Home  bond 9.071** 0.897 3.057*** 10.020*** 1,064 2,305 0.879 9.074* 
 
(3.796) (6.769) (1.549) (3.110) (1.734) (2.788) (1.908) (4.728) 
Euro Area bond 0.996** 9.598 1.058*** -6.335 1.862*** 13.028** 0.226 -9.742 
  (0.409) (11.775) (0.143) (5.328) (0.233) (5.129) (0.167) (8.149) 
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Ln total assets 0.655*** 0.751*** 0.699*** 0.613* 0.418** 0.483* 0.430*** 0.546* 
 (0.151) (0.228) (0.143) (0.321) (0.162) (0.254) (0.139) (0.304) 
Cash & overnight / total assets 2.076** -1.230 3.321*** 10.487*** 0.093 2.590** 9.318** 1.246 
 (0.920) (0.853) (0.874) (1.658) (0.830) (1.319) (4.460) (7.901) 
Customer loans / total loans 1.116** 1.069 -0.737* -1.731** -0.399 -0.578 -1.671** 3.222** 
 
(0.470) (0.729) (0.389) (0.714) (0.462) (0.588) (0.705) (1.262) 
Security portfolio / total assets 7.475*** 5.165*** 3.939*** 4.372*** 5.236*** 6.428*** -0.341 4.820*** 
 
(0.698) (0.930) (0.549) (0.840) (0.641) (0.870) (0.930) (1.763) 
Core capital / total assets -7.256*** 3.291** -19.946*** -26.555*** 1.455 -5.999 -22.792*** -20.285 
 
(1.409) (1.461) (7.139) (10.204) (4.683) (6.644) (7.101) (13.676) 
Retail deposits / total assets -2.549*** 0.077*** -1.209 -1.928 -0.928 -1.588* 0.966 4.897 
 
(0.607) (0.024) (0.880) (1.287) (0.617) (0.813) (2.962) (3.103) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 0.976 4.402** -3.281*** -3.475 -1.255 6.290*** -1.319** -0.471 
 
(1.506) (1.976) (1.211) (2.233) (1.251) (1.698) (0.579) (1.295) 
Return on equity 0.374 0.126 -1.072*** 1.376 0.068 0.009 0.154** -0.211 
 
(0.264) (0.511) (0.220) (0.859) (0.583) (1.047) (0.074) (0.243) 
Cost-to-income ratio -1.230*** 0.069 -3.867*** 2.484*** -1.012** 0.022 1.156 0.500 
 
(0.397) (0.093) (0.663) (0.826) (0.478) (0.659) (1.182) (0.991) 
Fee over interest income 0.006 -0.009** -0.304 1.226 0.954* -0.989 -0.850** -0.360** 
  (0.011) (0.004) (0.699) (0.957) (0.530) (0.906) (0.340) (0.182) 
Constant 2.179 -4.869 6.742** 9.066 6.347** -6.456 13.987*** 11.273 
  (3.813) (10.081) (2.834) (7.289) (2.939) (6.101) (3.607) (8.473) 
Observations 4.783 4.353 16.211 14.046 15.883 22.84 3.439 2.143 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 2.838 3.793 2.494 3.097 2.651 3.805 1.159 1.597 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.218 0.371 0.154 0.228 0.272 0.360 0.112 0.221 
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Table 1.6: List of countries by risk category 
This Table shows the included countries per risk category. The risk measure is based on the average of the ratings by 
Moody's, Fitch and Standard and Poor's. Low risk is defined as AAA, intermediate risk is defined as AA and A, and high risk 
as BBB or worse. An asterisk (*) indicates that sovereigns migrated from one category to another between 2005 and 2013. 
Low-risk sovereigns Intermediate-risk sovereigns High-risk sovereigns 
Australia (AU) Belgium (BE) Greece (GR)*since Q2:2010 
Austria (AT) Czech Republic (CZ) Hungary (HU)*since Q4:2008 
Canada (CA) France (FR)*since Q4:2012 Iceland (IS)*since  Q1:2009 
Denmark (DK) Hungary (HU)*until Q3:2008 Ireland (I.E.)*since Q3:2011 
Finland (FI) Iceland (IS)*until Q4:2008 Italy (IT)*since Q4:2012 
France (FR)*until Q3:2012 Ireland (I.E.)*Q3:2009 until Q2:2011 Mexico (MX) 
Germany (DE) Italy (IT)*until Q3:2012 Portugal (PT)*since Q3:2011 
Ireland (I.E.)*until Q2:2009 Greece (GR)*until Q1:2010 Slovenia (SI)*since Q4:2012 
Luxembourg (LU) Japan (JP) Spain (ES)*since Q2:2012 
Netherlands (NL) Korea (KR) 
 
Norway (NO) Poland (PL) 
 
Spain (ES)*until Q1:2010 Portugal (PT)*until Q2:2011 
 
Sweden (SE) Slovenia (SI)*until Q3:2012 
 
Switzerland (CH) Spain (ES)* Q2:2010 until Q1:2012  
 
United Kingdom (UK)*until Q3:2012  Slovak Republic (SK) 
 
United States (US)  United Kingdom (UK)*since Q4:2012 
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Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics for the bank risk regressions 
This Table shows descriptive statistics for the regression sample for bank-level covariates in the bank risk equation. The 
sample is annual and includes 1,612 banks from 2006 until 2012. The z-score which is defined as return on assets plus capital 
over assets divided by the volatility of return on assets. Volatility is measured by the variation (in absolute terms) in RoA that 
cannot be explained by time and bank fixed effects. The NPL-indicator equals one if a bank is within the 10% worst quantile 
of the non-performing loans to total loans distribution in a given year. Deciles are defined on the basis of the entire 
population of banks, i.e. including those without government bond exposures or missing data that precluded certain 
observations from the estimation sample. CDS spreads are observed quarterly and are available for 24 German banks. We 
show the average CDS spread per banking group and year averaged over quarters. Total assets and the funding structure are 
observed quarterly. The remaining variables are available annually. The government bond exposure variables are included as 
predicted volumes of low, intermediate, and high risk government bond holdings relative to total assets. Only banks that hold 
government bonds are included. 
  Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Z-score 3.56 1.2 7,708 
CDS spread 112.61 138.81 396 
NPL ratio 28.17 44.44 7,704 
Ln total assets 13.43 1.6 7,708 
Cash & overnight / total assets 0.06 0.06 7,708 
Customer loans / total loans 0.8 0.16 7,708 
Security portfolio / total assets 0.26 0.12 7,708 
Retail deposits / total assets 0.23 0.99 7,708 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.83 0.3 7,708 
Fee over interest income 0.35 0.6 7,708 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 0.03 0.07 7,708 
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets 0.4 1.91 7,708 
Predicted intermediate risk holdings / total assets 0.008 0.07 7,708 
Predicted high risk holdings / total assets 0.0006 0.007 7,708 
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Table 1.8: Average risk measures per banking group and year 
This Table shows the average bank risk measures per banking group and year. Panel A shows the z-score which is defined as 
return on assets plus capital over assets divided by the volatility of return on assets. Volatility is measured by the variation (in 
absolute terms) in RoA that cannot be explained by time and bank fixed effects. Panel B shows the average of the NPL-
Indicator which equals one if a bank is within the 10% worst quantile of the non-performing loans to total loans distribution 
in a given year. Deciles are defined on the basis of the entire population of banks, i.e. including those without government 
bond exposures or missing data that precluded certain observations from the estimation sample. In this Table we only show 
observations that are used in the regression though. Panel C shows the average CDS spread per banking group and year 
(averaged over quarters). See Section 1.4.2 for a detailed description of the construction of the risk measures. Z-score and 
CDS spread are shown in absolute terms here but enter regressions in logs. 
Panel A: Z-score 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Commercial banks 3.03 2.75 2.89 3,36 3.19 2.40 2.78 2.91 
Savings banks 3.61 3.85 3.81 3.76 3.69 2.56 3.38 3.52 
Cooperative banks 3.60 4.12 3.87 4.00 3.84 2.92 3.58 3.67 
Mortgage banks 2.84 2.11 1.88 2.78 3.53 1.52 3.07 2.54 
All 3.55 3.87 3.73 3.86 3.74 2.76 3.46 3.55 
Panel B: NPL ratio 
     
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Commercial banks 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.13 
Savings banks 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 
Cooperative banks 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.09 
Mortgage banks 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.13 
All .099 .0996 .099 .099 .099 .099 .099 .09 
Panel C: CDS spreads 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
Commercial banks 14.35 28.00 86.62 103.59 105.49 169.59 225.14 105.80 
Savings banks 11.77 27.22 96.30 120.62 129.71 218.44 182.74 100.68 
Cooperative banks 19.83 44.16 126.76 161.08 140.71 158.29 173.43 126.83 
Mortgage banks 17.88 22.84 239.53 451.93 127.54 160.58 159.07 152.84 
All 14.00 28.24 114.19 165.93 124.03 185.74 190.66 112.61 
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Table 1.9: Regressions explaining bank risk 
This Table shows panel regression results to explain bank risk per banking group and different sample periods. The 
dependent variable is the log of z-score per bank. Higher value indicates lower risk. The government bond exposure variables 
are included as predicted volumes of low, intermediate, and high risk government bond holdings relative to total assets in %. 
Panel A shows results for the entire sample. Panels B and Panel C show sample split results for the period before the 
European sovereign crisis (2006-2009) and the period since the outbreak of the sovereign crisis (2010-2012). Bank-specific 
control variables are included but not reported. See Table 1.14 in the appendix to this chapter for results on control variables. 
Fixed effects for bank and time are included. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  All Commercial Savings Cooperatives 
Panel A: Entire sample period 2006-2012 
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets 0.003 0.021 0.056** 0.060** 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Predicted ntermediate risk holdings / total assets 0.301 0.884* 1.197 0.004 
(0.333) (0.515) (1.003) (1.63) 
Predicted high risk holdings / total assets 0.243 2.139 -4.934 -4.506 
(1.27 (1.708) (7.761) (11.462) 
Observations 7,708 595 2,431 4,568 
R² 0.16 0.123 0.232 0.172 
Number of banks 1,612 130 436 1,027 
Panel B: Before sovereign crisis period 2006-2009 
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets 0.032 0.055** -0.044 0.031 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.041) (0.045) 
Predicted  intermediate risk holdings / total assets  0.194 1.169* 2.185** 4.463 
(0.838) (0.654) (1.004) (4.316) 
Predicted  high risk holdings / total assets 2.566 3.853 46.440* -12.378 
(7.272) (5.931) (26.896) (33.942) 
Observations 4,041 308 1,388 2,277 
R² 0.034 0.174 0.024 0.081 
Number of banks 1,409 104 419 868 
Panel C: Since sovereign crisis period 2010-2012 
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets 0.026** 0.031** 0.024 0.138*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.046) 
Predicted intermediate risk holdings / total assets  -0.449 -1.582*** 3.345 0.834 
(0.427) (0.289) (3.412) (2.327) 
Predicted  high risk holdings / total assets -9.194*** -4.369*** -6.603 -5.501 
(2.959) (1.253) (18.125) (13.638) 
Observations 3,667 287 1,043 2,291 
R² 0.229 0.161 0.324 0.225 
Number of banks 1,405 115 389 884 
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Table 1.10: Regressions explaining bank risk using alternative risk measures 
This Table shows panel regression results to explain bank risk per time period using alternative measures for bank risk. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator which equals one if the bank belongs to the upper decile in the non-
performing loans to total loans ratio. We estimate the equation using Probit estimation and display marginal effects. In Panel 
B, the dependent variable is the log of the CDS spread of each bank. Bankgroup and time fixed effects, which control for 
common financial market developments, are included. Robust standard errors are used. The government bond exposure 
variables are included as predicted volume of low, intermediate and high risk government bond holdings relative to total 
assets in %. Bank-specific control variables are included in all specifications but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level and shown in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  All 
Before sovereign 
crisis 
Since sovereign 
crisis 
Panel A: NPL ratio as risk measure    
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets -0.014*** 0.000 -0.021*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) 
Predicted intermediate risk holdings / total assets 0.152 -0.094 0.114 
 (0.145) (0.284) (0.200) 
Predicted high risk holdings / total assets 1.320** -1.690 2.670 
 (0.643) (2.933) (1.638) 
Observations 7,704 4,039 3,665 
Panel B: CDS spreads as risk measure       
Predicted low risk holdings / total assets -0.004** -0.006 -0.003*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
Predicted intermediate risk holdings / total assets 0.099** 0.114 0.027 
(0.049) (0.104) (0.021) 
Predicted high risk holdings / total assets  0.301** 1.493*** 0.234** 
(0.142) (0.550) (0.106) 
Observations 397 257 140 
R² (incl time and bankgroup FE) 0.887 0.873 0.520 
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Table 1.11: Heckman model with alternative measures for country risk  
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a 
Heckman model with alternative measures for country risk (ratings and CDS spreads). The log of bank i’s government bond 
holdings of country j is the dependent variable in the outcome equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i 
holds bonds of country j is the dependent variable in the selection equation. Fixed effects for banking group, time and country 
are specified in the selection equation. In the outcome equation, fixed effects for bank, time and country are included. The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. The sample covers the period 
from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Average rating CDS spreads 
  
Intensive margin 
(Outcome) 
Extensive margin 
(Selection) 
Intensive margin 
(Outcome) 
Extensive margin 
(Selection) 
Ln GDP 0.624** 0.117* 0.539** 0.096 
(0.257) (0.070) (0.264) (0.073) 
Government debt ratio 1.325*** 0.455*** -0.417*** -0.088*** 
(0.126) (0.033) (0.117) (0.031) 
CPI inflation 3.481*** 1.268*** -0.951 0.014 
(0.769) (0.211) (0.824) (0.232) 
Government bond yield -6.362*** 1.246*** -2.855*** 1.015*** 
(0.708) (0.189) (0.890) (0.249) 
Average country rating -0.402*** -0.135*** 
(0.027) (0.007) 
CDS spread of government bond -0.031*** -0.006*** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Eurozone bond 1.956*** 0.520*** 2.006*** 0.522*** 
  (0.098) (0.024) (0.105) (0.026) 
Ln total assets 0.765*** 0.163*** 0.745*** 0.162*** 
(0.049) (0.002) (0.052) (0.002) 
Cash & overnight / total assets 0.079 0.106** 0.029 0.076 
(0.318) (0.050) (0.333) (0.053) 
Customer loans / total loans 0.104 -0.087*** 0.139 -0.081*** 
(0.135) (0.017) (0.141) (0.018) 
Security portfolio / total assets 4.910*** 1.912*** 4.796*** 1.908*** 
(0.188) (0.018) (0.195) (0.019) 
Core capital / total assets -2.614*** -1.002*** -2.502*** -0.965*** 
(0.633) (0.079) (0.665) (0.082) 
Retail deposits / total assets 0.042** -0.000 0.046** 0.001 
(0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 2.915*** 1.068*** 2.942*** 1.072*** 
(0.299) (0.041) (0.311) (0.043) 
Return on equity 0.154** 0.030 0.106 0.006 
(0.072) (0.020) (0.074) (0.021) 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.038 -0.001 0.022 -0.001 
(0.059) (0.002) (0.059) (0.002) 
Fee over interest income -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.003*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant -0.656 -3.095*** 0.285 -2.872*** 
(1.063) (0.104) (1.118) (0.108) 
Observations 83,427 1,569,427 76,731 1,344,731 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 3.037 3.007 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0853   0.0894   
  
Chapter 1: Banks’ government bond holdings and bank risk 
59 
Table 1.12: Heckman model excluding German government bonds 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a 
Heckman model for different periods excluding German bonds. The log of bank i’s government bond holdings of country j is 
the dependent variable and we report only the outcome equation. In the outcome equation, fixed effects for bank, time and 
country are included. Results are given separately for the pre-Lehman (Q4:2005 to Q2:2008), the post-Lehman, the pre-
sovereign crisis period (Q3:2008 to Q1:2010) and the period since sovereign crisis (Q2:2010 – Q3:2013). The inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. The sample covers the period from Q4:2005 
to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Whole period Before Lehman 
After Lehman 
until sovereign 
crisis 
After sovereign 
crisis 
Ln GDP 2.393*** 1.445 4.661*** -0.735 
(0.365) (0.894) (1.305) (1.016) 
Government debt ratio 0.675*** 1.364** -0.095 -3.665*** 
(0.155) (0.694) (0.546) (0.436) 
CPI inflation 5.488*** 0.711 -12.266*** 21.149*** 
(1.020) (1.593) (2.087) (2.454) 
Government bond yield -12.632*** 0.794 5.920 -20.938*** 
(0.800) (5.424) (4.543) (1.557) 
IMF measures -0.391*** -0.651*** 0.449*** 
(0.058) (0.155) (0.085) 
Eurozone bond 2.167*** 0.835*** 0.916*** -0.403 
(0.141) (0.199) (0.259) (3.871) 
Ln total assets 0.946*** 0.581*** 0.675*** 0.654*** 
(0.078) (0.154) (0.194) (0.167) 
Cash & overnight / total assets -0.347 0.786 -3.314** -0.827 
(0.464) (0.936) (1.456) (0.741) 
Customer loans / total loans -0.105 -0.564 -1.825** -0.330 
(0.191) (0.463) (0.749) (0.407) 
Security portfolio / total assets 6.100*** 5.426*** 5.228*** 5.840*** 
(0.378) (0.665) (1.058) (0.644) 
Core capital / total assets -1.272 -8.917* -6.201 1.558 
(0.973) (4.614) (6.637) (1.253) 
Retail deposits / total assets -0.286*** -1.286** -3.817*** -0.097*** 
(0.037) (0.651) (0.975) (0.037) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 2.908*** 1.484* 2.367 4.024*** 
(0.443) (0.799) (1.964) (1.048) 
Return on equity 0.142 0.166 0.062 0.316 
(0.097) (0.119) (0.179) (0.265) 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.751*** -2.051*** -0.837 -0.298 
(0.189) (0.508) (0.758) (0.245) 
Fee over interest income -0.008 0.417* -0.021 -0.034*** 
(0.008) (0.240) (0.045) (0.011) 
Constant -1.375 7.281** 8.568** 5.786 
(1.662) (3.225) (4.126) (4.490) 
Observations 52918 14479 9865 29057 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 3.823 2.625 2.714 3.934 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.211 0.239 0.339 0.320 
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Table 1.13: Heckman model restricted on central government bonds 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in government bonds using a 
Heckman model for different periods including only central government bonds. The log of bank i’s government bond 
holdings of country j is the dependent variable and we report only the outcome equation. In the outcome equation, fixed 
effects for bank, time and country are included. Results are given separately for the pre-Lehman (Q4:2005 to Q2:2008), the 
post-Lehman, the pre-sovereign crisis period (Q3:2008 to Q1:2010) and the period since sovereign crisis (Q2:2010 – 
Q3:2013). The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection.  The sample 
covers the period from Q4:2005 to Q3:2013, 1,970 banks, and 29 destination countries. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Standard errors are shown in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Whole period Before Lehman 
After Lehman 
until sovereign 
crisis 
Since sovereign 
crisis 
Ln GDP 2.629*** 2.384*** 4.576*** -0.610 
(0.314) (0.704) (1.270) (1.059) 
Government debt ratio 0.880*** 1.837*** 0.194 -3.387*** 
(0.134) (0.604) (0.548) (0.423) 
CPI inflation 6.181*** 0.122 -11.929*** 19.713*** 
(0.871) (1.255) (2.092) (2.459) 
Government bond yield -11.922*** -17.429*** 8.270* -21.058*** 
(0.679) (4.973) (4.506) (1.590) 
IMF measures -0.155*** -0.680*** 0.448*** 
(0.046) (0.150) (0.088) 
Eurozone bond 2.023*** 0.818*** 0.849*** 1.674 
(0.115) (0.154) (0.257) (4.047) 
Ln total assets 0.853*** 0.490*** 0.858*** 0.628*** 
(0.059) (0.098) (0.185) (0.169) 
Cash & overnight / total assets -0.174 0.527 -0.853 -0.747 
(0.358) (0.684) (1.401) (0.732) 
Customer loans / total loans -0.151 -0.633* -0.860 -0.721* 
(0.157) (0.324) (0.710) (0.414) 
Security portfolio / total assets 5.143*** 4.144*** 3.954*** 6.292*** 
(0.282) (0.456) (0.997) (0.639) 
Core capital / total assets -0.897 -4.200** -1.682 -0.498 
(0.699) (1.848) (3.896) (1.273) 
Retail deposits / total assets 0.053*** -1.086** -2.230** 0.025 
(0.020) (0.540) (0.929) (0.028) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 2.422*** 0.350 0.843 3.593*** 
(0.360) (0.648) (2.034) (1.067) 
Return on equity 0.123 -0.023 0.021 0.603** 
(0.084) (0.089) (0.185) (0.288) 
Cost-to-income ratio 0.002 -1.282*** -1.076 0.150 
(0.082) (0.340) (0.725) (0.111) 
Fee over interest income -0.009*** -0.003 0.013 -0.012*** 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.047) (0.004) 
Constant 0.788 11.299*** 4.556 4.247 
 
(1.242) (2.115) (3.948) (4.640) 
Observations 58456 17135 10754 30725 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 3.267 1.653 2.754 4.130 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.154 0.121 0.302 0.316 
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Table 1.14: Baseline regressions explaining bank risk  
This Table shows panel regression results to explain bank risk. The dependent variable is the log of the z-score of each bank 
where a higher value indicates lower risk. The sample is split into the before European sovereign crisis period (2006-2009) 
and the period since the outbreak of the sovereign crisis (2010-2012). Fixed effects for bank and time are included. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level and shown in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  All 
Before sovereign 
crisis 
Since sovereign 
crisis 
Ln total assets -0.038 0.002 -0.049 
(0.031) (0.051) (0.092) 
Cash & overnight / total assets -0.296* -0.619** -0.185 
(0.152) (0.300) (0.214) 
Customer loans / total loans 0.014 -0.133 0.045 
(0.083) (0.127) (0.184) 
Security portfolio / total assets 0.117 0.104 0.037 
(0.111) (0.191) (0.212) 
Retail deposits / total assets -0.052 0.292 0.000 
(0.165) (0.297) (0.302) 
Securitized liabilities / total assets 
-0.501** -0.173 0.464 
(0.224) (0.425) (0.570) 
Cost-to-income ratio -0.006 0.146 -0.021* 
(0.016) (0.137) (0.012) 
Fee over interest income 0.001 0.036 -0.041 
(0.032) (0.072) (0.030) 
Volume of low risk government bonds (predicted) / 
total assets (%) 0.003 0.032 0.026** 
(0.015) (0.023) (0.012) 
Volume of int. risk government bonds (predicted) / 
total assets (%) 0.301 0.194 -0.449 
(0.333) (0.838) (0.427) 
Volume of high risk government bonds (predicted) / 
total assets (%) 0.243 2.566 -9.194*** 
(1.270) (7.272) (2.959) 
Constant 1.727*** 1.111 1.915 
  (0.436) (0.717) (1.280) 
Observations 7,708 4,041 3,667 
R-squared 0.160 0.034 0.229 
Number of banks 1,612 1,409 1,405 
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Chapter 2: Moral suasion in regional government 
bond markets1 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the European sovereign debt crisis, banks’ large holdings of home government debt 
had detrimental consequences for financial stability, bank lending, and the real economy 
(Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch, 2016; Becker and Ivashina, 2017). Policy makers and 
academics are striving for a better understanding of banks’ incentives to hold (home) 
government debt. One hypothesis is that governments use moral suasion to persuade home 
banks to hold more home government bonds (Ongena, Popov and van Horen, 2016; 
Weidmann, 2013). 
The idea of moral suasion is that governments use explicit or implicit threats or the 
understanding that favours will be reciprocated in the future to persuade private firms to 
engage in activities that they would not do otherwise (Romans, 1966).2 Moral suasion is 
difficult to observe directly but the theoretical literature suggests that governments have an 
incentive to use moral suasion on home banks to hold home government debt if fiscal 
fundamentals are weak and other investors are less willing to lend (Chari, Dovis and Kehoe, 
2016). The bank’s incentive to act upon moral suasion should be particularly high if the bank 
is owned by the government and/or politicians are members of its supervisory board. 
This chapter tests the moral suasion hypothesis at the regional level in Germany, i.e. for 
German banks’ state (“Laender”) bond holdings. The institutional setting in Germany lends 
itself to the study of moral suasion on the regional level since there are close links between 
state governments and banks, since states have their own budget that they finance (inter alia) 
by borrowing in bond markets and since detailed data on German banks’ state bond holdings 
are available. My empirical methodolody uses differences in the fiscal strength between states 
and over time as reported by the German Stability Council3 to identify differences in the 
states’ incentives to use moral suasion. Specifically, the Stability Council evaluates the fiscal 
                                                 
1
 This Chapter is based on Ohls, J. (2017) Moral suasion in regional government bond markets. Deutsche 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series, 33/2017. 
2
 Moral suasion has been used in a wide array of policy areas, including labour policies and monetary policy 
(Romans, 1966). 
3
 The German Stability Council assesses the risk of an impending budgetary emergency of states and publishes 
its results annually (for detailed information on the Stability Council, see Section 2.2) 
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condition of German states along four stability criteria and I construct an indicator capturing 
the number of criteria that are breached by a state (i.e. “breaches of stability criteria”).4 In 
addition, I make use of differences in bank location and bank ownership to identify the 
incentives of banks for collusion. 
This chapter applies a Heckman (1979) selection model to account for the impact of moral 
suasion on a bank’s decision whether to hold any state bonds (selection equation), in addition 
to the impact on the volume of a bank’s state bond holdings (outcome equation). It is 
important to control for the self-selection of banks into holding state bonds as moral suasion 
might trigger a bank to invest in home state bonds at all. In addition, I study the impact of 
moral suasion on a bank’s share in outstanding state bonds by implementing a fractional logit 
model as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and fixed effects regressions. 
Overall, my results are in line with moral suasion by state governments on (state-owned) 
home banks. Home banks (i.e. banks located in the state that issues the bond) are more likely 
to hold home state bonds and hold larger volumes of these bonds than “out-of-state” banks 
(i.e. banks located in another German state). The preference for home state bonds increases 
significantly when the state is in a weak fiscal condition and the bank is directly owned by the 
state government (i.e. Landesbanken and regional development banks). State-owned banks 
located in weak states hold more home state bonds than state-owned banks located in “sound” 
states.  
The key challenge for identifying the impact of moral suasion is to control for banks’ 
alternative incentives to hold home government debt. The regional setting of my analysis 
mitigates differences in the institutional and regulatory framework that may confound results 
in cross-country studies. Also, I explicitly control for alternative hypotheses suggested by the 
literature, such as risk shifting (Farhi and Tirole, 2016), political endearing (Koetter and 
Popov, 2017), other lending opportunities (Gennaioli et al. 2014), and information 
asymmetries (Portes, Rey and Oh, 2001). Finally, I make use of variation in state bond 
holdings between banks and within banks across different issuers over time to control for 
unobserved incentives of banks for holding government debt (identification through 
heterogeneity). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that simultaneously 
controls for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at the bank-level and for the time-constant 
but bank-specific preference for a particular issuer, e.g. for the home state. My findings on 
                                                 
4
 The stability criteria are the following: interest expense to tax income, outstanding state debt, structural net 
lending/borrowing, and the credit funding ratio. They are evaluated in two dimensions, current and future fiscal 
planning. 
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moral suasion remain. State-owned banks increase their home state bond holdings more than 
other banks if the fiscal condition of the home state worsens (i.e. the number of stability 
criteria that are breached increases). 
The empirical analysis is based on a detailed panel dataset constructed from the Securities 
Holdings Statistics (Bade, Flory and Schönberg, 2016), Capital Market Statistics, Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistics5 and bank supervisory data of the Deutsche Bundesbank and data 
provided by the German Stability Council. My dataset includes all state bond holdings (2,078 
state bonds) of each German bank (2,024 banks) for the time period Q4:2005 – Q2:2014 and 
hence covers tranquil times, the financial crisis and the European debt crisis period. The data 
suggest that German banks are important for the funding conditions of state governments 
since they hold 64% of the outstanding volume of German state bonds (Q2:2014). At the 
same time, German state governments own regional development banks and, partly, 
Landesbanken, thereby controlling 17% of the German banking system’s total assets (Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistic of the Deutsche Bundesbank).6 This setting may render moral suasion 
particularly attractive to state governments. 
Governments can exert moral suasion on (state-owned) banks through several channels 
such as conversations, membership of state politicians in bank supervisory boards, explicit 
mandates or anticipatory obedience of state-owned banks. I find that a bank’s preference for 
home state bonds is larger if the state owns a larger share of the bank’s equity, if the bank is 
owned by only one instead of several states and if the share of politicians on the supervisory 
board is higher. 
The results on moral suasion are robust to controlling for unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity at the issuer level, to different measures of a state’s fiscal strength and different 
clustering of standard errors, to constraining the sample to the period after the introduction of 
the Stability Council (from 2010 onwards), and to excluding special types of states. 
This study is related to several streams of literature, most importantly the recent papers on 
moral suasion in European government bond markets. These empirical studies on large 
European banks find that home banks (Horváth, Huizinga and Ioannidou, 2015; Ongena et al., 
2016), publicly owned banks (Altavilla, Pagano and Simonelli, 2016; Becker and Ivashina, 
2017; De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016; Ongena et al., 2016) and banks headed by 
                                                 
5
 For more information on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, see 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Service/Reporting_systems/monthly_balance_sheet_
statistics.html?https=1 
6
 While the relationship between governments and savings banks is close at the municipality level as well, data 
on bank lending to municipalities is scarce. 
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politicians (Becker and Ivashina, 2017; De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2016) tend to hold more 
home sovereign debt, especially in risky countries (Altavilla et al., 2016; Horváth et al., 2015) 
and at times in which governments have high funding needs (Ongena et al., 2016).  
This chapter contributes to the literature by testing for moral suasion on the regional 
instead of the consolidated government level which mitigates differences in the institutional 
framework and helps to better identify the direct links between governments and banks. Also, 
the empirical approach better accounts for alternative incentives of banks to invest in (home) 
government debt by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the bank-time and issuer-
bank level. Finally, the sample extends the evidence for moral suasion beyond large banks 
and countries that are experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. 
The empirical literature has identified several other reasons for banks to hold government 
debt that I control for in my empirical analysis: Risk-shifting by banks (Horváth et al., 2015), 
discrimination of foreign bond holders (Brutti and Sauré, 2014), hedging of redenomination 
risk (Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2014) and political endearing of banks (Koetter and 
Popov, 2017). Using a similar dataset as this chapter, Koetter and Popov (2017) study the 
impact of political elections on the political endearing of savings banks. They find that 
savings banks owned by municipalities that are politically misaligned with the state 
government (i.e. governed by a different political party) have a higher exposure to the home 
state (relative to their assets). While the study by Koetter and Popov (2017) focuses on 
municipal-owned savings banks, I focus on state-owned Landesbanken and regional 
development banks that are politically aligned through direct state ownership. Furthermore, I 
use the variation between home and out-of-state banks and “sound” and “weak” German 
states. 
This study also relates to the research on the determinants of prices in the German state 
government bond market. Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) and Lemmen (1999) find that yields 
increase, and thus prices decrease, with higher indebtedness of the state, although only to a 
limited extent. My findings suggest that it is worthwhile to account for the differences in 
investors’ incentives for holding state bonds when studying the impact of fiscal fundamentals 
on market prices. Schulz and Wolff (2008) document differences in funding strategies 
between German states for the time period 1992 – 2007 and a common liquidity event in state 
bond spreads in 2007. My empirical approach takes that into account by controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the issuer-time level and, in a robustness check, at the bank-
issuer level. 
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A good understanding of banks’ incentives to hold government debt is important since 
banks’ exposures towards risky government bonds have adverse consequences for bank 
stability (Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014; Buch, Koetter, and Ohls, 2016), bank 
lending to the private sector (Becker and Ivashina, 2017; Popov and van Horen, 2015) and the 
real economy (Acharya et al., 2016). Also, a larger home bias in banks’ government bond 
portfolios is associated with higher government debt levels and lower government borrowing 
costs (Asonuma, Bakhache, and Hesse, 2015). Asonuma et al. (2015) conclude that banks’ 
home bias may give governments more time for consolidation but at the same time pose the 
risk of delaying necessary reforms.    
The remaining part of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 derives the hypothesis 
on moral suasion from the existing theoretical literature and discusses the institutional 
background in Germany. Section 2.3 explains the construction of the dataset and shows 
descriptive evidence on the state bond holdings of German banks. Section 2.4 discusses the 
empirical methodology and presents the results. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical hypotheses and institutional background 
2.2.1 Theoretical hypotheses 
The theoretical literature offers several hypotheses on why banks invest more in home than 
in foreign government debt. These include risk-shifting by risky banks (Ari, 2016; Farhi and 
Tirole, 2016), information asymmetries (Portes et al., 2001), discrimination of foreign 
borrowers (Broner, Erce, Martin and Venture, 2014), and moral suasion (Chari et al., 2016) 
which is the focus of this chapter. This Section briefly describes the theoretical model and its 
implications, while the following Section 2.2.2 discusses how the hypothesis relates to the 
institutional setting in Germany. The alternative hypotheses are discussed and tested in 
Section 4.3.2.  
Chari et al. (2016) augment a standard neoclassical model with banks in the spirit of 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) to study the government’s incentives for pressuring banks into 
holding home government debt. Chari et al. (2016) assume a benevolent government that 
funds expenditures by levying taxes and borrowing in debt markets subject to a borrowing 
constraint. Banks face a collateral constraint limiting bank borrowing and thus lending by 
bank’s net worth. As a result, higher holdings of home government debt come at the cost of 
lower private lending (crowding out). Benefits from requiring banks to hold home 
government debt arise in the model from alleviating the government’s borrowing constraint, 
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smoothing taxes and thus consumption.7 The government’s borrowing constraint is relaxed 
because default is assumed to be strategic and higher government bond holdings of home 
banks serve as a commitment device for the government to repay its debt in order to avoid 
domestic output costs (Chari et al., 2016).8 
The model predicts that the government requires home banks to hold home government 
debt (by means of a regulatory constraint), when the government faces funding needs 
exceeding its borrowing constraint. This situation may occur when the government is in a 
weak fiscal situation and therefore non-home investors are less willing to lend (Chari et al., 
2016). 
Moral suasion hypothesis part (I): The government requires home banks to hold home 
government bonds if it has weak fiscal fundamentals because banks from other states are less 
willing to hold government bonds in these situations. 
I test this hypothesis using differences in fiscal strength between German states as reported 
by the Stability Council and by comparing state bond holdings of home versus out-of-state 
banks. 
While Chari et al. (2016) model the government’s ability to impact home banks’ 
investment decisions as a binding regulatory constraint, European banking regulation favours 
government bonds issued in domestic currency but does not differentiate between government 
issuers on the regional level. Instead, state governments might impact the investment 
decisions of home banks through moral suasion (Romans, 1966). Moral suasion should be 
particularly effective on state-owned banks due to the government’s close relationship with 
these firms. The political view of state-owned firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) suggests that 
governments might use its control over state-owned firms to pursue private goals. In fact, 
banks have been shown to engage in politically motivated private lending (see, among others, 
Dinc, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Sapienza, 2004). The second part of my hypothesis on 
moral suasion therefore refers to the special role of state-owned banks. 
Moral suasion hypothesis part (II): Moral suasion by governments is particularly effective for 
banks that are directly owned by the state or that have state politicians on the supervisory 
board as these banks have higher incentives to concede to moral suasion. 
                                                 
7
 While governments in Chari et al. (2016) smooth taxation, German states are generally not able to increase tax 
rates because these fall into the authority of the German central or municipal governments. However, German 
states may engage in smoothing government expenditures. 
8
 The reason is that a default on home banks would reduce bank lending, and thus domestic investment and 
growth. Basu (2009), Broner et al. (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) build models with a similar mechanism but 
study the probability of a sovereign default and not the implications for moral suasion. 
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I test this hypothesis using an indicator for state ownership of a bank, using data on the degree 
of state ownership and on supervisory board members of large banks. 
2.2.2 Institutional background 
Germany is a federal republic consisting of 16 states (“Laender”), each of them having 
their own budget.9 State debt accounts for 30% of consolidated German government debt 
(Q2:2014, Deutsche Bundesbank) and the funding structure of German states has shifted from 
bank loans to bonds in recent years (Figure 2.1). Due to limited data availability on banks’ 
lending to German states, this analysis focuses on the bond market for which detailed 
information is available (see Section 2.3.1).10 
The fiscal situation varies considerably between states and over time as illustrated, for 
example, by the distribution of the interest expenses to tax income (in %) and the state 
government debt (per capita in thsd euro) in the upper panel of Figure 2.2. The analysis makes 
use of these differences in states’ fiscal situation to identify fiscally weak states that may have 
a larger incentive to sway home banks into holding home state bonds (see moral suasion 
hypothesis part (I)). 
The German Stability Council 
The German Stability Council helps with identifying these fiscally weak states as it 
increases market transparency on the fiscal situation of states through detailed annual reports. 
The council was established on April 28, 2010 to strengthen the framework for fiscal 
sustainability in Germany and is a joint body of the German states and the German federation. 
It is led by the respective finance ministers and advised by an independent scientific 
committee. The Stability Council assesses the risk of a budgetary emergency in the German 
states along four criteria and publishes the results on its website in the fourth quarter of each 
year. The criteria include structural net lending/borrowing, credit funding ratio (i.e. the degree 
to which the current budget is financed by net borrowing), interest expense to tax income ratio 
and outstanding debt. They are evaluated in two dimensions: the current budgetary situation 
(covering the current and last two years) and future fiscal planning (covering the next four 
years). For each of these criteria, the Stability Council reports a threshold that is derived from 
                                                 
9
 In order to finance higher expenditures, German states are generally not able to increase tax rates because these 
are set by the German central and municipal governments. Instead, German states may finance fiscal deficits by 
borrowing directly from banks as well as in the bond market. Differences in the tax income between states 
generally reflect differences in economic strength and are largely rebalanced through horizontal and vertical 
fiscal equalization schemes.  
10
 While the credit register in Germany now includes data on bank loans to states, government borrowers were 
excluded from the reporting requirements until 2014 and a reporting threshold of 1.5mn euro applies. 
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the average value of all states plus an allowance. A state is marked as “noticeable” (in a 
negative sense) with respect to a criterion if the state breaches the threshold.11  
My baseline measure for the fiscal situation of a state is the number of stability criteria that 
a state breaches. The indicator “breaches of stability criteria” is ordinal and can take values 
from zero breaches to eight breaches (i.e. four criteria times two dimensions). The advantages 
of this indicator are that it combines the information from all stability criteria and focuses on 
observations where the case for moral suasion might be particularly strong since the state has 
been marked as having a relatively weak fiscal condition. Table 2.1 shows the cross-sectional 
variation (i.e. between states) and the time variation (i.e. within states) of the indicator. In a 
robustness check, I use the underlying continuous indicators (i.e. structural net 
lending/borrowing, credit funding ratio, interest expense to tax income and outstanding debt) 
to capture the fiscal situation of states. 
One concern is whether investors take the differences in states’ fiscal situation into account 
given high credit ratings (varying between AAA and AA for the 11 out of 16 states that are 
rated) and bailout expectations (Heppke-Falk and Wolff, 2008). However, the German federal 
government and the states are in principle not liable for the debt burden of each other. Instead, 
German Basic Constitutional Law guarantees the sole fiscal responsibility of states for their 
debt (Article 109 Para 1 Basic Constitutional Law). Under certain conditions though, the 
Constitutional Court may decide on transfers from the German federal government to a state. 
Even if positive, these court decisions may lead to a delay in the redemption of state bonds. 
Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) and Lemmen (1999) show that state bond spreads reflect 
differences in state debt ratios, at least to some extent. This means that latent credit risks are 
highest for states that are in a relatively weak fiscal condition.  
Also, while benefits from moral suasion might be lower for German states than for high 
credit risk countries, costs in terms of crowding out (Chari et al., 2016) might be lower as well 
due to the eligibility of German state bonds as collateral in interbank and Eurosystem 
refinancing operations.12 The net effect is hence unclear. My findings suggest that banks 
located in other states reduce their bond holdings of states that have a deteriorating fiscal 
                                                 
11
 If a state breaches more than two criteria, the Stability Council evaluates whether the state is at risk of a 
budgetary emergency. If so, the state enters a consolidation program. As of 2011 five states (Berlin, Bremen, 
Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig Holstein) entered a consolidation programme. These state governments 
have to submit a consolidation plan that is evaluated by a committee and have to ensure the reduction of net 
borrowing within the next five years. Consolidation members have to report on their progress to the Stability 
Council on a semi-annual basis. 
12
 Roughly 72% of German state bonds have been eligible as collateral in Eurosystem refinancing operations (see 
Section 3.2).  
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condition (i.e. a larger number of stability criteria that are breached). This supports the case 
for moral suasion on the German regional government bond market. 
Ownership structure of the German banking system 
Another institutional feature used in this analysis is the heterogeneity in the ownership 
structure of German banks. For a general description of the German banking system, see 
Section 1.2.1 of this thesis and Koetter (2013). Regarding bank ownership, I distinguish four 
groups: (i) privately-owned banks (such as commercial banks and specialized banks, e.g. 
mortgage banks); (ii) mutually-owned cooperative banks; (iii) savings banks which are owned 
by the municipality; and (iv) state-owned banks, i.e. Landesbanken and regional development 
banks.  
Moral suasion is expected to be particularly effective for the latter group of state-owned 
banks and for banks with state politicians on their supervisory board (hypothesis part II). I use 
the term “moral suasion” in a broad sense to summarize various means of government 
influence, including conversations, membership of state politicians in bank supervisory 
boards, explicit mandates or anticipatory obedience of state-owned banks. The different 
channels are difficult to disentangle as they are likely to be used complementarily. Table 2.2 
summarizes detailed data on the degree of government control and on supervisory board 
members that allows me to test for some of these channels. 
 In total, 20 banks, which account for 17% of the German banking system’s total assets, are 
directly owned by state governments in Q2:2014. During the entire sample period from 2005 
to 2014 there are 23 state-owned banks (for more details on these banks, see 2.A in the 
appendix to this chapter). On average, state governments own 83% of these banks’ capital, 
savings associations own 11%, other public banks own 3% and the remaining share is held by 
other investors (Table 2.2). The so-called “regional development banks” are fully state-owned 
and their debt is guaranteed by the states.13 One fifth of state-owned banks are owned by more 
than one state government. I test whether multiple state owners limit the ability of a state to 
impact the bank’s investment decisions. Table 2.2 further shows that on average 44% of 
supervisory board members of state-owned banks are state politicians but there is a large 
heterogeneity between banks that I will exploit in the empirical analysis.  
                                                 
13
 There are two development banks that are fully guaranteed by the German central government and are 
therefore not included in the group of state-owned banks, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) and the 
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank. While the KFW is partly owned by the states (20% of equity), it’s liabilities are 
fully guaranteed by the central government and therefore assigned to the group “Other MFI”. Results are robust 
against treating the KFW as a (partly) state-owned bank. 
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My main approach uses the extensive margin of state ownership, i.e. the variation between 
state-owned and other banks to test for moral suasion. State ownership is a structural 
characteristic of the German banking system that has persisted for a long time. This addresses 
the concern that the degree of state ownership might be endogenous to banks’ state bond 
holdings (for a detailed discussion on endogeneity issues, see Section 2.4.2.2). In further tests, 
I use differences in the intensity of state control as reflected in the (time-varying) state 
ownership share and the share of state politicians in the supervisory board of banks. 
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
2.3.1 Data sources 
This Section introduces the datasets and discusses data preparation. A detailed description 
of the constructed variables can be found in 2.A in the appendix to this chapter. 
Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Bade et al., 2016) 
The German state bond market has a size of 315 bn euro of which 81% (254 bn euro) are 
included in the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank (Q2:2014). My 
analysis focuses on state bond holdings by German banks which are available for all German 
banks on a security-by-security and bank-by-bank level. German banks hold 64% (162 bn 
euro) of the outstanding volume of state bonds in the Securities Holdings Statistics (Q2:2014). 
The time period runs from Q4:2005 to Q2:2014 and thus covers pre-crisis times, the financial 
crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. 
The dataset covers the entire German banking system and thus complements earlier studies 
on moral suasion that focus on large banks only (Horváth et al, 2015; Ongena et al, 2016). 
Similar to Chapter 1, I exclude branches of foreign-owned banks, as their investment behavior 
typically depends on the business model of the parent banks, which I do not have information 
on. However, special-purpose banks are included to cover regional development banks. This 
gives 2,024 banks (unbalanced sample due to mergers, entries and exits). The number of 
banks per quarter decreases from 1,982 in Q4:2005 to 1,732 in Q2:2014. 
I follow the bank supervisory classification of the Deutsche Bundesbank in sampling 
existing banks. In case of mergers, this implies that the bank that is taking over remains in the 
sample and reports state bond holdings for both entities together. The asset growth of the 
absorbing bank is controlled for by including a dummy variable in the estimations. Most 
mergers have taken place within the groups of small savings or cooperative banks, but there 
have been three events within the group of state-owned banks, that are given in the data 
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appendix 2.A.14 Therefore, Section 2.4.3.1 checks the robustness of the results to excluding 
the period before 2010 which encompasses the merger and recapitalization events stemming 
from losses during the financial crisis (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011).  
I include only banks’ bond holdings on their own account and not those on behalf of bank 
customers since banks cannot actively manage the latter. Furthermore, I use notional values of 
bond holdings to focus on quantity and not price effects. 
Information on the issuer of the bond is obtained from Bloomberg and merged to the 
securities holdings data using the ISIN of each security. I include bonds issued by German 
states only. Specifically, I exclude banks’ holdings of bonds issued by bad banks, such as 
“Erste Abwicklungsanstalt”, because the state is liable only for part of the bonds. Also, I 
exclude 41 bonds issued jointly by several German states (“Gemeinsame Laender Anleihe”)15 
because I am not able to identify the share and participation of individual states in these bonds 
(German banks’ holdings equal 8 bn euro). Finally, I exclude one security issued jointly by 
German states and the central government. As a result, my dataset includes 2,078 securities 
with aggregate holdings by German banks worth 162 bn euro. 
For the estimations, I aggregate security holdings of bank i in quarter t to the issuer (i.e. 
state) level. To account for the right-skewed distribution of the dependent variable, I take 
natural logarithms of state bonds holdings.16 The inflated dataset that includes all bank-issuer-
time combinations has 1,031,203 observations and 89,171 non-zero observations. This allows 
me to study the impact of bank and issuer characteristics on the extensive and intensive 
margin of banks’ state bond holdings. 
Capital Market Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
Data on security characteristics such as amount outstanding, amount issued, issue and 
redemption date are taken from the Capital Market Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
These variables are used to clean the data suc as reported holdings prior to the placement of 
the security or after redemption (111 observations are dropped). 
                                                 
14
 While WestLB AG exited in 2012, Portigon AG became its legal successor and thus the identifier of the bank 
did not change, following banking supervisory classifications. The size of the bank did only decrease slightly. 
Furthermore, there has been a merger between two regional banks in the same state in 2011. While the owner did 
not change, the merger had a scale effect on the absorbing bank that is controlled for through a dummy. 
15
 Federal states that regularly participate in these joint issuances are Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia. 
16
 Due to technical reasons, mainly, 4% of observations on the security level are negative positions, but the 
majority cancels out on the issuer level. Merely 0.3% of observations need to be dropped in order to take logs.   
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Data on the initial price, coupon type and rate are in principle also available, but around 
half of the state bonds are floating coupon bonds with no further details on the coupon rate. 
Bank supervisory and statistical data of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
Bank control variables including size (i.e. log total assets), capitalization, deposit ratio and 
commitment ratio are constructed from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank (for a definition of variables, see 2.A).17 These variables are available at a 
quarterly frequency; the information on banks’ non-performing loans (NPL) obtained from 
the annual financial statements submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank is available at an 
annual frequency. To account for the statistical breaks in the prudential definitions of NPL, I 
use a relative NPL indicator that is equal to one for banks in the highest quartile of the NPL 
distribution of the respective year (the indicator remains unchanged within one year). These 
control variables account for differences in the size and business models between banks that 
may affect the banks’ demand for government bonds (for a detailed discussion, see Section 
1.2.4 of this thesis).  
Information on bank type, state ownership and the location of the banks’ headquarters is 
taken from bank supervisory data of the Deutsche Bundesbank. I construct an indicator “state-
owned” that is equal to one for banks that are directly owned by the state government. 
Public (financial) reports and supervisory data on the 23 state-owned banks and 16 other 
large German banks have been used to identify time-varying ownership shares of state 
governments and other owners (such as the federal government or banking associations) and 
to collect information on the supervisory board members of these banks. These data have been 
gathered for the largest German banks due to data availaibility. 
State variables 
Macroeconomic data on German states (including state debt and population) is collected 
from the German Federal Statistical Office. I use annual core state debt per capita as measure 
for the state debt burden and interpolate it to quarterly frequency. Further information on the 
fiscal situation of the state is taken from the online publications of the German Stability 
Council.18 I construct the composite, ordinal indicator “breaches of stability criteria” as 
defined in Section 2.2.2. The assessments of the Stability Council are available since Q4:2010 
and updated in the fourth quarter of each year (remaining constant throughout the year). 
                                                 
17
 For more information on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, see 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Service/Reporting_systems/monthly_balance_sheet_
statistics.html?https=1 
18
 For more information on the Stability Council, see http://www.stabilitaetsrat.de/EN/Home/home_node.html 
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2.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
The structure of the German state bond market 
The following descriptive statistics and regressions are based on 2,078 state bonds 
included in the Securities Holdings Statistics (without joint state bonds) with an aggregate 
volume of 254 bn euro of which 64% (162 bn euro) are held by German banks (Q2:2014). 
Between Q4:2005 and Q2:2014, German states have placed 1,456 new state bonds 
(excluding joint state bonds). State bonds are often privately placed (Koetter and Popov, 
2017) and have a much smaller bond size (260 mn euro on average) than central government 
bonds (6,960 mn euro on average) that are publically auctioned to a group of eligible financial 
institutions. With respect to other bond characteristics, the state bond market consists mainly 
of coupon bonds (57%) and floaters (42%), while the central government bond market is 
dominated by zero coupon bonds (57%), followed by coupon bonds (42%) and only a few 
floaters (1%). The average maturity of a state bond in my sample is 6.2 years and thus below 
the maturity of central government bonds which is 8.3 years on average. Foreign currency 
denomination plays a minor role in the state bond market (2.5% of state bonds). Schulz and 
Wolff (2008) document differences in the volume and frequency of bond placements between 
German states. My empirical approach accounts for these differences in funding strategies 
between states through issuer-time and bank-issuer fixed effects. 
Given private placements, my results are not likely to be driven by the potential role of 
dealer banks that redistribute state bonds in the secondary market. In fact, the data shows that 
changes in the investor base of a particular security are not more frequent in the quarters 
immediately after a bond’s placements than later during the bond’s life. Overall, the average 
state bond is traded at least 9 times within my sample period (Q4:2005 – Q2:2014; based on 
quarter-on-quarter changes).19 
The holder structure on the security level is rather concentrated in the German state bond 
market. One-third of all bonds are held by one bank only. These bonds tend to have a 50% 
smaller volume than other state bonds but a similar maturity and Eurosystem eligibility. The 
average state bond is held by 7 German banks simultaneously, while 10% of German state 
bonds are held by more than 21 banks in the average quarter. Section 2.4.2.2 studies the share 
of a bank in outstanding state bonds at the issuer level in greater detail. 
  
                                                 
19
 I can only approximate the trading pattern by quarter-on-quarter changes in the ownership of a particular bond 
since flow data are not available. 
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The role of German banks in the state bond market 
German banks are the most important investors in the state bond market. They hold on 
aggregate 64% of the outstanding volume of these bonds (Q2:2014). By comparison, German 
banks hold only 1.1% of the outstanding volume of German central government bonds (i.e. 
“bunds”). Instead, foreign investors (incl. foreign central banks) are primarily active in the 
bund market due to the larger bond sizes and the availability of ratings. Public information on 
credit risk is less easily available in the state bond market. Only 11 out of 16 states have a 
rating from a major rating agency, which might constrain some types of investors. As a result, 
German banks focus on the regional rather than the central government bond market and 
invest on average 41% of their total government bond portfolio in German state bonds and 
only 3% in “bunds” (Table 2.3). 
Within the German banking system, state-owned banks are the largest creditors in the state 
bond market. While the average German bank holds only 0.09 bn euro in state bonds, an 
average state-owned bank holds state bonds worth 2.06 bn euro (Table 2.3). The picture 
remains similar after controlling for bank size. State-owned banks invest more than 3% of 
their assets in state bonds, while commercial banks invest a mere 1% and savings and 
cooperative banks 2% of their assets (Q2:2014). Consequently, the group of state-owned 
banks hold 16% of the outstanding volume of German state bonds which is a larger market 
share compared to the other banking groups, despite the relatively small number of state-
owned banks. Investment decisions by state-owned banks are thus particularly relevant for the 
funding conditions of states, which may increase the governments’ incentives for using moral 
suasion. 
Despite the general importance of state bonds for German banks, about 26% of them do 
not hold any state bonds at all during my sample period. Many banks enter and exit the state 
bond market frequently such that only about 45% of German banks hold some state bonds in 
the average quarter. Results from Probit estimations on the banks’ likelihood of holding some 
state bonds in Table 2.4 show that these banks tend to be larger, have a larger deposit ratio 
and a lower capital ratio (relative to unweighted assets). These banks might be more in need 
for zero risk weighted assets, such as state bonds, to support their regulatory capital ratio. This 
self-selection of banks into holding state bonds needs to be taken into account in the empirical 
approach, which I do by applying a Heckman model.   
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The degree of “home bias” in German banks’ state bond portfolios  
In order to derive a descriptive measure for a banks’ preference of home state bonds which 
takes into account the size of the home state, I follow Coeurdacier and Rey (2013). Based on 
the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), they measure home bias as the deviation 
of an investor’s share of home assets in the portfolio from the share of home assets in the 
market portfolio. Transferring this idea to the subnational level, the “home bias” in the state 
bond portfolio of a bank i in quarter t can then be calculated as follows: 
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A value of the 	
 equal to one reflects complete home bias while a value of zero 
indicates perfect diversification according to the CAPM. A negative value is associated with 
an underrepresentation of home assets in the portfolio.  
Table 2.5 shows the 	
 in the state bond portfolios of banks that hold some 
investment in state bonds (by banking group for 2014Q2, excluding banks with zero 
holdings). On average, state-owned banks exhibit the largest home bias with a value of 0.19. 
Savings and cooperative banks have a home bias in state bond portfolios of 0.07 and 0.08 
respectively. Mortgage banks are fully diversified, arguably reflecting their sophisticated 
investment strategies in government bond markets. However, the variation within banking 
groups is large which renders the home bias insignificant at conventional levels (Table 2.5). 
One reason for this may be the impact of the states’ fiscal situation on the banks’ home bias. 
The empirical approach tests this hypothesis, among others, and controls for unobserved 
differences between states and / or between banks that may drive the descriptive figures.  
  
Chapter 2: Moral suasion in regional government bond markets 
 
78 
2.4 Empirical methodology and results 
2.4.1 Empirical methodology   
To test for moral suasion, I employ heterogeneity between banks with respect to state 
ownership, within banks with respect to bond holdings from home versus other state issuers 
and between states over time with respect to the Stability Council indicators. I extend the 
methodology of existing studies by De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016), Horváth et al. (2015), 
Koetter and Popov (2017), and Ongena et al. (2016) in two dimensions.  
First, I analyse the impact of moral suasion on the bank’s decision whether or not to hold 
any bonds from a specific state (extensive margin), in addition to analysing the volume of the 
bank’s state bond holdings. To this end I apply a Heckman (1979) model and fractional logit 
model as proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). While previous studies on moral 
suasion have analysed the intensive margin only (due to their focus on large banks), 
governments may also use moral suasion to persuade banks to hold asset classes that they 
would not hold otherwise and therefore affect the extensive margin of banks’ state bond 
holdings. 
Second, I use not only banks’ bond holdings of the home state but also that of other states 
on an issuer level. This allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity between states over 
time through issuer-time dummies in the baseline specification, and to additionally control for 
alternative investment incentives of banks by bank-time and bank-issuer fixed effects in the 
augmented regressions (using high-dimensional fixed effects regressions). Existing studies do 
not use heterogeneity within banks, but only between banks and states over time (De Marco 
and Macchiavelli, 2016; Horváth et al., 2015; Koetter and Popov, 2017; Ongena et al., 2016). 
Similar to De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016), Horváth et al. (2015), and Koetter and 
Popov (2017), I study banks’ holdings of state bonds instead of purchases of state bonds. This 
allows me to use the cross-sectional variation between the states’ fiscal condition in addition 
to the variation within states over time. Also, the dataset does not allow a clear identification 
of flows (unlike the dataset on large European Banks by Ongena et al., 2016). In an 
augmented fixed effects regression, I check that my results on moral suasion are not only 
driven by the cross-sectional variation by including bank-issuer fixed effects (along with 
bank-time and issuer-time fixed effects, Table 2.9). Results from this estimation are driven by 
the variation over time and the findings remain in line with moral suasion. 
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Heckman model 
My baseline empirical approach applies a Heckman (1979) model to account for the self-
selection of banks into holding state bonds. Buch et al. (2016) apply a similar approach to 
studying German banks’ holdings of OECD government bonds. The model proceeds in two 
steps. First, it analyses the bank’s decision whether to hold bonds from state j in quarter q 
using a probit model (selection equation, i.e. extensive margin). And second, if yes, it 
analyses the bank’s decision on how much to hold (outcome equation, i.e. intensive margin). 
The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) calculated from the predicted likelihood of observing an 
exposure of bank i in state j at quarter q in the first stage corrects for self-selection of banks. 
In this set-up, the selection equation (1) and outcome equation (2) are specified as follows: 
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Where EXPijq is an indicator variable equal to one if bank i (2,024 German banks) holds 
government bonds issued by a specific state j (16 states) at the end of quarter q (35 quarters 
from Q4:2005 to Q2:2014) and zero otherwise. 4	$% gives the corresponding log amount of 
banks i’s bond holdings of state j at quarter q. Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution 
function.  
The variable homeij is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the issuer state is the state 
where the bank’s headquarters is located. If a bank has more than one headquarters (in the 
case of a few Landesbanken), I treat all headquarters locations as home states. 
The main variable of interest is the interaction effect of the home indicator with bank 
variables and/or issuer specific variables ℎ	$ ∗ 12	$%. These interactions give 
bank-issuer-time specific variables that allow testing for the moral suasion hypothesis. In the 
baseline specification in Table 2.7, the “home” indicator is interacted with an issuer-specific 
variable, the number of Stability Council criteria that a state breaches (“breaches of stability 
criteria”) to test for the moral suasion hypothesis part (I).20 In Section 2.4.2.2, the term is 
                                                 
20
 As assessments by the Stability Council are available only from 2010Q4 onwards, all specifications include an 
indicator equal to one from 2010Q4 onwards (and interaction effects with this indicator are included where 
appropriate). While this is necessary to correctly interpret the interaction effects with the variable “Breaches of 
stability criteria”, it is generally not reported for the sake of brevity. In a robustness test, I exclude the period 
before the establishment of the Stability Council in 2010Q4. 
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additionally interacted with the bank specific variable on state ownership (“state-owned”) to 
test for the second part of the moral suasion hypothesis. All underlying (two-way) interaction 
effects are included for correct interpretation but usually not reported for the sake of brevity. 
Since in principle all banks are able to hold home state debt and moral suasion may affect 
the extensive as well as the intensive margin, there is no obvious exclusion restriction for the 
Heckman model. Instead, it is identified based on functional form and on differences in the set 
of included dummies. The coefficient η  on the IMR is significant in all specifications, 
confirming that it is important to control for self-selection of banks into holding state debt. 
Differences between state issuers over time, such as differences in placement activity or 
economic conditions, are controlled for by issuer-time fixed effects (.$% in the outcome 
equation; only the differential effect between home and out-of-state banks can thus be 
identified.21 The selection equation includes one-way issuer and time dummies only in order 
to avoid the incidental parameters problem in probit estimations. 
At the same time, I control for the impact of bank-time specific variables that capture 
different business models of banks and variations in banks’ demand for state bonds over time. 
These bank-specific control variables Xiq-1 are lagged by one quarter and include total assets, 
capitalization, deposit ratio, commitment ratio and a non-performing loan indicator. I control 
for mergers between banks using an indicator that is equal to 1 for the surviving bank in the 
quarter of the merger. The indicator is significantly positive in most specifications, reflecting 
a size effect for the surviving bank, and is not reported. For more information on the bank 
mergers and exits, see Section 2.3.1. Summary statistics of the variables are given in Table 
2.6. 
Fractional logit and fixed effects regressions 
The Heckman specification studies the impact of moral suasion on banks’ state bond 
holdings in absolute terms. Moral suasion behavior might also be reflected in large bond 
holdings of home state-owned banks relative to the outstanding state bonds. This approach 
focuses on the state’s creditor structure and captures diversification in a state’s investor base 
(Asonuma et al., 2015).  
In an alternative specification I therefore use the bank’s state bond holdings relative to the 
outstanding amount on an issuer level as the dependent variable. Since it is a proportion and 
                                                 
21
 The baseline impact of issuer-time variables could not be identified even in the absence of issuer-time fixed 
effect since, by construction, an increase in holdings of one bank has to result from a decrease in holdings from 
other banks (controlling for the amount outstanding and abstracting from non-bank or foreign investors which 
are of minor relevance in this market). 
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does include a corner solution (i.e. the value zero), I use the pooled fractional logit model as 
proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The advantage of the fractional logit which uses 
the logistic link function is that it is fairly robust against misspecification (Papke and 
Wooldrige, 1996). The explanatory variables are specified as in Equation (1). Due to the 
incidental parameters problem in non-linear models, I do not include issuer-time dummies in 
these specifications. In a robustness check, I introduce one-way issuer and time dummies, 
which are less problematic as there are many banks per issuer and time (Papke and 
Wooldridge, 2008). Standard errors are clustered on the issuer-time level to account for the 
fact that the shares of banks in outstanding state bonds are negatively correlated. 
I cross-check the results of the fractional logit model with ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions that do not account for the bounded nature of the dependent variable but can 
provide a good approximation (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Also, OLS regressions allow 
for the inclusion of high dimensional fixed effects and offer a straightforward interpretation of 
parameters as marginal effects (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Specifically, I use issuer-time, 
bank-time and bank-issuer fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity between and 
within banks and the structural preference of a bank for a specific state (identification through 
heterogeneity following Khwaja and Mian, 2005). The dependent and independent variables 
are the same as in the fractional logit case except that the dependent variable is multiplied by 
100 (i.e. given in %) to transform the scale of the estimated coefficients. This specification 
allows me to identify the bank-issuer-time specific moral suasion effect.  
2.4.2 Main Results 
2.4.2.1 Differences between home and out-of-state banks 
Results of the baseline Heckman model are shown in Table 2.7; for both specifications the 
first column gives the outcome equation and the second column the selection equation of the 
Heckman model. Column 3 includes two-way fixed effects at the issuer-time level that 
captures the heterogeneity at the state level such as differences in funding strategies of states 
and in economic conditions as well as events that are common to all states such as changes in 
the bund yield. Column 4 of Table 2.7 gives marginal effects for the selection equation to ease 
the economic interpretation of the coefficients. 
The main results are threefold. First, home banks hold significantly more bonds issued by 
the state than out-of-state banks. Quantitatively, the volume of bond holdings is by about 49% 
larger if the bank is located in the issuer state (column 3). 
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Second, and in support of the moral suasion hypothesis, the state’s fiscal condition has an 
opposite effect on the state bond holdings of home versus out-of-state banks. The latter hold 
fewer bonds issued by states that breach criteria of the Stability Council (see negatively 
significant parameter on “Breaches of stability criteria” in column 1). Home banks however 
hold more bonds if the home state breaches criteria of the Stability Council (see positively 
significant parameter on the interaction effect of “Home * Breaches of stability criteria” in 
columns 1 and 3). In fact, banks increase their home state bond holdings by 16% for each 
stability criterion that the home state breaches (column 3). Similarly, home banks are more 
likely to hold bonds when the state breaches stability criteria (column 4), while out-of-state 
banks tend to avoid exposure in these situations (column 2). This is in line with an effect of 
moral suasion on the extensive margin of banks’ state bond holdings. 
Third, Table 2.7 shows that bank characteristics matter in explaining banks’ state bond 
holdings. Not surprisingly, there is a scale effect, as larger banks tend to hold more state 
bonds (in line with Buch et al., 2016, and Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Better capitalized 
banks, measured as balance sheet equity over unweighted assets, hold fewer state bonds. An 
increase in capitalization by one percentage point decreases the volume of bonds held by 5% 
(column 3). This might reflect lower incentives for well-capitalized banks (measured in 
unweighted terms) to load up on zero risk-weighted assets to support their regulatory capital 
ratio and is in line with findings by Acharya and Steffen (2015) for European banks. Contrary 
to the intuition that banks with a large deposit base rely less on state bonds as collateral for 
wholesale funding (Buch et al., 2016), I find that high deposit ratios are associated with 
higher state bond holdings of banks. One explanation could be that deposit-funded banks are 
more risk-averse and therefore favour comparatively safe assets such as German state bonds. 
This matches the result that riskier banks in terms of having a comparatively high non-
performing loans ratio (upper quartile) hold fewer state bonds. The parameters on bank 
control variables remain very similar in all regressions and are therefore no longer reported in 
the following tables. 
2.4.2.2 The impact of state ownership 
This Section gives results on the impact of state ownership on banks’ state bond holdings 
using a Heckman model in Table 2.8 and a fractional logit model as well as a high-
dimensional fixed effects model in Table 2.9. All specifications include a set of bank control 
variables as specified in Table 2.7 (not reported) and control for unobserved heterogeneity at 
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the issuer-time level (Table 2.8), at the issuer and time level (column 2 of Table 2.9) and at 
the issuer-time, bank-time and bank-issuer level (column 3 of Table 2.9). 
The results from Table 2.8 and 2.9 support the moral suasion hypotheses (part I and II) 
developed in Section 2.2.1. Home banks that are directly owned by the state are significantly 
more invested in their home state than other home banks. Column 1 of Table 2.8 shows that 
state bond holdings of state-owned home banks are about 89% higher than those of other 
home banks. Also, state-owned home banks hold a higher share of outstanding bonds 
compared to other home banks (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9).  
In line with moral suasion, state-owned home banks hold even more home state bonds 
when the state breaches some criteria of the Stability Council (see positively significant 
parameter on “Home * State-owned * Breaches of stability criteria” in Tables 2.8 and 2.9). In 
economic terms, state-owned banks hold a 14% larger amount of home state bonds than other 
home banks and than state-owned banks from other states per breach of stability criteria 
(column 3 of Table 2.8). Relative to the outstanding amount of home state bonds, the share of 
state-owned banks in states that breach a stability criterion is 29 percentage points higher than 
the share of other home banks or state-owned banks from other states (column 3 of Table 2.9). 
Also, state-owned banks are more likely to hold home state bonds in these situations (column 
4 of Table 2.8). 
The underlying two-way interaction effect (“State-owned * Breaches of stability criteria” 
in column 3 of Table 2.8) shows that state-owned banks generally hold more bonds from 
states that breach stability criteria, not only from the home state. In terms of magnitude 
though, the effect is only one-third of the incremental home effect for state-owned banks (5% 
compared to 14%) and it is insignificant on the extensive margin. These findings suggest that 
moral suasion plays an important role in the decision of state-owned banks to hold any home 
state bonds when fiscal conditions are weak. 
After controlling for the special role of state-ownership, home and out-of-state banks differ 
less in their holdings of bonds issued by weak states which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that moral suasion is more effective on state-owned banks (part II of the moral suasion 
hypothesis). In fact, the difference between home and out-of-state banks that are not state-
owned becomes insignificant on the extensive margin of state bond holdings (column 4 of 
Table 2.8) and in the fractional logit model (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9). 
Hence, home banks have larger holdings of home state bonds if the bank is directly owned 
by the state government and the state is breaching criteria of the Stability Council. Column 3 
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of Table 2.9 shows that this finding remains significant after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the bank-time level (e.g. time-varying demand of a bank for state bonds), at 
the issuer-time level (e.g. time-varying differences in issuing strategies or economic and fiscal 
conditions between states) and at the bank-issuer level (e.g. bank-specific preferences for the 
home state or for a particular issuer). I find that home state-owned banks increase their state 
bond holdings more than other home banks or state-owned banks located in other states when 
the fiscal condition of the home state deteriorates (in terms of the number of stability criteria 
that are breached). Overall, the results are in line with moral suasion of home state-owned 
banks by state governments. 
Discussion of endogeneity concerns 
One potential concern is that state ownership might be endogenous to banks’ holdings of 
state bonds if ownership by states is conditional on the importance of a bank for state funding. 
Several arguments mitigate this concern in this case. First, my baseline approach uses only the 
extensive margin of state ownership, i.e. an indicator whether a bank is owned by the state or 
not. State ownership of regional development banks and Landesbanken is a structural 
characteristic of the German banking system that persisted for a long time (De Marco and 
Macchiavelli, 2016). In contrast, banks adjust their state bond holdings frequently. It is thus 
unlikely that state ownership is a function of banks’ state bond holdings. 
Second, regional development banks are fully state-owned and their debt is guaranteed by 
the state such that further increases in the intensity of state ownership conditional on state 
bond holdings are not possible. 
Third, I test for moral suasion using a restricted sample period from 2010 onwards (see 
Section 2.4.3.1). This smaller sample excludes the financial crisis, during which some 
Landesbanken have suffered large losses to their wholesale activities and have had to be 
recapitalized by their owners, i.e. the states and the savings banks associations (Puri et al., 
2011). Excluding the financial crisis eliminates all changes in the state ownership indicator 
making it pre-determined for the subsequent sample. Results on moral suasion remain robust. 
Finally, to further corroborate this argument, I test whether weakly capitalized state-owned 
banks hold more home state bonds presumably to increase bailout probability (see Section 
2.4.3.2 and column 1 of Table 2.14). I find that capitalization has no significant effect on 
home state bond holdings of state-owned banks. In fact, highly capitalized state-owned banks 
generally hold more state bonds, irrespective of the issuer. 
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The intensity of state control  
Based on these arguments, I extend the analysis beyond the binary state ownership 
indicator and account for differences in the intensity of government control within the group 
of state-owned banks (for descriptive statistics, see Table 2.2). Table 2.10 gives the results 
from a Heckman model using a sample of state-owned banks only in columns 1 to 3 and on 
39 large banks (including the 23 state-owned banks) in column 4 for which data on 
supervisory board members could be gathered. Bank control variables (as specified in Table 
2.7) and issuer-time dummies are included. 
State-owned banks hold more bonds issued by the home than by other states (column 1 of 
Table 2.10) but this preference for home bonds is smaller for banks that are owned by more 
than one state (column 2 of Table 2.10). The latter result is in line with a stronger influence of 
political agents that are homogenous. Column 3 of Table 2.10 shows that the degree of state 
ownership matters. Banks hold more home state bonds if a larger share of bank equity is 
owned by the home state. Finally, banks with a larger share of state politicians in their 
supervisory boards also hold more home state bonds. To sum up, the preference for home 
state bonds increases with the degree of state control over a bank.   
2.4.3 Additional results 
2.4.3.1 Robustness tests 
My main findings remain robust to different measures for a state’s fiscal situation, different 
computation methods of standard errors, to constraining the sample to the period after the 
introduction of the Stability Council, and to excluding city states. 
Table 2.11 shows results from the intensive margin of a Heckman model using alternative 
measures for a state’s fiscal condition. Columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.11 use the structural net 
lending / borrowing, the credit funding ratio, the interest expense to tax income ratio and the 
outstanding state debt respectively. In contrast to the composite, baseline measure “breaches 
of stability criteria”, these indicators measure the fiscal strength of each state on a continuous 
scale and thus address the concern that the findings rely on relatively few breaches only. All 
four fiscal measures confirm the findings on moral suasion from the baseline results: state-
owned banks hold more home bonds than other home banks or state-owned banks located in 
other states, if the home state is in a weak fiscal condition (columns 1 to 4 of Table 2.11). 
Furthermore, the information whether a state breaches the stability criteria has explanatory 
power for banks’ state bond holdings even after controlling for the state debt burden (column 
5 of Table 2.11). This supports the use of my baseline fiscal measure. 
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In the baseline estimations, I use heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The idea behind 
this is that banks decide whether they want to invest in a particular state bond or not without 
having a binding portfolio constraint. The portfolio constraint is alleviated since German state 
bonds can be used as collateral with the Eurosystem or in the interbank market to obtain 
additional funding. If, however, banks target a fixed size of their total state bond portfolio, the 
decision to invest in a particular bond depends on all other state bonds. As a result, a bank’s 
bond holdings might be correlated between states. In a robustness test I allow for this by 
clustering on the bank-time level and results remain robust (column 1 of Table 2.12). 
Furthermore, if banks hold state bonds until maturity, there is persistence in state bond 
holdings over time. In column 2 of Table 2.12, I therefore cluster on the bank-issuer level and 
find that parameter estimates remain similar but standard errors increase and thus effects 
become insignificant.22 
Next, assessments of stability criteria are only available after the introduction of the 
Stability Council. In my baseline specifications, I account for this through interaction effects 
with an indicator that is equal to one from the establishment of the Stability Council onwards. 
Results are also robust against excluding the period before the Stability Council (column 3 of 
Table 2.12). 
Finally, I test whether my results are driven by state-owned banks located in the so-called 
“city states” (i.e. Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg). These states are special since they consist of 
cities only. If their fiscal situation is structurally weaker due to larger expenditures per capita 
and if, at the same time, state-owned banks in these states are large relative to the outstanding 
volume of state bonds, banks located in city states might be driving my results. However, 
columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.12 show that the findings on moral suasion remain nearly 
unchanged when I exclude banks located in city states or restrict the sample to banks from 
city states respectively. More generally, my findings cannot be explained by large banks that 
happen to be located in weak states, since my results hold after controlling for bank-issuer 
unobserved heterogeneity in Table 2.9. 
  
                                                 
22
 Due to lower degrees of freedom, I do not include any fixed effects in this specification but follow the baseline 
specification from column 1 of Table 2.7. 
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2.4.3.2 Alternative hypotheses 
Besides moral suasion, the theoretical literature suggests further incentives for banks to 
invest in home government debt which I address below. 
First, banks might hold more home government bonds in order to shift risks from bank 
owners to debtors (Ari, 2016) or taxpayers (Farhi and Tirole, 2016). In the model of Farhi and 
Tirole (2016), weak banks load up on risky home sovereign debt in order to maximize the 
value of the “bailout put”, i.e. the taxpayers’ money that banks can extract in a bailout. While 
asset classes other than German state bonds seem more apt to engage in risk taking, the 
bailout probability of a bank may increase with home government bond holdings as long as 
the bailout capacity of the government is sufficient (Farhi and Tirole, 2016). In fact, Koetter 
and Popov (2017) show that German savings banks are more likely to receive a bailout when 
they have higher holdings of home state bonds. Therefore, Table 2.13 tests whether weakly 
capitalized banks or “high credit risk” banks have higher holdings of home government 
bonds, especially in fiscally weak states. Bank capitalization is measured as capital over 
unweighted assets to ensure that it is not affected by the zero risk weights of state bonds. 
“High credit risk” banks are banks in the upper quartile of the non-performing loan ratio 
distribution in the respective year. 
I do not find evidence for the hypothesis on increasing bailout probability, since bank 
capitalization and credit risk does not significantly affect the bank’s home state bond holdings 
(columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.13 respectively). Furthermore, well capitalized banks - not 
weakly capitalized banks - have larger bond holdings when the state breaches stability 
criteria, irrespective of whether it is the home or another state (see significantly positive 
coefficient on “Capitalization (%) * Breaches of stability criteria” and insignificant coefficient 
on “Home * Capitalization (%) * Breaches of stability criteria” in column 2 of Table 2.13). 
This result is in line with findings by Ongena et al. (2016) on large European banks from 
countries experiencing a sovereign debt crisis. Focusing on home government debt only, they 
show that well capitalized banks – not weakly capitalized banks – lend more when the 
government is faced with a high funding need. 
Overall, after controlling for bank riskiness, my results remain in line with moral suasion 
as reflected in the positively significant parameter on the interaction effect “Home * State-
owned * Breaches of stability criteria” in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.13. 
Second, I test whether state-owned banks hold more home state bonds when their 
capitalization (measured as bank equity over unweighted assets) is low. The idea behind this 
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is that lowly-capitalized banks could engage in political endearing by financing the home state 
and thereby increase the likelihood of being bailed out. As discussed in Section 2.4.2.2 and 
due to direct state ownership or full-fledged state guarantees (for development banks), the 
incentives for state-owned banks to engage in such behavior should be lower than for savings 
banks that may need to bridge a political gap (Koetter and Popov, 2017). Still, I check 
whether weakly capitalized state-owned banks drive my results and find that the level of a 
state-owned bank’s capitalization does not significantly affect its home state bond holdings 
(see insignificant coefficient on “Home * State-owned * Capitalization (%)” in column 1 of 
Table 2.14). Generally, highly capitalized state-owned banks hold more (home and other) 
state bonds (see positive coefficient on “State-owned * Capitalization (%)”). In this respect, 
state-owned banks do not differ from the average German bank that shows no sign of risk-
shifting through state bonds (Table 2.13). 
Third, the lack of good private lending opportunities rather than moral suasion could be 
behind banks’ large home state bond holdings in times of weak fiscal conditions (for a 
theoretical model, see Gennaioli et al., 2014). Since the home economy is likely to be in a bad 
state when fiscal fundamentals are weak, home government bonds may be used to store 
liquidity for future profitable lending opportunities (Gennaioli et al., 2014). In column 2 of 
Table 2.14, I test whether German banks hold more home state bonds when their lending to 
the private sector is low (i.e. their claims on banks and non-banks relative to total assets are 
low). Contrary to the lending opportunity hypothesis though, banks with a higher loan ratio 
hold more home than other state bonds.  
One explanation for this finding might be that state-owned banks expand their private 
lending activities in weak fiscal situations in order to fulfil their mandate to promote the 
economic and social development within their home state. At the same time, these banks may 
also increase their holdings of home government bonds in weak fiscal situations to support the 
state government that is in need of funding. 
Furthermore, a preference for home over foreign assets has often been explained by 
information asymmetries (Portes et al., 2001). Information costs for the regional government 
bond market are likely to be higher than for the federal government level given the absence of 
a rating for 5 out of 16 German states (Q4:2013) and the lower availability of macroeconomic 
and fiscal data. When testing for the impact of information asymmetries between home and 
out-of-state banks, I make use of the establishment of the Stability Council in 2010. Column 3 
of Table 2.14 shows that an increase in public information through the establishment of the 
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Stability Council reduced the home preference only in “sound” states. In “weak” states the 
home effects gets larger when negative information is available through the publications of 
the Stability Council (the positive significant parameter on “Home * Breaches of stability 
criteria” is larger than the negative parameter on “Home * Stability Council”). Out-of-state 
banks have lower state bond holdings in these situations. Hence, while potential information 
advantages of home banks are reduced through the publications of the Stability Council, home 
banks in weak states hold more state bonds than out-of-state banks. 
Finally, since my analysis is on the regional instead of the national level, I can exclude two 
other hypotheses that have been suggested in the literature: banking supervision (Farhi and 
Tirole, 2016) and redenomination risk (Battistini et al., 2014). German state governments do 
not have any bank supervisory powers that they could use to increase home bias. And while 
the perceived risk of a break-up of the euro area might have driven the home bias at the 
national level in European sovereign debt markets (Battistini et al., 2014), this would not have 
introduced redenomination risk in the German subnational state government bond market. 
All in all, after testing for alternative hypotheses, evidence remains in line with moral 
suasion by state governments on home state-owned banks. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This study tests the hypothesis that governments use moral suasion on home (state-owned) 
banks to hold home government debt in the context of the German regional government bond 
market. Thereby, it makes use of differences in the states’ fiscal condition as measured by the 
stability criteria of the German Stability Council as well as differences in bank location and 
ownership. This chapter is complementary to recent cross-country studies on moral suasion 
and mitigates differences in the institutional and regulatory framework by focusing on the 
regional level. The empirical methodology controls for self-selection of banks into holding 
state bonds and uses the variation in state bond holdings between banks and within banks 
across different issuers over time to control for alternative incentives of banks to hold (home) 
state bonds.  
The main findings are the following. Home banks are more likely to hold home state bonds 
and hold a significantly larger volume of these bonds if the home state breaches criteria of the 
Stability Council. In contrast, banks located in other states (out-of-state banks) hold fewer 
state bonds in this situation. Banks directly owned by the state government (i.e. Landesbanken 
and regional development banks) have larger home state bond holdings than other home 
banks and state-owned banks located in other states. Within the group of state-owned banks, 
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the preference for home state bonds is larger if the state owns a larger share of the bank’s 
equity and if there are more state politicians on the supervisory board. Finally, state-owned 
banks that are located in states that breach criteria of the Stability Council hold more home 
state bonds than their counterparts in fiscally sound states. These results are in line with moral 
suasion by state governments on home state-owned banks.  
The findings remain after controlling for bank characteristics such as size, capitalization, 
deposit ratio and credit risk, for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at the issuer level, and 
for several alternative hypotheses such as risk-shifting by banks (Farhi and Tirole, 2016), 
information asymmetries (Portes et al., 2001) or alternative lending opportunities (Gennaioli 
et al., 2014). The results are robust to using different empirical models, different measures of 
fiscal strength and controlling for unobserved time-varying heterogeneity at the issuer and at 
the bank level and time-constant heterogeneity at the bank-issuer level. 
My findings have implications for risk-sharing between German states. I find that state-
owned banks hold more bonds issued by (home and other) states that breach the criteria of the 
Stability Council. While the effect is largest for home state bonds, it is significantly positive 
for other states as well. As a result, exposures of state-owned banks may introduce another 
channel of contagion between German states beyond the institutional channels such as the 
fiscal equalization scheme. For the European context, Kirschenmann, Korte and Steffen 
(2016) show that banks’ cross-border exposures increase correlation between default risks of 
sovereigns. 
Finally, soft borrowing constraints for regional governments are a major issue in federal 
unions, including Germany (Baskaran, 2012). The publications of the German Stability 
Council can reinforce fiscal discipline if bond market participants take differences in the 
states’ fiscal strength into account. Indeed, I find that out-of-state banks that are not state-
owned hold fewer bonds from states that breach criteria of the Stability Council. However, 
home (state-owned) banks hold more state bonds in these situations and thereby potentially 
mitigate market discipline. The research on the role of market discipline in federal systems 
(Heppke-Falk and Wolff 2008; Lemmen, 1999) could benefit from taking the heterogeneity in 
the investment incentives of market participants into account.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
2.A Data 
 
List of state-owned banks 
 
This list gives the names of German banks that are directly owned by a state government (fully or only 
a fraction of bank equity) and are included in my analysis as “state-owned”. 
 
Bayerische Landesbank 
Bremer Aufbau-Bank 
Bremer Landesbank 
Hamburgische Investitions- und Foerderbank (prev: Hamburgische 
Wohnungsbaukreditanstalt) 
HSH Nordbank 
Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz  (ISB)  
Investitionsbank Berlin 
Investitionsbank des Landes Brandenburg 
Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein 
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Landesbank Berlin (until 2007; then owned by savings association) 
Landesbank Hessen-Thueringen 
Landesbank Saar 
Landesbank Sachsen (until 2008, then susidiary of LBBW) 
Landeskreditbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 
LfA Foederbank Bayern 
Norddeutsche Landesbank 
NRW.Bank 
Saarlaendische Investitionskreditbank 
Saechsische Aufbaubank 
Thueringer Aufbaubank 
WestLB (until mid 2012; then Portigon as legal sucessor) 
Landestreuhandbank Rheinland-Pfalz (until end 2011; then merged with ISB 
Rheinland-Pfalz) 
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Definitions of variables and data sources 
Sovereign bond portfolios 
Exposure to issuer state EXP: a dummy variable which is equal to one if the bank i holds 
bonds issued by state j in quarter t and zero otherwise. The information is based on the 
Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
State Bond Holdings SOV: notional value of a bank’s state bond holdings of state j in quarter 
t. Data are obtained from the Securities Holdings Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Individual security data are aggregated to the issuer state level by summing up overall ISINs 
per state, bank and quarter. Only state bonds held on banks’ own accounts are included, 
covering both the banking book and the trading book.  
Political economy variables 
Home: a dummy variable which is equal to one if the bank’s headquarters is located in the 
issuer state. If a bank has more than one headquarters (in the case of a few Landesbanken), I 
treat all headquarters locations as home states. But results are robust to defining just one 
headquarters following the bank supervisory database. The information is based on bank 
supervisory data of the Deutsche Bundesbank and Bloomberg. 
State-owned: a dummy variable which is equal to one if the bank is directly owned by a state. 
These include some Landesbanken and state development banks. For a complete list of state-
owned banks see Appendix A1. Information is taken from supervisory data on bank 
ownership and from public homepages of banks. 
State-level variables 
State debt: state debt per capita (in thd euro). All debt instruments including bonds and loans 
are included. Only debt associated with the core budget (“Kernhaushalt”) is considered. 
Additional budgets (“Extrahaushalt”) contain spending related to bad banks and public 
enterprises that would distort my analysis. The information is collected from the German 
Federal Statistical Office and in annual frequency. 
State bonds outstanding: volume of outstanding state bonds per issuer (in mn eur). The 
information is collected from the German Ministery of Finance and in annual frequency. 
Stability Council: a dummy variable which is equal to one after the introduction of the 
German Stability Council in the first quarter of 2010. 
Breaches of stability criteria: the number of stability criteria that are breached according to 
the German Stability Council. This ordinal variable ranges from zero to eight. The Stability 
Council assesses four criteria in the following two dimensions: current budgetary situation 
(covering the current and last two years) and future fiscal planning (covering the next four 
years). Criteria include structural net lending/borrowing (per capita), credit funding ratio (i.e. 
net borrowing to fiscal budget) (%), interest expense to tax income ratio (%) and outstanding 
debt (per capita). The information is collected from the annual online publications (in 
German) of the German Stability Council. For more information on the Stability Council, see 
http://www.stabilitaetsrat.de/EN/Home/home_node.html. 
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Bank-level variables 
Balance sheet total: log of total assets (in thsd euro) of the bank. Data are taken from the 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. It is a measure for bank size. 
Capitalization: ratio of equity capital (= subscribed capital + reserves - published losses) to 
total assets (in %), obtained from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. This variable reflects the risk-bearing capacity of banks. 
Commitments ratio: ratio of commitments (= contingent liabilities + placing and underwriting 
commitments + irrevocable lending commitments) to total assets plus commitments (in %) 
obtained from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Deposit ratio: ratio of overnight deposits from household and non-financial firms to total 
assets (in %) obtained from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
Loan ratio: ratio of claims on banks and non-banks (= loans + advances, including received 
bills) to total assets (in %) obtained from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. 
NPL (4th quartile): an indicator equal to one if bank is in the 4th quartile of the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans (in %) in the respective year as obtained from the annual 
financial statements submitted to the Deutsche Bundesbank. To account for the statistical 
breaks in prudential definitions of NPL, I use this relative NPL indicator instead of comparing 
NPL ratios over time. 
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2.B Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Funding structure of German states 
 
This Figure shows the decomposition of the aggregate outstanding debt of German states by debt type (i.e. 
bonds, loans from banks and other debt) over time. Data are taken from Deutsche Bundesbank. 
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Figure 2.2: Heterogeneity between states in the fiscal indicators  
 
This Figure shows the distribution of four fiscal indicators over time using boxplots. The upper (lower) hinge of the box 
shows the 75th (25th) percentile of the distribution. The median is indicated by the horizontal line within a box and the lines 
give the upper and lower adjacent values respectively. Outside values are not shown. The upper left panel shows the interest 
expense to tax income (in %), the upper right panel the state debt level Per Capita (in thsd euro), the lower left panel the 
credit funding ratio (i.e. net borrowing to fiscal budget, in %) and the lower right panel the structural net borrowing Per 
Capita (in thsd euro). Data are collected from the public reports by the Stability Council that can be accessed at 
http://www.stabilitaetsrat.de/EN/Home/home_node.html. 
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Table 2.1: Assessments by the German Stability Council 
This Table shows the variation in assessments of the German Stability Council between states, i.e. the variation in the 
variables "breaches of stability criteria". Columns give the number of stability criteria that are breached by the issuer 
state. The variable ranges from zero to eight, i.e. four criteria in two dimensions each (current fiscal situation and 
future budgetary planning). Criteria include structural net lending/borrowing (per capita), credit funding ratio (%), 
interest expense to tax income ratio (%) and outstanding debt (per capita). Each observation in the Table gives the 
assessment of one year. For each state there are four observations, i.e. annual assessments of the Stability Council 
from 2010-2013. 
Number of stability criteria that are breached 
Issuer 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bavaria 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Berlin 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Bremen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Hamburg 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hesse 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lower Saxony 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Northrhine-Westphalia 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhineland Palatinate 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saarland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Schleswig Holstein 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brandenburg 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thuringia 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saxony 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total (=64) 35 11 5 1 2 2 0 2 6 
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Table 2.2: Intensity of state government control over state-owned banks 
This Table shows descriptive statistics for the intensity of state government control over state-owned 
banks. The first row shows the share of bank capital owned by the state (in %). The subgroup of regional 
development banks are fully state-owned, which is shown in italics in the second row. The following 
rows report the owners of state-owned banks other than the state governments. Other proxies for the 
intensity of state control are an indicator variable on whether the bank is owned by more than one state 
and the share of state politicians on the supervisory board (in %). Column 3 gives the share of the 
respective banks in the total assets of the German banking system (in %). For instance, banks that are 
owned by several states account for 9.12% of the banking system's assets. The Table shows unweighted 
averages for the 20 state-owned banks at the second quarter of 2014. 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Mean Std 
Size of banks in % 
of banking system 
assets 
Share owned by state (in %) 83.17 25.88 16.96 
Other owners of state-owned banks 
 
  
Savings association (in %) 10.68 20.58 
 
Other public banks (in %) 2.84 12.24 
 
Other (in %) 3.31 7.82 
 
Owned by several states (1/0) 0.20 0.41 9.12 
State politicians on supervisory board (in %) 44.00 25.00   
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Table 2.3 German banks' government bond portfolios 
This Table shows the importance of state bonds in the government bond portfolios of German banks. Unweighted 
averages within each banking group are reported. The group of cooperative banks include the head institutions. 
Column 1 shows total assets in bn euro, Columns 2 and 3 the overall government bond portfolio and Columns 4 
and 5 holdings of German central government bonds. Columns 6 and 7 give the state bonds holdings per banking 
group. Column 8 shows the number of banks per banking group. Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre 
(RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, own 
calculations, 1,732 banks as of Q2:2014. Data are for the second quarter of 2014. 
Total 
assets 
(TA) 
 Government bond 
portfolio (Gov PF) 
German central 
government bond 
holdings  
 German state bond 
holdings  
 No of 
banks 
  
 bn euro  bn euro  in % of TA  bn euro 
 in % of 
Gov PF  bn euro 
 in % of 
Gov PF  No 
Commercial banks 15.69 0.54 3% 0.02 5% 0.25 46% 167 
State-owned banks 63.54 5.13 8% 0.17 3% 2.06 40% 20 
Savings banks 2.65 0.11 4% 0.00 3% 0.06 57% 417 
Cooperative banks 0.97 0.04 4% 0.00 1% 0.01 33% 1,076 
Mortgage banks 24.67 3.26 13% 0.01 0% 0.66 20% 17 
Other MFI 29.39 1.03 3% 0.00 0% 0.42 41% 35 
All banks 4.33 0.21 3% 0.01 3% 0.09 41% 1,732 
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Table 2.4: Banks’ likelihood of holding state bonds 
This Table shows results for estimating the determinants of the banks’ likelihood of holding some state 
bonds using Probit estimations. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds some state 
bonds in quarter t is the dependent variable. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. Fixed 
effects are included as specified in the lower part of the Table.  Data sources: Research Data and Service 
Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet 
Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations. Marginal effects for the Prbit estimations are reported in 
Column 2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors are shown in 
brackets. 
(1) (2) 
Probit results Marginal Effects 
Balance sheet total (ln) 0.309*** 0.122*** 
(0.004) (0.002) 
Capitalization (%) 
-0.021*** -0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Deposit ratio (%) 0.012*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Commitment ratio (%) 
-0.011*** -0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.001) 
NPL (4th quartile) 
-0.017 -0.007 
(0.012) (0.005) 
State-owned bank 0.318*** 0.126*** 
(0.064) (0.025) 
Constant -4.526*** 
(0.070) 
      
Observations 64,463 64,463 
FE Time Time 
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Table 2.5 Home bias in banks' state bond portfolios 
This Table shows descriptive statistics on the home bias in banks' state bond portfolios measured as 
HomeBias_it=1-(The group of cooperative banks include the head institutions.  Share of foreign 
state bonds in portfolio_it)/(Share of foreign  bonds in German state bond markets_t ). Column 1 
gives the mean of the home bias measure in the respective banking group, Column 2 the standard 
deviation and Column 3 the number of banks in each banking group. Banks that do not have any 
state bond holdings in 2014 Q2 are exlcuded because the home bias is not defined in these cases. 
Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities 
Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, own calculations, 933 banks. Data are for 
the second quarter of 2014.  
(1) (2) (3) 
Bank type Home bias No of banks 
    mean sd   
Commercial banks 0.02 0.22 72 
State-owned banks 0.19 0.29 19 
Savings banks 0.07 0.30 319 
Cooperative banks  0.08 0.33 486 
Mortgage banks 0.00 0.18 16 
Other MFI   0.14 0.28 21 
All banks   0.08 0.31 933 
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics for Heckman model estimations 
This Table shows in Panel A descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in selection and outcome 
equation and in Panel B the complete observations of issuer-specific variables in the selection and the 
outcome equations. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for bank variables. The variables are defined in 
the Appendix A2. The variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) 
that a state breaches in the respective year as reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of 
all variables, see data appendix. Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own 
calculations, 2,024 banks (unbalanced), and 16 issuer states. I include the 25th and 75th percentile of 
variables for the outcome equation in order to better assess the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in 
the outcome equation. 
  
Selection 
equation Outcome equation 
1,031,203 89,171 
  Mean Stdv Mean  Stdv p25 p75 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Holding bonds issued by state j (dummy) 0.09 0.28 
 
   
Volume held of bonds issued by state j (ln) 
 
 
15.97 1.74 14.73 16.99 
Volume held of bonds issued by state j (euro bn) 
 
 
0.05 0.22 0.00 0.02 
Panel B: State-specific variables 
State bonds outstanding 13.81 16.35 27.14 22.15 9.16 34.75 
State debt (thd euro PC) 8.61 7.43 9.45 9.66 6.08 9.00 
Stability Council 0.41 0.49 0.55 0.50 
 
 
Breaches of stability criteria 0.68 1.86 0.65 1.51 
 
 
Home 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.33 
 
 
Panel C: Bank-specific variables 
Balance sheet total (ln) 13.18 1.59 14.62 2.04 13.25 15.52 
Capitalization (%) 6.37 5.78 5.13 2.62 4.07 5.92 
Deposit ratio (%) 26.53 12.94 23.64 15.19 12.50 34.60 
Commitment ratio (%) 5.21 3.62 5.64 4.05 3.12 6.99 
NPL (4th quartile) 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41     
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Table 2.6: Differences between home and out-of-state banks 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in state bonds 
using a Heckman model. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings of state j is the dependent variable in 
the outcome equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of state j is the 
dependent variable in the selection equation. An indicator that is equal to one from the introduction of the 
Stability Council onwards is included (stand-alone and interacted with home indicator) but not reported. 
The variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state 
breaches in the respective year as reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all 
variables, see data appendix. Fixed effects are included as specified in the lower part of the Table. The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. Data 
sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings 
Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations. Marginal effects 
for the extensive margin are reported in Column 4. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
(Marginal 
Effects) 
      
Home 0.317*** 0.323*** 0.485*** 0.025*** 
(0.025) (0.010) (0.029) (0.001) 
State bonds outstanding 0.032*** 0.022*** 
(0.001) (0.000) 
Breaches of stability criteria  -0.008*** -0.015*** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria  0.152*** 0.013 0.155*** 0.002** 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.019) (0.001) 
Balance sheet total (ln) 1.022*** 0.322*** 1.195*** 0.027*** 
(0.017) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) 
Capitalization (%) -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.049*** -0.002*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
Deposit ratio (%) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Commitment ratio (%) -0.037*** -0.007*** -0.040*** -0.001*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
NPL (4th quartile) -0.116*** -0.049*** -0.140*** -0.004*** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.000) 
Constant -1.724*** -6.276*** -4.844*** 
(0.392) (0.025) (0.458) 
          
Observations 89,171 1,031,203 89,171 1,031,203 
FE No No Issuer-Time Issuer, Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 1.379 1.994 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0698   0.0810   
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Table 2.8: Differences between state-owned and other banks  
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in state bonds using a 
Heckman model and distinguishing between state-owned and other banks. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings 
of state j is the dependent variable in the outcome equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds 
bonds of state j is the dependent variable in the selection equation. The variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures 
the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the respective year as reported by the German Stability 
Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. Fixed effects and bank control variables are included as 
specified in the lower part of the Table. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and 
corrects for self-selection. Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations.  ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Split by Stability Council assessment 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
Extensive 
margin 
(Marginal 
Effects) 
          
Home 0.452*** 0.296*** 0.444*** 0.295*** 0.024*** 
(0.029) (0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.001) 
State-owned bank -0.269*** 0.074*** -0.378*** 0.072*** 0.006*** 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.041) (0.021) (0.002) 
Home * State-owned bank 0.886*** 0.386*** 0.852*** 0.455*** 0.037*** 
(0.095) (0.060) (0.120) (0.073) (0.006) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria 0.092*** -0.004 -0.000 
(0.021) (0.010) (0.001) 
State-owned * Breaches of stability criteria 0.047*** 0.013 0.001 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.001) 
Home * State-owned * Breaches of stability 
criteria 0.135** 0.115*** 0.009*** 
(0.053) (0.030) (0.002) 
Constant -4.983*** -6.189*** -4.699*** -6.191*** 
(0.464) (0.030) (0.457) (0.030) 
            
Observations 89,171 1,031,203 89,171 1,031,203 1,031,203 
Bank control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
FE 
Issuer-
Time 
Issuer, 
Time 
Issuer-
Time 
Issuer, 
Time Issuer, Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 2.002 1.950 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0821   0.0808     
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Table 2.9: Alternative empirical approaches 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in state bonds relative to 
outstanding state bonds using fractional data response models and fixed effects regressions. The proportion of state 
bond holdings relative to the outstanding state bonds  is the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 and multiplied 
by 100% in Columns 3. The variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) 
that a state breaches in the respective year as reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all 
variables, see data appendix. Fixed effects, underlying interaction effects and bank control variables are included as 
specified in the lower part of the Table.  Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own 
calculations.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Standard errors clustered at the 
issuer-time level are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Fractional logit Fractional logit OLS regression 
Proportion 
including zeros 
Proportion 
including zeros 
Proportion (in %) 
including zeros 
        
Home 0.299*** 0.509*** 
(0.082) (0.088) 
Home * State-owned bank 0.744*** 0.661*** 
(0.116) (0.121) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria 0.010 0.003 0.006*** 
(0.049) (0.042) (0.001) 
State-owned * Breaches of stability criteria 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.046*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Home * State-owned * Breaches of stability criteria 0.120** 0.109*** 0.285*** 
(0.049) (0.042) (0.029) 
Constant -21.496*** -21.721*** 
(0.144) (0.163) 
        
Observations 1,029,507 1,029,507 1,036,067 
Bank control variables Y Y Y 
FE No Issuer, Time 
Issuer-Time; 
Bank-Time; 
Bank-Issuer 
Interactions effects Y Y Y 
R-squared     0.366 
 
  
Chapter 2: Moral suasion in regional government bond markets 
 
108 
Table 2.10: Intensity of government control on state-owned banks 
This Table shows regression results for estimating the impact of state control on banks’ state bond holdings using 
a Heckman model. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings of state j is the dependent variable in the outcome 
equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of state j is the dependent variable in 
the selection equation. For the sake of brevity, only the results from the intensive margin are reported. The 
variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the 
respective year as reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. 
Fixed effects and bank control variables are included as specified in the lower part of the Table. The inverse Mills 
ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. Only state-owned banks are 
included in columns 1 to 3; column 4 additionally includes 39 large banks for which supervisory board 
information was collected for the years 2013 and 2014. Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – 
Q2:2014, own calculations, except for Column 4 which covers Q1:2013 to Q2: 2014.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline Multiple state 
owners 
Intensity of 
state 
ownership 
Supervisory 
board 
membership 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
        
Home 1.157*** 1.776*** 0.625*** 0.653*** 
(0.085) (0.120) (0.125) (0.187) 
Owned by several states 1.073*** 
(0.075) 
Home * Owned by several states -1.026*** 
(0.159) 
Intensity of state ownership -0.246*** 
(0.093) 
Home * Intensity of state ownership 0.959*** 
(0.190) 
State politicians in supervisory board (%) -2.010*** 
(0.338) 
Home * State politicians in supervisory board 
(%) 2.690*** 
(0.584) 
Constant -1.857 -2.858** 0.912 12.752*** 
(1.345) (1.258) (1.214) (1.012) 
Observations 3,965 3,965 3,965 1,561 
Bank control variables Y Y Y Y 
FE Issuer-Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 0.984 1.500 0.668 1.522 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.139 0.133 0.128 0.269 
 
  
Chapter 2: Moral suasion in regional government bond markets 
 
109 
Table 2.11: Robustness tests using different measures for the states’ fiscal 
situation 
This Table shows robustness results from a Heckman model using different measures for the fiscal situation of 
states. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings of state j is the dependent variable in the outcome equation. An 
indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of state j is the dependent variable in the selection 
equation. For the sake of brevity, only the results from the intensive margin are reported. Columns 1-4 give the 
results for the structural net lending / borrowing, the credit funding ratio, the interest expense to tax income ratio 
and the outstanding state debt respectively as fiscal variables on the issuing state. Data for these variables are taken 
from the publications of the Stability Council and thus are available for 2010Q4 - 2014Q2 only. Column 5 uses 
outstanding state debt as provided by statistical offices and is thus available for the entire sample period. The 
variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the 
respective year as reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. 
Issuer-time fixed effects, bank control variables and all necessary two-way interaction effects are included. The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. Data sources: 
Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations, in Columns 4-5 and the period from Q4:2010 to 
Q2:2014 in Columns 1-3 due to data availability.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Fiscal variables Structural net lending/borrowing 
Credit 
funding 
ratio 
Interest 
expense 
to tax 
income 
ratio 
Outstanding 
state debt  
(thd eur 
PC) 
Outstanding 
state debt  
(thd eur 
PC) 
Intensive margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
            
Home 0.612*** 0.611*** 0.410*** 0.364*** 0.361*** 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.064) (0.029) (0.031) 
Home * State-owned bank 0.630*** 0.575*** 0.153 0.879*** 0.797*** 
(0.146) (0.148) (0.291) (0.127) (0.147) 
Home * Fiscal variable -0.001*** -0.040*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.009*** 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
State-owned bank * Fiscal variable 0.000*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
Home * State-owned bank * Fiscal 
variable 0.003*** 0.133*** 0.101*** 0.023** 0.006 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.024) (0.011) (0.012) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria 0.081*** 
(0.021) 
Home * State-owned * Breaches of 
stability criteria 
0.121** 
(0.053) 
Constant -3.177*** -3.113*** -2.954*** -3.889*** -4.020*** 
(0.496) (0.493) (0.492) (0.435) (0.443) 
            
Observations 48,803 48,803 48,803 89,171 89,171 
Bank control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effects Y Y Y Y Y 
FE Issuer-Time 
Issuer-
Time 
Issuer-
Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 1.627 1.613 1.585 1.803 1.827 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0899 0.0893 0.0890 0.0770 0.0784 
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Table 2.12: Robustness tests  
This Table shows robustness results  for estimating the determinants of banks’ investments in state bonds using a 
Heckman model. The log of bank i’s bond holdings of state j is the dependent variable in the outcome equation. An 
indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of state j is the dependent variable in the selection 
equation. For the sake of brevity, only the results from the outcome equation are reported. The variable “breaches of 
stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the respective year as reported 
by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. Fixed effects, bank control 
variables and all necessary interaction effects are included as specified in the lower part of the Table. The inverse 
Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. Data sources: Research Data 
and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet 
Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations, except for in Column 3 where it covers Q1:2010 to Q2:2014.  ***, 
** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  Standard errors are clustered at the bank-time level in 
Column 1 and at the bank-issuer level in Column 2 using a bootstrap technique. In Column 3 robust standard errors 
are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Std errors 
clustered 
at bank-
time level 
Std 
errors 
clustered 
at bank-
issuer 
level 
Since 
Stability 
Council 
Excluding 
city states 
Only city 
states 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
            
Home 0.437*** 0.274*** 0.404*** 0.480*** 0.121 
(0.026) (0.088) (0.030) (0.031) (0.141) 
Home * State-owned bank 0.833*** 0.762 0.808*** 0.612*** 0.371 
(0.120) (0.545) (0.119) (0.146) (0.256) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria 0.092*** 0.112* 0.073*** 0.012 -0.133** 
(0.019) (0.060) (0.019) (0.026) (0.061) 
Home * State-owned * Breaches of stability 
criteria 0.140*** 0.024 0.156*** 0.137* 0.281*** 
(0.041) (0.171) (0.044) (0.072) (0.091) 
Constant -4.617*** -1.615 -2.587*** -5.955*** 3.761*** 
(0.587) (1.255) (0.487) (0.519) (1.157) 
            
Observations 89,171 89,171 48,803 83,456 5,715 
Bank control variables Y Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effects Y Y Y Y Y 
FE 
Issuer-
Time No 
Issuer-
Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 1.932 1.341 1.532 2.088 0.909 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0804 0.0693 0.0882 0.0906 0.210 
 
  
Chapter 2: Moral suasion in regional government bond markets 
 
111 
Table 2.13: Testing the risk-shifting hypothesis 
This Table shows regression results from a Heckman model for testing whether banks’ investments in state bonds 
can be explained by the risk shifting hypothesis. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings of state j is the 
dependent variable in the outcome equation. For the sake of brevity, only the results from the outcome equation are 
reported. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. 
Column 1 and 2 analyse the impact of banks' capital ratio and Column 3 and 4 the impact of a banks' non 
performing loans ratio on its state bond holdings decisions. The variable “breaches of stability criteria” captures the 
number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the respective year as reported by the German Stability 
Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. Issuer-time fixed effects, bank control variables and all 
necessary two-way interaction effects are included. Data sources: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, 
own calculations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Robust standard errors are 
shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capitalization NPL Ratio 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
Intensive 
margin 
      
Home 0.428*** 0.394*** 0.541*** 0.457*** 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.025) (0.031) 
Home * Capitalization (%) 0.005 0.003 (0.005) (0.007) 
Capitalization (%) * Breaches of stability 
criteria 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
Home * Capitalization (%) * Breaches of 
stability criteria 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria  0.104* 0.087*** (0.058) (0.024) 
Home * State-owned * Breaches of 
stability criteria 
0.159*** 0.136*** 
(0.053) (0.053) 
Home * NPL (%) -0.052 -0.080* 
(0.034) (0.047) 
NPL (%) * Breaches of stability criteria 0.032*** (0.008) 
Home * NPL (%) * Breaches of stability 
criteria 
0.008 
(0.041) 
Constant -4.400*** -4.874*** -4.832*** -4.493*** 
(0.451) (0.460) (0.456) (0.451) 
      
    
Observations 89,171 89,171 89,171 89,171 
Bank control variables Y Y Y Y 
Interaction effects Y Y Y Y 
FE Issuer-Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time Issuer-Time 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 1.889 1.997 1.996 1.916 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0797 0.0815 0.0809 0.0800 
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Table 2.14: Testing for alternative explanations 
This Table shows regression results for testing alternative hypotheses on banks’ investments in state bonds using a 
Heckman model. The log of bank i’s sovereign bond holdings of state j is the dependent variable in the outcome 
equation. An indicator equal to one when observing that bank i holds bonds of state j is the dependent variable in 
the selection equation. For the sake of brevity, only the results from the outcome equation are reported. Column 1 
tests whether banks' capitalization (i.e. equity over unweighted assets) affects the holdings of state-owned banks. 
Column 2 tests the hypothesis that banks hold home state bonds to store liquidity for future lending opportunities. 
The loan ratio is defuned as claims on banks and non-banks relative to total assets. Column 3 tests for information 
asymmetries where Stability Council is an indicator equal to one from 2010 onwards. The variable “breaches of 
stability criteria” captures the number of stability criteria (0-8) that a state breaches in the respective year as 
reported by the German Stability Council. For a definition of all variables, see data appendix. Fixed effects, bank 
control variables and underlying interaction effects are included as specified in the lower part of the Table. The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is obtained from the extensive margin and corrects for self-selection. Data sources: 
Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Securities Holdings Statistics and Monthly 
Balance Sheet Statistics, Q4:2005 – Q2:2014, own calculations. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level.  Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. 
(1) (2) (3) 
Capitalization of 
state-owned banks 
Other lending 
opportunities 
Information 
asymmetries 
  Intensive margin Intensive margin Intensive margin 
Home 0.436*** 0.157** 0.317*** 
(0.036) (0.062) (0.025) 
Home * State-owned 1.150*** 
(0.170) 
State-owned * Capitalization (%) 0.151*** 
(0.010) 
Home * State-owned * Capitalization (%) -0.000 
(0.030) 
Loan ratio -0.033*** 
(0.001) 
Home * Loan ratio 0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Home * Breaches of stability criteria  0.165*** 0.152*** 
(0.015) (0.016) 
Breaches of stability criteria  -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
Home * Stability Council -0.061** 
(0.028) 
Stability Council 0.213*** 
(0.016) 
Constant -4.900*** 1.534*** -1.724*** 
(0.458) (0.269) (0.392) 
        
Observations 89,171 89,171 89,171 
Bank control variables Y Y Y 
Interaction effects Y Y Y 
FE Issuer-Time Issuer-Time No 
Inverse Mills ratio (IMR) 2.012 1.230 1.379 
Standard deviation of IMR 0.0815 0.0558 0.0698 
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Chapter 3: The transmission of sovereign risk to 
insurance companies1 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign risk has been one of the 
main threats to financial stability. Many recent research papers investigate the link between 
sovereign risk and the banking system. By contrast, however, research on the effects of 
sovereign risk on insurance companies is very rare. This is surprising, given the importance of 
insurance companies as large institutional investors in sovereign bond markets. Insurers hold 
roughly 12% of all global financial assets (IAIS, 2011) and they invest about 20% of those 
assets in sovereign bonds (J.P. Morgan Cazenove, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to analyse empirically the channels of risk transmission from sovereigns to 
insurers. 
In our empirical methodology, we control for reverse causality using an Instrumental 
Variable approach, identify a portfolio channel and a transmission channel to systemically 
important insurers, and test for differences sovereign risk transmission to insurers, banks and 
non-financial firms.  
Our analysis is based on a novel panel dataset that covers sovereigns, insurance companies, 
banks and non-financial firms from nine countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) over the time 
period from 1 January 2008 to 1 May 2013. We analyse the market’s expectations of default 
risk by using CDS spreads as our baseline risk measure. We control for risk transmission from 
the domestic banking sector and for the macroeconomic environment.  
We find that there is a strong and robust transmission of default risk from sovereigns to 
insurers. This risk spillover is not significantly different from the spillover of sovereign risk 
onto banks but it is stronger than for non-financial firms. We take a closer look at the 
channels of risk transmission and find that insurers which later have been classified as global 
                                                        
1
 Chapter 3 is based on the published article Duell, R., Koenig, F., and Ohls J. (2017) On the exposure of 
insurance companies to sovereign risk - Portfolio investments and market forces. Journal of Financial Stability, 
31, pp. 93–106. The copyright of the original article is with Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier B.V. 
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systemically important insurer (G-SII) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) were more 
susceptible to domestic sovereign risk during our sample period. 
We also test for the impact of insurers’ sovereign bond holdings on insurer default risk 
using portfolio data for 16 large European insurers as provided by J.P. Morgan Cazenove 
(2014). These data are based on the financial reports published by insurance companies and 
are available quarterly from Q4 2009 through to Q1 2013 (see Appendix for a list of insurers). 
We show that sovereign risk spills across borders through insurers’ holdings of foreign 
sovereign bonds. Domestic sovereign bond holdings are not a significant driver of insurer 
default risk in our sample, probably because data are available predominantly for insurers 
from relatively safe countries. These insurers are affected by their exposure to foreign, risky 
sovereigns. We document that diversification in sovereign bond portfolios is low and has been 
declining in recent years.  
Furthermore, we find that sovereign risk transmission to domestic insurers increases with 
the level of sovereign risk and has been stronger in the euro area than elsewhere. Over time, 
however, the transmission of sovereign risk to domestic insurers is rather stable. Finally, risk 
in the domestic banking sector also significantly raises insurance companies’ default risk. 
Our findings are important for policymakers, regulators and the industry alike. The 
portfolio channel identified has important implications for supervisory monitoring and 
designing regulation. At present, domestic sovereign bond investments are generally exempt 
from capital charges under insurance regulation. Under the new European insurance 
regulation, Solvency II, which came into effect at the beginning of 2016, EU sovereign bonds 
are exempt from the credit and concentration risk modules when calculating solvency capital 
requirements under Pillar 1. The regulation thus deems domestic and EU sovereign bonds to 
be risk free for European insurance companies. We show, however, that markets take risks in 
sovereign bond portfolios into account when assessing insurer default risk.  
Insurer stability is of interest from a macroprudential perspective as insurance companies 
pool and allocate risks in the economy, thereby contributing to financial stability. Moreover, 
distress in the insurance sector can destabilize the financial system (International Monetary 
Fund, 2016) given its importance as a large institutional investor.  
Taking into account these issues, it is surprising that research on insurers’ vulnerability to 
sovereign risk is so rare. The only paper known to us that includes insurance companies as 
part of the nexus between sovereigns and the financial system is Billio, Getmansky, Gray, Lo, 
Merton, and Pelizzon (2013). Based on Granger causality and network analysis, this chapter 
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finds that the system of banks, insurance companies, and sovereigns is highly dynamically 
connected. It does not, however, discuss the channels of risk transmission, which is what we 
do in this chapter. 
The literature on risk spillovers between sovereigns and the private sector focuses almost 
exclusively on (i) banks (see, for example, Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2014; Altera and 
Schüler, 2012; Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2014)2 or (ii) (non-financial) firms (see, for 
example, Ciocchini, 2002; Durbin and Ng, 2005). We contribute to this strand of the literature 
by providing insights into the effects of sovereign risk on a third important sector: insurance. 
Before turning to the empirical approach, we first look at the mere correlation of sovereign 
risk and insurer risk. While both sectors tend to move together, the extent of the comovement 
varies between countries  (see Figure 3.1). The blue (red) line reports the average 5-year CDS 
spread of the insurance sector (the sovereign) as published by the data provider, Markit. 
While Figure 3.1 gives a first hint at a relationship between sovereign and insurer risk, this 
finding might be driven by different factors that affect both sovereign and insurer risk 
simultaneously. We will address these concerns in our empirical strategy.  
First, we estimate a reduced form equation of insurer risk on sovereign risk, controlling for 
a number of confounding factors (following the methodology in Acharya et al., 2014, for an 
application to the banking sector). We perform additional checks to address whether 
sovereign risk transmission has a causal and insurer-specific effect. We compare the 
magnitude of transmission across sectors (as in Bühler and Prokopczuk, 2010) and control for 
reverse causality through instrumental variable (IV) regressions (as in Bedendo and Colla, 
2013).  
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss our hypotheses of the 
transmission channels through which sovereign risk spills over onto insurer risk. Section 3.3 
presents the dataset and our empirical strategy. In Section 3.4 we present the results. Section 
3.5 concludes and offers insights into policy implications.  
  
                                                        
2 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that several studies analyse contagion from banks to the 
sovereign, e.g. through bank bail-outs (Alter und Beyer, 2014; Gerlach, Schulz and Wolff, 2010; International 
Monetary Fund, 2012). 
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3.2 Hypotheses of risk transmission channels 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model to guide our hypotheses of the 
relationship between sovereigns and insurance companies. We, therefore, build on the 
findings of the related literature on banks and non-financial firms mentioned above and adapt 
them to suit the insurance-specific case. In our empirical setup, we consider several 
transmission channels through which sovereign risk can spill over onto insurer risk. 
1. Various studies have shown that banks are vulnerable to sovereign risk due to their 
sovereign bond portfolios (see, for example, Buch, Kötter and Ohls, 2016; De Bruyckere, 
Gerhardt, Schepens and Vander Vennet, 2013). This may stem from the risk of incurring 
direct losses on bond holdings as well as from the importance of sovereign bonds as collateral 
to obtain funding (CGFS, 2011). Similarly, sovereign risk may affect insurers through a 
portfolio channel. We will study this channel by including company-level information on 
insurers’ sovereign bond holdings.  
Insurers are highly exposed to sovereigns through their bond holdings. Our data suggest 
that insurers hold a larger share of their assets in sovereign bonds than banks do (in Europe, 
the portions are roughly 20% and 11%, respectively). 3  Life insurance companies, in 
particular, often have long-term nominal liabilities. In respect of duration matching, these are 
best matched with long-term low-risk bonds with a fixed nominal return. This ‒ together with 
preferential regulatory treatment ‒ has led many insurance companies to invest heavily in 
government bonds (Wilson, 2013). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that insurers’ 
domestic sovereign bond investments are particularly large and growing in countries 
experiencing sovereign stress. Italian insurers, for instance, increased their exposure to Italian 
public debt from 33% of their total asset portfolio in 2008 to 50% of their portfolio by the end 
of 2012.4  
Credit risk from sovereign bond holdings may impact insurer default risks in several ways. 
Direct losses in the market value of their sovereign portfolio are likely to pose the greatest 
risk (see also Bank of England, 2014; Ellul, Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Wang, 2014). 
According to Ernst & Young, the majority of insurers’ sovereign bonds (over 60%) are 
classified as “available for sale” (Ernst & Young, 2011).5 This is because they are held as a 
liquidity buffer with the option of selling them before maturity. Given current accounting 
                                                        
3
 For insurers, see J.P. Morgan Cazenove (2014); for European banks, see EBA (2011). 
4 See speech by Aldo Minucci, the Head of Italy's insurance association, ANIA (Bloomberg news, 2.7.2013). 
5 This view is supported by Impavido and Tower (2014), p. 18. 
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rules (i.e. IAS 39 - Financial Instruments), this implies that movements in the price of 
sovereign bonds will affect the insurers’ capital position directly.  
Also, insurance companies may need collateral for hedging operations such as interest rate 
swaps. In contrast to banks, though, insurers rely less on sovereign bonds as collateral for 
funding. They are prefunded as they receive regular payments from insurance customers. 
Insurers typically impose costs on their customers for lapsing an insurance policy and are 
hence less prone to liquidity runs than banks. Large-scale policy lapses cannot be ruled out 
completely, however (Feodoria and Förstemann, 2015; Foley-Fisher, Narajabad, and Verani, 
2015).  
Finally, there is a trade-off between the risks and the returns connected with the purchases 
of new sovereign bonds. If higher returns are compensation for higher risks, then the impact 
of new sovereign bond purchases on insurer default risk is ambivalent. Life insurers have, in 
some jurisdictions, issued fixed nominal interest rate guarantees which they are struggling to 
fulfil in the current low interest rate environment (Kablau and Weiss, 2014). As we base our 
analysis on the market’s expectations of insurer default risk, the trade-off between risks and 
returns should already be priced in, meaning that the estimated coefficients should give the 
net effect of the risk and return effects. 
Insurance regulation treats sovereign bond holdings as risk free. The Solvency I 
framework, which applied in Europe during our sample period, does not involve capital 
requirements for holding financial assets, including government bonds. 6  Some countries 
within our sample have introduced additional requirements, thus augmenting the Solvency I 
rules (the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), while other countries have introduced risk-
based capital requirements (Switzerland, Japan, and the United States). However, even in the 
latter countries, sovereign bonds are generally also excluded from both capital requirements 
and diversification requirements.7  
A new regulatory framework, Solvency II, was introduced in Europe in 2016. Under 
Solvency II, all assets held by insurance companies, including any holdings of sovereign 
bonds, have to be marked to market. Thus, a Solvency II balance sheet reflects the expected 
value of an insurer’s assets and liabilities. In addition, insurers have to hold capital to cover 
                                                        
6
 Capital requirements were generally based on the volume of premiums, technical provisions or claims incurred. 
7 At least those issued by OECD countries and especially those issued by the domestic sovereign. In Switzerland, 
claims against AAA-rated sovereigns are exempt from diversification requirements. 
Chapter 3: The transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies 
118 
unexpected losses under different risk categories (e.g. spread and concentration risks). 8 
However, sovereign bonds issued by an EU member state are exempt from the pillar 1 capital 
requirements for spread and concentration risks.9 Thibeault and Wambeke (2014) show that 
an investment in long-term EU sovereign bonds could even result in a marginal decrease in 
capital requirements if this investment reduces the overall interest rate risk from a duration 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. As a result, insurers’ incentives to invest in sovereign 
bonds could even be higher under Solvency II than during our sample period and therefore 
increase insurers’ exposure to sovereign risk. 
2. Risk transmission from the banking system to insurance companies may also play a 
role. Our portfolio data from J.P. Morgan Cazenove (2014) suggests that insurers’ exposure to 
bank debt is of a similar size to their exposure to sovereigns. A number of earlier studies 
document that insurers are affected by bank risk (Bernoth and Pick, 2011; Chen, Cummins, 
Viswanathan and Weiss, 2014; Hammoudeh, Nandha, and Yuan, 2013). We control for the 
banking channel by including a measure of domestic banking system risk. There is some 
indication that risk spillovers can also occur from insurers to banks (Podlich and Wedow, 
2013). We take this potential endogeneity into account by using instrumental variables 
regression as a robustness check (see Section 3.4). The banking channel may capture part of 
the (indirect) transmission of sovereign risk to insurers, as banks are also highly exposed to 
the sovereigns themselves. 
3. A large number of studies have found that the expectation of government bail-outs 
creates a robust link between the credit risk of key financial institutions and the domestic 
sovereign (e.g. Acharya et al., 2014; Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez, 2014; Noss and 
Sowerbutts, 2012). While these studies focus on banks, government guarantees for insurance 
companies or insurance guarantee funds10 may also lead to sovereign risk spillovers onto 
insurers. If a government guarantees that it will rescue an insurance company (or is expected 
to do so), then the perceived risk for insurers grows if the risk of sovereign default increases, 
i.e. if bail-out capacity decreases. We will test whether insurers which the FSB has classified 
as G-SIIs in June 2013 are more closely connected to the default risk of the domestic 
sovereign. We are unable, though, to provide a direct test for government guarantees. Such a 
                                                        
8 The solvency capital requirement is calibrated in such a way that it reflects the value-at-risk at the 99.5% 
quantile. 
9 Under Pillar 2 of Solvency II, however, insurance companies still have to assess their overall solvency needs in 
relation to their specific risk profile (Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA)). 
10
 Insurance guarantee funds step in to honour the covered claims of an insolvent insurer’s policyholders, similar 
to a deposit insurance system. 
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test would require data on the market’s expectations regarding bail-outs ‒ which are 
unavailable to us ‒ and is therefore left to future research.  
4. Insurer risk and sovereign risk are also linked through the macroeconomic 
environment. Heightened sovereign risk often goes hand in hand with an economic downturn 
and reduced domestic demand which, in turn, impairs private firms’ earning opportunities and 
increases their probability of default (see, for example, Ciocchini, 2002; Durbin and Ng, 
2005). Moreover, Acharya et al. (2014) argue that sovereign default risk increases the 
expected tax burden, consequently reducing firms’ profitability and investment. Based on 
these findings, our analysis includes the national stock index as a proxy for the 
macroeconomic environment. Also, by explicitly comparing the vulnerability of insurance 
companies with that of other private sector firms, we control for the transmission effect 
common to all firms. 
3.3 Dataset and empirical strategy 
We construct a panel dataset with information on the credit default risk of firms in 
different industries around the world. It covers insurance companies, banks, and non-financial 
firms from nine countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) over the time period from 1 
January 2008 to 1 May 2013. The countries were selected on the basis of data availability on 
CDS spreads of insurance companies from these countries. 
Our dataset includes all types of insurers (life, reinsurance, health, property, etc.) except 
insurers that provide financial guarantees (e.g. AIG or MBIA). The latter have a very special 
business model which focuses on so-called “non-traditional insurance activities”, such as 
bond insurance. Sovereign risk is, therefore, likely to be transmitted differently in the case of 
these firms which is not covered by our analysis. Our exclusion of financial guarantee 
insurers reduces the sample size from 46,712 to 39,673. Also, we exclude three financial 
conglomerates whose business includes not only insurance but also banking activities to a 
non-negligible extent (above 10% of their group balance sheet).11 This reduces our sample to 
35,090 observations. To make sure that only quotes for frequently traded CDS are used in the 
analysis, we exclude any company reporting CDS values for less than three years over our 
                                                        
11 Furthermore, we exclude the initial observations of two companies that conducted banking activities exceeding 
10% of their group balance sheet total until the financial crisis (Allianz until selling Dresdner Bank to 
Commerzbank on 12 January 2009 and Ageas being part of a financial conglomerate (Fortis group) until October 
2008).  
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sample period (750 trading days).12 This reduces our sample further to 32,592 observations. 
Owing to missing control variables, our final sample comprises 30,555 observations. The 
resulting sample covers 26 insurance companies and 1,379 trading days (unbalanced sample). 
We also collect CDS data for banks and non-financial firms from the aforementioned 
countries. We include all firms with non-missing CDS pricing data for 750 trading days. This 
extended sample has 461,138 observations and covers 393 private sector firms from ten 
industry sectors over 1,379 trading days (unbalanced sample).13 The sample is composed of 
7% insurance companies, 20% banks and 73% non-financial firms.   
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics of the variables in the different estimation samples. 
All in all, our estimation sample is rather similar to the overall sample. 
Empirical approach 
As a baseline, we regress insurer risk on home sovereign risk. This yields Equation (I) 
 ∆ ln	, =  + ∆ ln, + ∆ + 	,			(I) 
where 	,  is a measure of insurer performance at time t, ,  is domestic 
sovereign risk, and  is a matrix of country-specific control variables. We control for growth 
(expectations), risk aversion in financial markets, counterparty risk in the CDS market and 
risks in the national banking system. All variables are measured daily and in changes of their 
logs ∆ ln. . A similar approach has been used by Acharya et al. (2014) for studying the 
effects of sovereign risk on banks. The log transformation allows us to interpret the 
coefficients as elasticity, a measure of sensitivity that is independent of the scale of our risk 
measure. That is to say, the coefficient captures the percentage increase in insurer risk for a 
1% increase in the independent variable.  
The current low interest rate environment poses a challenge for (life) insurer solvency, 
especially if the insurer has promised fixed nominal interest rates to its policyholders 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015; Kablau and Weiss, 2014). Typically, insurance 
companies’ vulnerability depends on the level of interest rates as well as on the business 
model. Therefore, we control for any structural differences between insurers in e.g. asset 
liability management, by estimating all of the specifications in log changes. Also, we include 
                                                        
12 We also collect data on the trading volume of each insurer CDS used. This confirms that our risk measure is 
based on a highly liquid market. 
13 We distinguish between the following sectors as classified by the data provider, Markit: insurance, banks, 
basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, energy (including oil and gas), healthcare, industrials, 
technology and telecommunications. 
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time fixed effects that capture the common decrease in interest rates across advanced 
economies during our time period. In an augmented specification, we include country-time 
fixed effects, which also capture the time-varying differences in insurers’ business models 
from country to country.14  
A potential concern with Equation (I) is reverse causality. A detailed discussion of 
endogeneity issues and the results of instrumental variable regression can be found in Section 
3.4.1.  
Since our data contain a substantial time series component, we check for stationarity and 
find no evidence of unit roots in first differences.15 We also check for autocorrelation in our 
standard errors, but find little evidence of this.16 Our baseline regression does not control for 
autocorrelation. However, the results are unaffected if we do so.17 Apart from a correlation of 
shocks over time, there may be concerns about a correlation of shocks between firms during 
the same time period. To take this into account, we allow shocks to be correlated 
contemporaneously by clustering standard errors on the time dimension. 
Dependent variables 
We use three alternative measures for 	, : CDS spreads with a five-year maturity 
published by Markit, stock returns published by Bloomberg and expected default frequencies 
(EDFs) by Moodys KMV. CDS spreads measure default risk and are the standard metric in 
recent literature (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton, 2011; Acharya et al., 2014).18 
These papers discuss the two main reasons for choosing CDS spreads in lieu of bond spreads: 
first, they better reflect risk, as CDS are designed to insure against default risk and serve no 
other purpose that might affect their price; second, the CDS market is more liquid than most 
                                                        
14 For example, the duration gap between assets and liabilities varies substantially between insurers in different 
European countries. On average, German insurers have the largest duration gap, while the assets and liabilities of 
UK insurers are matched quite well (EIOPA, 2014). 
15 We perform the Fisher unit root test for heterogeneous mixed panel data. This assumes that there is no cross-
sectional dependence within the dataset. Our analysis has no independent cross sections as several insurance 
companies are from the same country, which means that they are related and exposed to common shocks. In 
order to mitigate this problem, we demean our time series as suggested by Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002).  
16
 Autocorrelation in the errors is below 0.2 and insignificant from the second lag onwards in all time series.  
17 As a robustness check, we allow for autocorrelated errors of up to one month (i.e. 20 trading days) (see 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998)). The results (available upon request) remain practically unchanged. 
18
 We selected USD-denominated CDS quotes published by the Markit group with a five-year maturity for senior 
unsecured debt, with the modified-modified restructuring clause for financial and non-financial firms and the 
cumulative restructuring clause for sovereigns. These represent the conventional and most liquid terms for CDS 
contracts on European reference entities, which will be the focus of our analysis. See also Bedendo and Colla 
(2013). 
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bond markets. Liquidity is key, as our analysis seeks to uncover risk transmission at a 
relatively high frequency (daily and weekly data). 
As a robustness check, we use other measures of insurer performance, namely stock 
returns and expected default probabilities. Stock returns reflect a broad set of developments, 
including default risk and insurer profitability. The advantage of stock returns is that they are 
more widely available and thus allow us to check whether our results hold more broadly. 
However, they include additional information that is unrelated to default risk. 
One great advantage of our market-based performance measures over balance sheet data 
are that they capture ex ante anticipated risk exposures and are available at a high frequency. 
Balance sheet measures would reflect only ex post realized risk. Our measures capture only 
risks that are correctly priced by the market, however. We, thus, do not seek to uncover 
hidden risks, but rather to highlight how risk passes from the sovereign sector to insurers 
based on the market’s expectations.  
Independent variables 
Our main variable is ,  , which is measured on the basis of domestic sovereign 
CDS with a five-year maturity (drawn from Markit). 
We include country-specific measures of economic performance, market confidence and 
banking risk as control variables. The national stock market index (drawn from Bloomberg) is 
a proxy for economic activity and growth. Both insurers (through loss events and premium 
income) and sovereigns (through tax income and social expenditure) are influenced by real 
economic activity. It is, therefore, important to control for growth in order to avoid an omitted 
variable bias. Market sentiment and risk aversion are measured by implied volatility on the 
national stock indexes over 30 days, e.g. VDAX-NEW for Germany and VIX for the United 
States (drawn from Bloomberg).19  
To control for risks emanating from the banking sector, we take the weighted average of 
the CDS of domestic banks, where we weight each bank by its relative size in the country.20 
Testing for transmission channels 
In order to analyse the transmission channels, we introduce additional variables to 
Equation (I). The portfolio channel captures exposure to (domestic and foreign) sovereign risk 
                                                        
19
 We were unable to obtain a national volatility index for Belgium, which is why we take VSTOXX in this case. 
20 Size is measured by total assets. National currency-denominated CDS spreads with a five-year maturity were 
taken from Markit. 
Chapter 3: The transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies 
123 
through insurers’ sovereign bond holdings. We construct a measure of a sovereign portfolio’s 
riskiness by weighing each sovereign CDS with its relevant sovereign share in an insurer’s 
portfolio, i.e.  
	, !"#	 =	∑  %&'()%*+,-#-%%%*, ∗ ∆ ln	/,0-##	%&!	1(%	 .  
where 23425	 refers to insurer i’s holdings of bonds issued by sovereign j (in USD) 
and , refers to the CDS quote for the same sovereign j. We divide the sovereign bond 
holding by total assets instead of the insurer’s overall sovereign bond portfolio in order to 
differentiate between insurers with a large or small overall sovereign bond portfolio relative 
to their total assets. 
This yields Equation (II): 
∆ ln	, =  + ∆ ln 6/,0ℎ289: + ∆, + ;,0<20=22 + 	,			(II) 
where all variables and econometric specifications are equivalent to those in Equation (I). 
The measure of portfolio risk is company-specific. This allows us to control for country-
specific time effects in a robustness check. 
As we are analyzing market behavior, we use the market estimate of an insurer’s exposure 
as provided by J.P. Morgan (J.P. Morgan Cazenove, 2014) rather than administrative data. 
J.P. Morgan regularly publishes estimates of the sovereign bond holdings of 16 large 
European insurers (see Appendix for a list of insurers). These data are based on the insurance 
companies’ own financial reports and are available quarterly from Q4 2009 through  Q1 2013. 
In order to test for international versus domestic transmission of sovereign risk, we 
separate the overall sovereign portfolio into its domestic and foreign parts, constructing the 
riskiness of both parts of the portfolio separately. In this specification, the riskiness of the 
home sovereign portfolio is simply the home sovereign bonds’ share of total assets multiplied 
by the CDS of the home sovereign. The riskiness of the foreign sovereign portfolio is 
constructed in a similar way to the riskiness of the overall sovereign portfolio, but excludes 
the domestic sovereign. 
Finally, we create a G-SII dummy that differentiates between insurers which the FSB 
(2013) classifies as systemically important and those which it does not. We will test whether 
the transmission of sovereign risk is the same for both groups. 
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3.4 Estimation and results 
3.4.1 Does sovereign risk transmit to risk in insurance? 
Table 3.2 reports the results of estimating Equation (I). Column 1 includes only the 
variable of interest and the coefficient thus reflects the correlation between insurance risk and 
the domestic sovereign. We find a highly significant positive elasticity. A 10% rise in 
sovereign risk leads to a 1.8% rise in domestic insurer risk. Column 2 controls for the national 
volatility index and stock market movements. The coefficients on the volatility index (stock 
market index) show the expected positive (negative) sign and reduce the effect of sovereign 
risk on insurer risk.  
In column 3, we control for risks in the banking sector. Including controls for the banking 
sector has two effects. First, as discussed above, the banking sector could be an omitted 
variable, which needs to be introduced for correct estimation. At the same time, however, the 
proxies for the domestic banking system may also capture an indirect transmission channel 
from sovereigns to insurers. Banks themselves are typically also highly exposed to the 
sovereign. Therefore, the estimated direct impact of home sovereign CDS on insurer CDS 
(=0.06) in column 3 can be interpreted as a lower bound of the total impact. Bank bonds are 
roughly as important in insurers’ balance sheets as sovereign bonds are (J.P. Morgan 
Cazenove, 2014). Indeed, we find that the stability of the domestic banking system is 
important for insurer stability. A 10% increase in banking risk increases a domestic insurer’s 
default risk by 4.4%. This finding is in line with previous studies, which found a significant 
transmission of banking risk to the insurance sector (Bernoth and Pick, 2011; Chen et al., 
2014; Hammoudeh et al., 2013). We will control for the potential endogeneity between 
insurer CDS and banking system CDS by using instrumental variables. 
In column 4, we use time fixed effects to absorb factors that are common to all insurers. 
What remains is a conservative estimate of risk contagion from the sovereign to the domestic 
insurer, as the average transmission at a given date will be absorbed by the time fixed effects. 
As expected, the elasticity decreases further in economic terms. However, even at this lower 
bound, the elasticity remains significant at the 1% confidence level. 
These findings prove robust to a number of different specifications. We perform the above 
regression in level changes rather than log changes and using weekly data instead of daily 
quotes (not reported). These results are in line with what we report above. Furthermore, we 
estimate Equation (I) with two alternative dependent variables: the log change in an insurer’s 
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stock price and in an insurer’s expected default frequency (EDF).21 The results are reported in 
Table 3.3 and confirm our findings based on CDS spreads. An increase in domestic sovereign 
risk is associated with a decrease in the insurer stock price and an increase in the EDF.22 
Finally, we extend our time period to include data from 1 January 2006 onwards so as not to 
focus exclusively on the crisis period.23 The coefficient on home sovereign CDS becomes 
slightly smaller when pre-crisis data are included, but remains positively significant at the 1% 
level (not reported). We test for differences in risk transmission over time in Section 3.4.4. 
IV Estimation 
An econometric concern may arise in the presence of reverse causality. Equation (I) is a 
reduced form regression, which yields the “true” causal effect of sovereigns on insurers only 
if there is no reverse causality, i.e. no effect of insurance companies on both sovereign risk 
and banking system risk. There are a number of a priori reasons why reverse causality would 
not be expected to be a concern in this specific context. 
First, traditional insurance companies have not featured prominently in the debate on 
government solvency. The insolvency of Equitable Life (UK) in 2000, for instance, is seen as 
an example of how policyholders can  incur considerable losses without a subsequent need for 
state intervention. Empirically, Billio et al. (2013) provide evidence on the Granger causality 
relations between sovereigns, banks and insurers, suggesting that the predictive power of 
insurer risk for sovereign risk is far weaker than the opposite relation from sovereigns to 
insurers. 
Second, our dependent variable is measured at the micro level. We consider individual 
insurance companies which are less likely to impact the macro level, such as the overall 
banking system and the sovereign. 
Finally, we perform instrumental variables regressions to test the robustness of our results. 
Following Bedendo and Colla (2013), we use average foreign sovereign risk as the instrument 
for domestic sovereign risk and, similarly, foreign banking system risk as the instrument for 
domestic banking system risk. This eliminates the concern that our observed link between 
insurers and sovereigns is due to implicit guarantees by their home governments. Our 
                                                        
21 We use Moody’s KMV EDF over a one-year horizon as a measure of the probability that a company will 
default within the next year. 
22 In this regression, we exclude the domestic stock index as an explanatory variable, as it often bundles the 
respective insurer stock prices into a single element. 
23
 Owing to liquidity concerns regarding the CDS market prior to 2008, we use the extended time series as a 
robustness check only. 
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instrument is the average risk in the largest sovereign bond markets and banking systems.24 
This instrument is relevant since foreign risks are correlated with domestic risks through 
contagion effects on the sovereign and banking CDS markets. F-statistics in the first stage 
regressions are highly significant and weak identification tests, as proposed by Angrist and 
Pischke (2010), confirm the relevance of our instruments above the conventional threshold.  
Our instrument would be invalid if there was reverse causality running from insurers to 
foreign sovereigns, most notably through their foreign sovereign bond holdings. However, 
reverse causality is unlikely to bias our results in this case, since individual insurers hold only 
a small share of outstanding foreign sovereign bonds. AXA holds the largest market share, it 
has 4% of Irish sovereign bonds in one quarter. Insurers are hence not expected to cause 
fluctuations in the foreign sovereign bond market. We perform overidentification tests to 
corroborate the argument. We include the interbank lending rate to satisfy the 
overidentification restriction. 25  The overidentification test is not rejected at the 5% 
significance level. We can, thus, be more confident that our IV estimates identify the 
transmission effect. 
Another concern is that our instrumental variable approach will give a combined “reduced 
form” effect of the portfolio channel and the risk transmission channel. This is because 
insurers are affected directly by foreign sovereign risk through their bond holdings. As an 
additional robustness test, we use alternative instruments. First, we use a weighted measure of 
foreign sovereign risk that downweights the sovereigns to which an insurer is exposed 
directly. Second, we use a measure of political uncertainty as reflected in Google searches for 
the term “country government”. 26  Both instruments plausibly do not affect insurer risk 
directly. Owing to data availability (e.g. portfolio data), we have to run these additional tests 
on a reduced sample and thus standard errors increase. Point estimates for home sovereign 
risk in the second stage remain very similar, albeit not always significant. A final concern is 
omitted variable bias. General market risk sentiment or shocks to global economic output may 
impact foreign sovereign risk and insurer risk simultaneously. Therefore, we explicitly control 
                                                        
24
 For sovereign bonds, these are US, JP, DE, IT, FR, UK, ES, CA, NL KR. In terms of banking systems, we 
take those of the largest non-developing countries, namely US, CA, BE, CH, DE, FR, UK, IT, NL, ES, JP and 
AU. 
25 Since short-term liquidity is less of a concern for insurers, movements in this rate should not affect the 
solvability of insurers directly. It does, however, have considerable effects on banks’ funding costs and, thus, on 
bank default risk. 
26
 To measure political uncertainty we collate Google searches for the term “country government” using Google 
Stats. During periods of high political uncertainty, the number of search queries rises. This allows us to construct 
a country-specific high frequency dataset of political risks. The search data are available at weekly frequency. 
We thus run the regressions at the weekly level. 
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for stock index volatility and stock index developments in order to capture these common 
factors. 
Table 3.4 reports the results of the instrumental variables regression. As in the OLS 
regressions, we find that domestic sovereign risk has a strong and significant effect on 
insurers. This also holds true if we introduce the interbank rate as an additional instrument 
(column 4).  
One interesting finding is that the coefficient of interest on domestic sovereign risk 
increases in IV estimation relative to our OLS estimates: it is twice as large as in the baseline 
column 3 of Table 3.2. At the same time, the effect emanating from the banking system also 
increases, while the effect assigned to wider market developments decreases substantially.  
The changes in coefficients relative to the OLS setting are in line with a negative effect of 
insurers on sovereigns and banks in the structural equation. This implies that our reduced 
form regression above underestimates the effect which sovereign risk has on insurers. One 
interpretation is that insurers absorb risks by providing stable liquidity in times of market 
stress (see Bank of England, 2014, for an illustration of this point). 
Overall, our robustness tests confirm that home sovereign risk plays an important role in 
insurance industry risk. 
3.4.2 Are insurers different to banks and non-financial firms? 
Sovereign default risk can create problems for any private sector firm, not just insurance 
companies. We would, therefore, like to know whether insurers are special when it comes to 
sovereign risk. 
We re-estimate specification (I) for insurers, banks and non-financial firms from the same 
nine countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) and over the same time period between 
1 January 2008 and 1 May 2013. As we include bank risk as a dependent variable, we no 
longer control for average banking system CDS on the right-hand side in order to avoid 
correlation by construction. All other variable definitions remain the same as described in 
Section 3.3. 
Table 3.5 reports the results of these regressions. In the pooled regression (column 1), the 
sovereign risk estimate is about 0.08 and highly statistically significant. We, thus, conclude 
that there is risk transmission from the domestic sovereign to private firms in general. This 
average effect disguises substantial differences across industries, however. In column 2, we 
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use insurance companies as a baseline category and introduce interaction effects between 
domestic sovereign risk and an identifier for banks and non-financial firms, respectively. 
Column 2 of Table 3.5 shows that risk transmission to non-financial firms is significantly 
lower than transmission to the insurance sector. This finding is not driven by specific non-
financial sectors. In column 3, we use a more detailed breakdown by sector and find that 
insurers are more affected than any non-financial sector. In terms of economic magnitude, 
domestic sovereign risk has an impact on insurers which is about twice as large (coefficient = 
0.130) as that on non-financial firms (coefficient = 0.130 [baseline effect] - 0.066 [interaction 
effect] = 0.064; see column 2 of Table 3.5). 
In a comparison between banks and insurers, we do not find a significant difference in 
these financial institutions’ vulnerability to sovereign risk (see insignificant coefficient of 
0.011 in column 2 of Table 3.5). Given the importance of sovereign bonds for bank funding 
(see, for example, Correa et al., 2014; International Monetary Fund, 2012) and the value of 
implicit state guarantees for banks, one might have expected banks to be more vulnerable than 
insurers. However, insurers also rely on sovereign bonds as collateral for swaps and they hold 
a larger share of their assets in sovereign bonds than banks do.  
In column 4, we add time fixed effects to account for common developments across firms 
and the results still hold. 
Overall, we find that banks and insurers are affected to a similar degree by domestic 
sovereign risk, while non-financial firms are significantly less affected. In what follows, we 
analyse the additional transmission channels that explain this gap between insurers and non-
financial firms. 
3.4.3 Taking a closer look at risk transmission channels 
In this section, we test for the transmission channels from sovereign risk to the insurance 
sector which were discussed in Section 3.2 and which may explain the greater vulnerability of 
insurers compared with non-financial firms. We start with a description of insurers’ sovereign 
bond portfolios. We then formally test the importance of the portfolio channel using the 
sovereign bond portfolio figures published by J.P. Morgan. These are available only from 
Q4 2009 to Q1 2013, and for 16 European insurers. We, therefore, perform the subsequent 
analysis with this reduced sample. 
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Descriptive facts concerning insurers’ sovereign portfolios 
Overall, sovereign bond investments play a sizeable and increasing role in the balance 
sheets of European insurance companies, amounting to around 22% of total assets in Q1 2013 
(see Figure 3.2), which is significantly more than in the balance sheets of European banks 
(approximately 11% of total assets, source: EBA 2011). 
Interestingly, the heterogeneity between countries is high. At the country level, the average 
importance of sovereign bonds is lowest for Dutch and UK insurers at 10% of total assets and 
highest for Italian and Belgian insurers at 35% of total assets. There is also within-country 
heterogeneity between insurers. We make use of this in the regressions. 
The importance of home sovereign bonds in insurers’ balance sheets stands out when 
considering their sovereign bond portfolios (see Figure 3.2): domestic sovereign bonds are the 
most important item, with an average share of 33%. If there were no home bias in sovereign 
bond portfolios, we would expect the average share of domestic sovereign bonds to equal 
1/number of sovereigns j = 1/11, i.e. 9%. Taking unweighted averages across all countries 
should mitigate the size effects of different countries, which could impact their weight in the 
sovereign portfolio.  
We take a closer look at diversification in insurers’ sovereign bond portfolios given the 
strong home bias. To measure portfolio concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman-
Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of sovereign j in the total 
sovereign portfolio. In our case, the index can, in theory, range from 0.09 (perfectly 
diversified) to 1 (completely concentrated). 27  The average concentration index increased 
continuously, from 0.3 in Q4 2009 to 0.4 in Q1 2013. Moreover, heterogeneity is high as the 
HHI ranges from 0.2 (10% quantile) to 0.9 (90% quantile) in Q1 2013. 
One remarkable event within our sample period is the restructuring of Greek debt in early 
2012. This induced losses on the part of private investors, including insurance companies. US 
insurance companies, for instance, realized losses amounting to $859.5 million due to the 
Greek bond exchange (NAIC, 2013). Before turning to the econometric analysis of the 
portfolio channel, we take a first descriptive look at whether the market differentiated 
between insurers with and insurers without exposure to the Greek sovereign. Figure 3.3 shows 
that the market charged higher CDS premiums for those insurers that had a high exposure to 
                                                        
27  We have exposure information for 11 sovereigns; the HHI may lie between 0.09 (equal shares for all 
sovereigns) and 1 (full concentration on only one sovereign) 
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the Greek sovereign at the time of the restructuring event. The CDS price for the highly 
exposed insurers increased markedly from mid-2011 onwards and became more volatile than 
that of the other insurers. However, in the period of the restructuring announcement, the 
highly exposed insurers’ risk decreased. This descriptive analysis does not take into account 
any determinants of insurer risk other than Greek debt exposures. We next turn to the 
empirical analysis of the portfolio channel’s impact on changes in insurer risk. 
Testing the portfolio channel 
To test the portfolio channel of sovereign risk transmission, we estimate Equation (II). In 
Table 3.6, column 1 shows that an insurer’s default risk increases significantly with growing 
riskiness in the sovereign bond portfolio. In column 2, we include country-time fixed effects 
to check the robustness of this finding. These two-way fixed effects capture the unconditional 
effect of domestic sovereign risk and all other macro variables on insurers, but the impact of 
sovereign portfolio risk can still be estimated since it is insurer-specific. Importantly, the 
portfolio channel remains significant. 
Overall, the results confirm that the market takes account of the investment risk in an 
insurer’s balance sheet or, more specifically, the credit risk involved in sovereign bond 
holdings. The major insurance regulations, such as Solvency I in Europe, have not 
acknowledged these connections. The traditional regulatory view is that insurance risk is 
driven by insurance policy-related risk on the liability side and not asset-related risk 
(Schinasi, 2005, page 266). The introduction of Solvency II in 2016 changed the regulatory 
treatment of investment risk in Europe. Our results underline the importance of taking asset 
risk into account. Our findings highlight the fact that sovereign bonds cannot be considered to 
be risk free. However, sovereign bonds issued by EU countries remain largely exempt from 
capital requirements under Solvency II. 
In column 3, we split the overall sovereign bond portfolio into its domestic and foreign 
parts. The domestic part is measured as the home sovereign bond holding share of total assets 
multiplied by the home sovereign CDS; its coefficient is positive but insignificant. The 
finding that larger home sovereign bond holdings do not significantly increase an insurer’s 
default risk is surprising at first. However, it may simply reflect the fact that the sample 
covers mainly insurers from stable countries where domestic sovereign risk does not vary 
very much. Ideally, we would have included a greater number of insurers from countries that 
experienced a sovereign debt crisis, such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal, but no CDS and/or 
portfolio data were available for insurers from those countries. Thus, Italy is the only stressed 
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country included in this regression and relatively stable countries, such as Germany, the UK 
and Switzerland, dominate the sample. In line with this explanation, we find that foreign 
sovereign bond holdings, which include bonds from stable countries as well as from countries 
in crisis, are an important driver of insurer default risk. Increases in the riskiness of the 
foreign sovereign bond portfolio significantly amplify an insurer’s default risk. Sovereign risk 
thus spills over internationally through insurers’ cross-border sovereign bond holdings. 
Implicit government guarantees 
In Table 3.5, we show that, on average, insurers are more susceptible to domestic 
sovereign risk than non-financial firms are. In the previous section, we rejected the hypothesis 
that insurers’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds are an explanation for why insurers are 
more vulnerable to domestic sovereign risk. Next, we test whether the nexus between the 
insurance sector and sovereign risk is stronger for certain types of insurers. In column 4 of 
Table 3.6, we differentiate between insurers that have been classified as systemically 
important by the Financial Stability Board in July 2013 (FSB, 2013) and those who have not. 
The FSB based its decision regarding the systemic importance of insurers on five criteria 
(size, global activity, interconnectedness, non-traditional and non-insurance activities and 
substitutability; see IAIS, 2013). It should be noted that the FSB’s decision was taken after 
the end of our sample period. We, thus, do not test for the effect of the announcement. 
Instead, we analyse whether the systemically important insurance companies’ CDS spreads 
reacted more sensitively to sovereign risk than those of others before the FSB decision was 
made public. Indeed, the elasticity of insurer risk to sovereign risk is 0.15 percentage points 
higher for systemically important insurers. This is a substantial difference given the baseline 
effect of 0.035 (column 4 of Table 3.6). The difference between insurers classified as G-SII 
and other insurers is not driven by variations in their sovereign bond exposures, however, as 
we simultaneously control for the riskiness of their sovereign bond portfolios. As we allow 
for greater sensitivity to sovereign risk on the part of systemically important insurers, the 
baseline effect which domestic sovereign risk has on insurer risk (i.e. 0.035, column 4 of 
Table 3.6) and becomes similar in magnitude to the effect which sovereign risk has on non-
financial firms (see column 2 of Table 3.5). 
All in all, after controlling for sovereign bond exposure, we find that systemically 
important insurers are more closely linked to their home sovereign than other insurers are. 
This is not direct evidence for the existence of implicit guarantees but provides a clue that 
should be explored further in future research. 
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3.4.4 Heterogeneity across countries and over time 
Our panel dataset, which covers various countries, allows us to test for heterogeneity in the 
transmission of sovereign risk between countries and over time. The euro area is a special 
case during our sample period from 2008 until May 2013, since several countries experienced 
a severe sovereign debt crisis in that time. Therefore, in Table 3.7, we look at the transmission 
of sovereign risk within the euro area in more detail. Column 1 shows that insurers located in 
a euro area country were more sensitive to sovereign risk than insurers located in other 
countries. Next, we study whether the level of sovereign risk plays a role in risk transmission 
to domestic insurers. We do so by including an interaction effect between the log changes of 
home sovereign risk and the level of home sovereign risk. The results are presented in 
column 2 and confirm that the elasticity of insurer risk is higher in the crisis countries than in 
the relatively safe countries. Thus, the transmission of sovereign risk to insurers is 
heterogeneous across countries. 
Next, we investigate changes in the sovereign-insurer relationship over time. We closely 
follow Acharya et al. (2014) who study sovereign-banking spillovers during the pre-bailout, 
bailout and post-bailout periods of the recent financial crisis. We regress insurer risk on 
domestic sovereign CDS, domestic stock index volatility and domestic banking system CDS, 
including time fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the company level (specification 
from Table 3.3 in Acharya et al., 2014). An augmented specification additionally controls for 
insurer fixed effects and the effects of insurer-specific parameters on domestic stock index 
volatility and domestic banking system CDS (as in Acharya et al., 2014). 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 give the results for the pre-bailout period (1 January 2007 to 
15 September 2008). Insurer risk is not significantly affected by domestic sovereign risk 
during this period, which is in line with the findings of Acharya et al. (2014) regarding banks. 
The bailout period starts on 16 September 2008, when the US government decided to bail out 
AIG, and runs until 21 October 2008 (following Acharya et al., 2014). In contrast to bank risk 
(Acharya et al., 2014, Table 3.3, columns 3 and 4), however, insurer risk is not significantly 
reduced by sovereign risk during the bailout period, but remains insignificant. This arguably 
shows that the traditional insurers on which we focus did not receive a bailout from their 
domestic governments. These insurers, thus, did not transfer part of their risk to domestic 
sovereigns like banks did (Acharya et al., 2014). Finally, the post-bailout period runs from 21 
October 2008 to 30 April 2011, for consistency with Acharya et al. (2014); the estimation 
results are given in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.8.  
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In addition to the financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis may have affected the 
relationship between sovereign risk and insurer risk. Bijlsma and Vermeulen (2016) find that 
Dutch insurers showed a marked flight to quality behavior in their sovereign bond portfolios 
during the height of the sovereign debt crisis. The flight to quality behavior disappeared, 
however, after ECB President Mario Draghi’s speech in mid-2012, in which he announced 
that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to protect the euro within the limits of its mandate. 
We, thus, look at the post-bailout period in greater detail and focus exclusively on euro area 
insurers. We distinguish between the post-bailout but pre-sovereign debt crisis period 
(October 2008 to 2010), the height of the sovereign debt crisis (2010 to mid-2012) and the 
period following Mario Draghi’s speech in London, and the subsequent announcement of 
outright monetary transactions (OMT) (from 26 July 2012 to May 2013). Column 3 of Table 
3.7 shows that the transmission of home sovereign risk to insurer risk in the euro area did not 
change significantly between these time periods.  
Thus, while the market did not price domestic sovereign risk into insurer default risk prior 
to the financial crisis, sovereign risk has increased insurer CDS since the bailout period and 
these transmission effects have remained fairly stable since then. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter finds a strong and highly significant link between sovereign default risk and 
risks in the insurance sector. Such transmission has been found for a number of different 
sectors. We document, however, that there are major differences in the various sectors’ 
vulnerability to sovereign risk. Insurers are affected by domestic sovereign risk to a similar 
extent as banks, but significantly more than non-financial firms. 
We investigate why such differences arise and find that sovereign risk has a greater impact 
on insurance companies which have subsequently been classified as global systemically 
important insurers by the FSB. This finding suggests that government guarantees may play a 
bigger role for some insurers. 
We also find that the riskiness of the sovereign bond portfolio is an important determinant 
of an insurer’s default risk, even after controlling for country-time fixed effects. As data are 
available mainly for insurers from relatively stable countries, we find holdings of foreign 
sovereign bonds (which include bonds from crisis countries) to be more important than 
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. Thus, sovereign risk spills over internationally through 
insurers’ cross-border bond holdings. We descriptively document a high concentration in 
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insurers’ sovereign bond portfolios as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index. The 
concentration (along with the share of domestic bonds) has increased substantially since the 
beginning of 2010. Also, heterogeneity between insurers is high, with Italian insurers being 
particularly exposed to the home sovereign. The incentives behind this home bias may be an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
Finally, we take a more detailed look at heterogeneity across countries and over time. We 
find that risk transmission to insurers is more prolific in high-risk countries. Similarly, the 
link between the sovereign and domestic insurers is stronger in the euro area than in other 
regions. While the market did not price domestic sovereign risk into insurer default risk prior 
to the financial crisis, it recognized the risk of spillovers after the bailout period; the 
transmission effects from sovereign to insurers have remained fairly stable since then. 
Overall, our results underline the fact that sovereign bonds should not be regarded as a risk-
free investment. We provide a detailed analysis of how sovereign risk is transmitted to insurer 
default risk and find the asset portfolio channel to be important. Hence, the market generally 
takes sovereign bond portfolio risk into account when assessing insurer default risk. Against 
this backdrop, our results challenge the regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds in most 
jurisdictions, including the Solvency II regulations in Europe, which exempt EU sovereign 
bonds from the credit risk and concentration risk modules when calculating the solvency 
capital requirement. Future research is needed to better understand the investment incentives 
induced by insurance regulation and their general equilibrium effects. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A Data 
 
List of insurers 
 
ACE Ltd 
*Aegon N.V. 
*Ageas N.V. 
*Allianz AG 
Allstate Corp 
Aon Corp 
*Assicurazioni Generali S p A 
*Aviva plc 
*AXA 
Genworth Financial Inc 
Groupe des Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles 
*Hannover Re AG 
*Legal & Gen Gp plc 
Liberty Mutual Group Inc 
MetLife Inc 
*Munich Re 
Old Mutual plc 
Prudential Financial Inc 
*Prudential PLC 
*Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group plc 
*SCOR 
Sompo Japan Insurance Inc 
*Standard Life Assurance Co 
*Swiss Life Insurance & Pension Co 
*Swiss Re Co 
*Zurich Insurance Co Ltd 
 
* Relevant information on sovereign bond portfolios is available in the J.P. Morgan 
Cazenove (2014) dataset 
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3.B Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 3.1: CDS spreads of insurers and sovereigns 
This Figures gives the CDS spread movements of the insurance sector (blue solid line) and 
the sovereign (red dashed line) in Germany, Italy, the UK, and the USA in the time period 
from 1 January 2008 to 1 May 2013 in basis points (Source: Markit). 
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Figure 3.2: Importance of sovereign bond portfolio 
This Figure shows goves the share of sovereign bonds to total assets (blue solid line) and 
domestic sovereign bonds to total assets (red dashed line) of the 16 insurance companies in 
our sample (unweighted averages) in the time period from 1 October 2009 to 1 May 2013 
(Source: J.P. Morgan Cazenove, own calculations).  
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Figure 3.3: CDS spreads of insurers by size of exposure to the Greek sovereign bond 
restructuring 
This Figure gives the CDS spreads of the group of insurers with low exposure to the Greek 
sovereign (lowest quartile of Greek sovereign exposure to total assets as of Q1 2012) relative 
to group of insurers with high exposure to the Greek sovereign (highest quartile of Greek 
sovereign exposure to total assets as of Q1 2012), in basis points. The total sample consists of 
16 insurance companies with available portfolio data from J.P. Morgan Cazenove. The red 
vertical line indicates the Greek bond exchange (Source: Markit). 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of variables 
Table 3.1 gives descriptive statistics of the estimation sample (left hand side) and the full sample (right hand 
side) of insurer and country specific variables. Note that variables are not yet transformed into log differences 
in this Table (like in the regressions) in order to facilitate interpretation of magnitudes. The full sample 
contains all insurers with traditional business model (excl. financial guarantee insurers and bancassurance 
companies). Panel a shows the sample of the regressions of insurer risk in Tables 3.2 -3.4 and 3.6-3.7. Panel b 
shows the sample of regressions on risk of insurers, banks and non-financial firms in Table 3.5. The sample 
covers the period from 01/01/2008 to 01/05/2013 for panel a and b. 
a. Estimations of insurer risk 
Estimation sample Full sample 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Insurer CDS 30,555 186.07 258.66 35,090 186.27 250.70 
Sovereign CDS 30,555 64.48 59.34 34,186 62.90 57.66 
Stock index volatility 30,555 24.76 10.23 34,365 25.43 10.65 
Stock index 30,555 5591.25 6078.19 34,237 5484.81 6092.39 
Banking system CDS 30,555 153.87 70.49 35,090 152.18 70.56 
Systemically important dummy 30,555 0.29 0.45 35,090 0.26 0.44 
Home sovereign bonds / total 
assets 10,815 0.06 0.05 11,622 0.06 0.06 
Home sovereign bonds (mn 
EUR) 12,150 20506.73 22160.81 13,224 20055.87 21631.97 
              
b. Are insurers different? 
  Estimation sample Full sample 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
CDS 461,138 223.78 401.73 594,409 264.51 4543.97 
of which 
   Insurer CDS 30,588 186.13 258.58 37,163 186.19 251.72 
  Bank CDS 91,063 221.85 386.94 107,771 219.80 395.32 
  Non-financial firm CDS 339,487 227.69 415.80 449,475 281.88 5223.29 
Sovereign CDS 461,138 62.56 60.47 589,222 57.83 56.19 
Stock index volatility 461,138 25.35 10.39 581,379 25.89 10.68 
Stock index 461,138 5367.12 6417.91 580,106 4843.77 6093.65 
Insurer dummy 461,138 0.07 594,409 0.06 
Banks dummy 461,138 0.20 594,409 0.18 
Basic material dummy 461,138 0.09 594,409 0.08 
Consumer goods dummy 461,138 0.16 594,409 0.17 
Consumer services dummy 461,138 0.21 594,409 0.20 
Energy, Oil & gas  dummy 461,138 0.03 594,409 0.04 
Health care dummy 461,138 0.04 594,409 0.05 
Industrials dummy 461,138 0.13 594,409 0.14 
Technology dummy 461,138 0.03 594,409 0.03 
Telecommun. Dummy 461,138 0.05   594,409 0.05   
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Table 3.2: Baseline regressions explaining changes in insurance risk 
Table 3.2 gives regression results for an estimation of the determinants of insurer risk. The log 
change in insurer i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are measured 
as log changes. Column 4 includes time fixed effects. The sample covers the period from 1 January 
2008 to 1 May 2013. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at time t) are shown in brackets.   
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Home sovereign CDS 0.181*** 0.121*** 0.063*** 0.019*** 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
Home stock index volatility 0.057*** 0.018* -0.011 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) 
Home stock index -0.662*** -0.284*** -0.171*** 
(0.061) (0.047) (0.053) 
Home banking system CDS 0.446*** 0.164*** 
(0.023) (0.019) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 30,555 30,555 30,555 30,555 
Number of insurers 26 26 26 26 
Time FE N N N Y 
R-squared 0.052 0.141 0.257 0.403 
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Table 3.3: Regressions with alternative dependent variables 
Table 3.3 gives regression results for an estimation of the determinants of insurer performance and 
risk using alternative dependent variables. The dependent variable is the log change in insurer i’s 
stock price in columns 1 and 2 and the log change in insurer i’s expected default frequency (EDF) 
over a one-year horizon as provided by Moody’s KMV. All explanatory variables are measured as 
log changes. Columns 2 and 4 include time fixed effects. The sample covers the period from 1 
January 2008 to 1 May 2013. Cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at time t) are shown in 
brackets.   ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stock price Stock price EDF EDF 
          
Home sovereign CDS -0.021*** -0.017*** 0.020*** 0.007* 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Home stock index volatility -0.178*** -0.132*** 0.047*** 0.053*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Home stock index  -0.699*** -0.520*** 
(0.028) (0.037) 
Home banking system CDS -0.149*** -0.083*** 0.053*** 0.031*** 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012) 
Constant -0.000 0.039*** 0.000 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 39,070 39,070 24,744 24,744 
Number of insurers 30 30 23 23 
Time FE N Y N Y 
R-squared 0.216 0.394 0.316 0.475 
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Table 3.4: Instrumental variables regression explaining changes in insurance risk
Table 3.4 gives instrumented variables regression results for estimating the determinants of insurer 
risk. The log change of insurer i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable in the second stage (Column 
1 and 4). Home sovereign CDS and home banking CDS are both instrumented by average foreign 
sovereign and banking system CDS in Column 2 and 3. In Column 4 we additionally include the 
interbank rate as instrument and report only the second stage results for the sake of brevity. All 
explanatory variables are measured in log changes.  The sample covers the period from 01/01/2008 to 
01/05/2013. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at time t) are shown in brackets.   ***, **, * = 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Second Stage First Stage  First Stage Second stage, 
overidentified 
  Insurer CDS 
Home 
sovereign 
CDS 
Home 
banking 
system CDS Insurer CDS 
        
Home sovereign CDS 0.153*** 0.223*** 
(0.055) (0.077) 
Home banking system CDS 0.721*** 0.678*** 
(0.050) (0.063) 
Average of foreign sovereign 
CDS 0.041*** 0.002 
(0.015) (0.002) 
Average of foreign bank CDS 0.498*** 0.868*** 
(0.042) (0.021) 
Stock index volatility -0.013 0.011 0.030*** -0.012 
(0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) 
Home stock index 0.022 -0.279*** -0.278*** 0.029 
(0.052) (0.063) (0.046) (0.051) 
Constant -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 30,455 30,455 30,455 30,315 
Number of insurers 26 26 26 26 
R-squared 0.209 0.123 0.561 0.190 
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Table 3.5: Are insurers different? 
Table 3.5 gives regression results for an estimation of sovereign risk transmission to insurers, banks and non-
financial firms. The log change in company i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable. All explanatory 
variables are measured as log changes. Column 1 gives the pooled effect of domestic sovereign risk. In 
columns 2 to 4, the insurance sector is the omitted category and reflected in the baseline effect of sovereign 
risk. The sample covers the period from1 January 2008 to 1 May 2013. Column 3 gives a detailed 
breakdown into non-financial sectors. Column 4 includes day fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors 
(clustered at time t) are shown in brackets.   ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aggregate 
view 
Sectoral 
breakdown 
Disaggregate 
breakdown 
Disaggregate 
breakdown 
          
Home sovereign CDS 0.082*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.056*** 
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007) 
Home stock index volatility 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.015** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Home stock index -0.544*** -0.539*** -0.538*** -0.217*** 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.027) 
Banks *home sov CDS 0.011 0.011 0.007 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Real sector *home sov CDS -0.066*** 
(0.008) 
Basic materials *home sov CDS -0.051*** -0.051*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Consumer goods *home sov CDS -0.063*** -0.063*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Consumer services *home sov CDS -0.074*** -0.065*** 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Energy, oil & gas *home sov CDS -0.083*** -0.062*** 
(0.008) (0.007) 
Health care *home sov CDS -0.092*** -0.065*** 
(0.009) (0.008) 
Industrials *home sov CDS -0.048*** -0.051*** 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Technology *home sov CDS -0.086*** -0.069*** 
(0.010) (0.009) 
Telecom. *home sov CDS -0.054*** -0.050*** 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.017*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 461,138 461,138 461,138 461,138 
Time FE N N N Y 
Number of firms 393 393 393 393 
R-squared 0.123 0.125 0.125 0.286 
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Table 3.6: Regressions explaining transmission channels 
Table 3.6 gives regression results for an estimation of the transmission channels from sovereign risk to 
insurer risk. The log change in insurer i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable. All explanatory variables 
are measured as log changes. The exposure and portfolio variables are measured as shares relative to total 
assets and are drawn from J.P. Morgan publications. An insurer is a G-SII if the FSB has classified it as 
being systemically important. The sample covers the period from 1 October 2009 to 1 May 2013 and 
includes 16 large European insurers. Country-time fixed effects are introduced in column 2. Cluster-robust 
standard errors (clustered at time t) are shown in brackets. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overall 
sovereign 
portfolio 
Country-
time FE 
Home and 
foreign 
sovereign 
exposure 
Systemic 
relevance 
          
Home sovereign CDS 0.081*** 0.101*** 0.035** 
(0.018) (0.023) (0.015) 
Stock index volatility 0.015 0.013 0.020* 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Home stock index -0.382*** -0.389*** -0.365*** 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
Home banking system CDS 0.426*** 0.424*** 0.412*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) 
Riskiness of overall sovereign portfolio 0.488*** 0.261*** 0.458*** 
(0.076) (0.093) (0.074) 
Exposure to home sovereign * CDS 0.121 
(0.200) 
Riskiness of foreign sovereign portfolio 0.533*** 
(0.090) 
G-SII insurer * home sovereign CDS 0.151*** 
(0.019) 
Constant 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 10,814 10,814 10,814 10,814 
Number of insurers 16 16 16 16 
R-squared 0.437 0.862 0.437 0.442 
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity across countries and over time 
Table 3.7 gives regression results for an estimation of the transmission channels from sovereign risk to insurer 
risk across countries and over time. The log change in insurer i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable. All 
explanatory variables are measured as log changes. The period "prior to debt crisis" runs from 1 January 2008 to 
1 January 2010. The period "height of sovereign debt crisis" is defined as starting on 1 January 2010 and ending 
with Mario Draghi’s speech on 26 July 2012, in which he first announced the OMT and stated that the ECB 
would "do whatever it takes" (the period thereafter is defined as "post-Draghi speech"). Cluster-robust standard 
errors (clustered at time t) are shown in brackets.   ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
  (1) (2) (3) 
All 
countries: 
All 
countries: Euro area: 
euro area 
effects 
country risk 
effects 
time period 
split 
        
Home sovereign CDS 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.168*** 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.029) 
Stock index volatility 0.023** 0.020* 0.010 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
Home stock index -0.237*** -0.269*** -0.211*** 
(0.047) (0.049) (0.045) 
Home banking system CDS 0.437*** 0.443*** 0.507*** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.036) 
Home sovereign CDS*euro area 0.138*** 
  (0.018) 
  Home sovereign CDS*level of sovereign CDS 
 
0.038*** 
 
 
(0.014) 
 Home sovereign CDS * height of sovereign debt crisis 
 
-0.025 
 
(0.036) 
Home sovereign CDS * post- Draghi speech 
 
-0.033 
  
(0.038) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 30,555 30,555 11,158 
Number of insurers 26 26 9 
R-squared 0.262 0.258 0.292 
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Table 3.8: Regressions explaining change in insurance risk following Acharya et al (2014)
Table gives regression results for estimating the determinants of insurer risk following the specification in Table 
3.3 of Acharya et al (2014). The log change of insurer i’s CDS spread is the dependent variable. All explanatory 
variables are measured in log changes. Columns (1) to (2) cover the pre-bailout period (1/1/2007 to 9/15/2008), 
columns (3) to (4) cover the bailout period (9/16/2008 to  10/21/2008), and columns (5) to (6) cover the post-
bailout period (10/22/2008 to 04/30/2011). All columns include day fixed effects. Following Acharya et al 
(2014), Columns (2), (4), and (6) include insurer fixed effects as well as insurer specific parameters for the 
change in the domestic banking system CDS and the change in the domestic stock market volatility indices (not 
reported). Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at insurer level) are shown in brackets.   ***, **, * = 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Pre-Bailout AIG-Bailout Post-Bailout 
Home sovereign CDS 0.013 0.003 0.102 0.112 0.048** 0.040** 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.103) (0.092) (0.018) (0.015) 
Home stock index volatility 0.003 0.084 -0.018 
(0.031) (0.080) (0.022) 
Home banking system CDS 0.246*** 0.184** 0.199*** 
(0.065) (0.080) (0.057) 
Constant 0.181 0.189 0.136*** 0.105*** 0.069** 0.066** 
(0.178) (0.179) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) 
Observations 7,684 7,684 439 439 14,813 14,813 
Number of insurers 23 23 18 18 26 26 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Insurer FE and interactions N Y N Y N Y 
R-squared 0.402 0.437 0.474 0.571 0.344 0.382 
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Chapter 4: Cross-border spillovers of regulation1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In response to the recent financial crisis, numerous and substantial changes have been 
made to the architecture of the financial system. One key objective is to maintain financial 
stability by widening the focus of regulation from individual banks to the stability of the 
financial system as a whole. Prudential instruments can help in achieving this objective. The 
effectiveness of these instruments for financial stability hinges however on the absence of 
unintended leakages and spillovers. In integrated financial markets, such as in the German 
case, this might be a challenge given that banks can circumvent prudential regulation by 
adapting their global activities.  
In this chapter, we analyse how prudential policies implemented in domestic and foreign 
markets affect German banks’ local and global lending behavior. Our study relates to the 
current policy debate on cross-border effects of regulatory policies and reciprocation. For 
instance, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is the European macroprudential 
institution, has recently issued recommendations which call for an annual assessment of cross-
border effects of national macroprudential measures (ESRB, 2015). We use detailed micro-
level data on German banks to study regulatory spillovers across borders in three different 
dimensions; inward transmission of foreign regulation into Germany due to international 
activities of German banks, inward transmission through foreign-owned affiliates located in 
Germany, and outward transmission to foreign countries through foreign lending of German 
banks and their affiliates. 
This analysis is part of the International Banking Research Network (IBRN) project on 
cross-border regulatory spillovers and follows the methodology described in Buch and 
Goldberg (2017). The IBRN is a network of several national central banks (NCBs), the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
                                                          
1
 Chapter 4 is based on Ohls, J., Pramor, M., and Tonzer, L. (2016) International Banking and Cross-Border 
Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series, 27/2016. The 
paper has been published in a shorter version as Ohls, J., Pramor, M., and Tonzer, L. (2017) International 
Banking and Cross-Border Effects of Regulation: Lessons from Germany. International Journal of Central 
Banking, 13 s1, pp.129-162. The copyright of the original article is with the Association of the International 
Journal of Central Banking. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) which seeks to analyse questions regarding global banks’ activities.2 
The key advantage of the IBRN is the access to NCBs’ high-quality micro-level data 
combined with the use of up-to date empirical methods and the availability of expert 
knowledge on the characteristics of national banking systems.  
The IBRN’s work thus yields, first, relevant results from single-country studies based on a 
common methodology and performed by the country teams within the network (for a 
complete list of country studies on regulatory spillovers, see International Journal of Central 
Banking, Volume 13, Supplement 1, March 2017). This chapter is based on the country study 
for Germany.  
Second, these country-specific results are compared and analysed in a meta-analysis (Buch 
and Goldberg, 2017). A previous IBRN project focused on the transmission of liquidity risk 
through banks’ international exposures; a summary of the results can be found in Buch and 
Goldberg (2015).  
We use the External Position Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which gives us detailed 
micro-level information on German banks’ international lending. Data on changes in 
prudential policies is obtained from the newly established IBRN Prudential Instruments 
Database which includes information on prudential instruments for more than 60 countries 
over the 2000-2014 period (Cerutti, Correa, Fiorentino, and Segalla, 2017). Furthermore, 
given that regulatory changes are likely to interact with economic conditions, we control for 
the business and financial cycles using data provided by the BIS. 
The prudential instruments studied in this chapter include general capital requirements, 
sector-specific capital requirements, loan-to-value ratio limits, reserve requirements (in local 
and foreign currency), and concentration limits. Thus, we take a broad approach and include 
micro- and macroprudential instruments as well as monetary policy instruments (i.e. reserve 
requirements) to study cross-border spillovers of instruments (Buch and Goldberg, 2017). 
While some of these instruments do not primarily target financial stability, they may affect 
financial stability through (desired or undesired) spillover effects on banks’ lending decisions. 
Also, the evaluation of these policies may be informative for the analysis of future 
macroprudential measures. Buch and Goldberg (2017) discuss the expected effects of the 
instruments under consideration in greater detail. 
The common methodology makes use of the international dimension of the data and of 
bank-level heterogeneity to address potential endogeneity concerns. For one, foreign 
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 For more information on the IBRN please see https://www.newyorkfed.org/IBRN/index.html.  
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regulation is unlikely to respond to the lending behavior of an individual (German) bank. 
Furthermore, the identification strategy is based on the variation between banks’ balance sheet 
conditions and on differences in the banks’ exposure to regulatory changes through their 
international lending activities. This variation allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
at the time and at the country level. In a robustness check, our analysis further controls for 
loan demand by including country-time fixed effects in the regressions. 
The German setting is well suited for an analysis of regulatory spillovers across borders 
because of the high degree of international activity of German banks. We analyse 
international loan growth of German-owned banks to 52 foreign countries. These foreign 
loans amount to 33% of total loans of German banks. Also, Germany hosts 72 affiliates of 
foreign banks which hold 9% of all German claims. From a German policy perspective, it is 
important to understand whether and how these foreign-owned banks transmit regulatory 
changes from their home country into the German market. Finally, German banks enter 
foreign markets not only through cross-border lending but also through both, foreign branches 
and foreign subsidiaries. Our data allow us to test whether foreign branches and subsidiaries 
behave differently to changes in regulation. 
While our results provide evidence for international spillovers of prudential instruments, 
we document that these spillovers are heterogeneous between types of instruments and types 
of banks. There are five main findings. 
First, analyzing the inward transmission of regulatory changes abroad due to foreign 
exposures of German banks, we find for the average bank that domestic loan growth increases 
if foreign regulation tightens. This holds specifically for a tightening in capital requirements 
and loan to value ratios. 
Second, foreign-owned affiliates located in Germany contract their loan growth in 
Germany in response to a policy tightening in their home country. This finding is surprising 
as one might expect that foreign-owned banks respond to stricter regulation in their home 
country by increasing lending activities of their foreign affiliates that are not subject to the 
regulation. However, regulatory pressure can have indirect effects on foreign affiliates located 
in Germany if their parent bank draws resources from them in order to fulfill tighter 
requirements in the home country. While there is a substantial heterogeneity between different 
types of foreign-owned banks, the impact of bank characteristics depends on the regulatory 
instrument.  Overall, the retrenchment from the German lending market is less pronounced for 
larger banks that are better capitalized and with a higher ratio of illiquid assets to total assets. 
Chapter 4: Cross-border spillovers of regulation 
154 
Third, for the outward transmission exercise, we find evidence that international loan 
growth by German banks is negatively affected by stricter regulation in the destination 
country. However, for most prudential instruments we only find short-run effects that vanish 
after one quarter. Only in the case of local reserve requirements, we find that a tightening in 
this instrument significantly reduces loan growth over a longer time horizon. This suggests 
that local reserve requirements, which have been used mainly by emerging markets in our 
sample, have been successful in controlling capital inflows from German banks. 
Furthermore, we study whether foreign branches and subsidiaries of German banks differ 
in their responses to changes in the prudential regulation in their host country. Institution-
based regulation in the host country usually applies to foreign subsidiaries, while foreign 
branches are subject to home country regulation. These differences in the treatment of 
branches compared to subsidiaries in the host country may facilitate regulatory leakages. Our 
results suggests that foreign subsidiaries are constrained by host country regulation as they 
reduce loan growth after a tightening in the host country prudential index (as well as in sector-
specific capital buffers, loan-to-value-ratios and foreign reserve requirements). Foreign 
branches, however, do not change their loan growth significantly after a change in host 
country regulation (except for a negative effect of concentration ratios and a positive 
contemporaneous effect of the prudential index). In contrast to foreign subsidiaries, marginal 
effects of a tightening in prudential instruments are positive in the foreign branch sub-sample, 
but they lack significance. 
Finally, we find that business and financial cycles matter for lending decisions. For 
example, foreign-owned banks located in Germany increase loan growth when the financial 
cycle in their home country undergoes an upturn. Similarly, German banks increase loan 
growth to destination countries which experience an upturn in the financial and business 
cycles. This procyclicality to destination country cycles, however, cannot be found for loan 
growth by German banks’ foreign affiliates that are hosted in these countries. 
Our study adds to research on the pattern of German banks’ international activities and 
cross-border spillovers. Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2014), for example, find that more 
productive German banks are more likely to maintain cross-border activities. In contrast, the 
propensity to maintain cross-border loans decreases with risk aversion (Duewel, Frey, and 
Lipponer, 2011). Besides productivity and risk aversion, bank size matters. While a large 
percentage of German banks are active abroad, only large banks maintain foreign affiliates 
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(Buch, Koch, and Koetter, 2011a). We include a set of bank control variables based on this 
literature. 
The recent financial crisis has affected banks’ international activities.3 Banks have 
withdrawn from international markets, with one reason being changes in funding conditions 
or government interventions (Buch, Neugebauer, and Schroeder, 2013; Kerl and Koch, 2015). 
Internal capital markets have been one tool to stabilize foreign affiliates’ lending activities 
after the crisis depending on parent banks’ characteristics (Frey and Kerl, 2015). Regarding 
international spillovers, Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2011b) look at the effect of rescue 
measures implemented in response to the recent financial crisis in the US and Germany and 
find evidence of spillover effects through foreign affiliates. 
This chapter contributes to these studies by focusing on the effects of changes in prudential 
regulation on German banks’ (international) lending activity. We address this issue by 
exploiting a novel dataset on regulatory changes obtained from Cerutti et al. (2017b), thereby 
contributing to a relatively new strand of the literature (e.g. Jiménez, Ongena, Peydro, and 
Saurina Salas, 2012; Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014). However, studies that evaluate 
the use and effectiveness of prudential instruments are mostly based on country-level data 
(IMF 2011; Claessens, Ghosh, and Mihet, 2013). Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2016) study 
the outcome of a new survey on prudential instruments conducted by the IMF. They find that 
these instruments tend to be used more in emerging market economies, that their use is linked 
to the state of the credit and housing markets, and, importantly, that there is evidence for 
avoidance of these policies by relying more on cross-border borrowing. Evidence at the micro 
level is scarce and often limited to domestic markets or single instruments (Jiménez et al., 
2012; Aiyar et al., 2014). Overall, we find a withdrawal from foreign markets when regulation 
in the home or foreign market tightens. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The following part describes the data and stylized 
facts regarding international activities of German banks. The third part presents regression 
results for the analysis of inward and outward transmission of prudential instruments. In 
addition to the common methodology, we analyse whether adjustments differ for foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of German banks. The final part concludes the chapter.  
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 For studies on the transmission of shocks through international banks, see, for example, Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2011). Bremus and Fratzscher (2015) look at the factors that caused changes in the structure of cross-border 
capital flows after the recent crisis. 
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4.2 Data and stylized facts for Germany 
4.2.1 Bank-level data 
We use confidential data collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank for the Monthly Balance 
Sheet Statistics of banks (BISTA)4 and for the External Position Report (Fiorentino, Koch,and 
Rudek, 2010). The sample covers the period from Q1:2002 to Q4:2013. Data are available for 
(i) all banks located in Germany, including foreign-owned subsidiaries, and (ii) German 
banks’ branches and subsidiaries operating abroad. The analysis is conducted at quarterly 
frequency in order to match the frequency of the regulatory dataset. To aggregate monthly 
data to quarterly frequency, we use quarter-end values.  
Dependent variables 
For the dependent variable, we use the change in log outstanding loans multiplied by 100. 
In the baseline specification, we use total loans; in robustness tests, we exploit the sectoral 
breakdown and analyse the effect on loans to banks, non-bank private sector, and the public 
sector separately.  
For the inward transmission exercise, we refer to total domestic loans as provided by the 
Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics. This data are available for domestic (German) banks and 
foreign affiliates located in Germany. 5 For the latter, we can identify the country of the parent 
bank.  
For the outward transmission exercise, we make use of data from the External Position 
Report. All German banks, including their foreign affiliates (branches and subsidiaries), are 
required to report foreign asset positions, broken down by destination country and asset class. 
While foreign subsidiaries of German banks have to report their foreign claims individually, 
foreign branches are aggregated for each German parent bank and host country.6 Our analysis 
includes the 52 largest destination countries (in terms of overall claims of the German 
banking system) and the 92 largest banks (plus their foreign affiliates) in terms of foreign 
assets. In this way, we cover more than 90% of the German banking system’s total foreign 
loans as of December 2013.  
                                                          
4
 For more information on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, please see 
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Standardartikel/Service/Reporting_systems/monthly_balance_sheet_
statistics.html?https=1  
5
 Please note that foreign affiliates located in Germany are not included in the outward transmission exercise due 
to data restrictions. In the inward transmission exercise, these banks are only included when specifically 
analyzing inward transmission through foreign banks located in Germany. We can not differentiate between 
branches and subsidiaries due to data limitations. 
6
 For a comprehensive description of the External Position Report, see Fiorentino, Koch, and Rudek (2010). 
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We focus on the traditional banking activities such as loans and advances and exclude 
tradeable claims such as equity and bonds for consistency with the common methodology in 
the IBRN. Furthermore, loans and advances account for roughly two thirds of German banks’ 
international claims comprised in the External Position Report (Fiorentino et al., 2010) and 
are more likely to be affected by bank regulation than tradeable assets. Our analysis focuses 
on the intensive margin, i.e. on loan growth, not on adjustments along the extensive margin. 
In order to reduce the cases of entries into and exits out of foreign markets in our dataset, we 
exclude small banks and less relevant destination countries. As a result, 84% of all bank-
destination country combinations exist in at least 75% of all quarters. 
Regarding the level of consolidation, we proceed as follows. When studying the lending 
responses of German-owned banks, we use consolidated (parent bank plus foreign branch) 
data if a German bank owns foreign affiliates but include also banks that lend directly cross-
border without having a foreign affiliate. This consolidation choice accounts for the fact that 
parents and their foreign branches are subject to home country regulation, whereas 
subsidiaries are subject to host country regulation. We approximate consolidated exposures at 
the parent-foreign branch level by using the unconsolidated positions of the parent and its 
foreign branches and a proxy for intrabank flows. This proxy has been used in previous 
studies with this data (Frey and Kerl, 2015). When studying the lending behavior of foreign-
owned affiliates located in Germany, we have to use unconsolidated data due to data 
constraints but control for internal capital market positions. 
To account for outliers we drop observations where log changes of lending exceed 100% in 
absolute terms. We keep only series for which at least two consecutive observations and at 
least eight observations in total are available. Qualitatively, our main regression results are not 
affected by the data cleaning. Summary statistics are provided in Table 4.1. 
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Balance sheet characteristics 
The balance sheet characteristics are taken from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics 
(BISTA). To clean the data, we drop observations for which the ratios described below are 
less than zero or greater than 100%.7 The balance sheet variables include the illiquid assets 
ratio, core deposits ratio, capital ratio, net intragroup funding ratio, log of total assets, and 
international activities ratio. The balance sheet variables are defined as follows, with 
corresponding summary statistics provided in Table 4.1: 
• percentage of a bank’s portfolio of assets that is illiquid 		
	, 
• percentage of a bank’s balance sheet financed with core deposits 
(

		,) 
• percentage of a bank’s equity-to-asset ratio , 
• percentage of a bank’s net intragroup funding position of headquarters relative to total 
liabilities (
,) 
• log of total assets ( 		
	,) 
• percentage of a bank’s  foreign assets plus foreign liabilities relative to total assets plus 
total liabilities (
,) 
Detailed information on the construction of these variables can be found in Table A1 in the 
appendix to this chapter. 
4.2.2 Data on prudential instruments 
To analyse spillovers of regulatory policies, this study draws on the IBRN Prudential 
Instruments Database developed by Cerutti et al. (2017b) which provides quarterly 
information on changes in prudential instruments plus a composite index for more than 60 
countries over the time period 2000-2014.8 The prudential variables provide information on 
tightening (coded by 1) and loosening (coded by -1) of a specific instrument in the specific 
quarter when the change came into effect, and zero otherwise. In this study, we focus on six 
out of seven instruments to study spillovers of prudential policies: general capital 
requirements, sector-specific capital requirements, loan-to-value ratio limits, reserve 
requirements (in local and foreign currency), concentration limits. We exclude interbank 
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 The variable capturing internal capital market positions can be less than zero; we therefore drop values that 
exceed 100%. 
8
 The database is available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/ibrn. 
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exposures limits from our analysis due to the small number of changes for this instrument in 
our sample (see Table 4.2).  
We use this information in our analysis to control for individual changes in prudential 
instruments in the home country of foreign banks located in Germany and in the destination 
country of lending by German banks. We are not analyzing the effects of regulatory changes 
in Germany on bank lending because we do not observe enough changes in regulatory 
instruments in Germany over the sample period. Instead, we control for German regulation 
through time fixed effects. The variables are defined as follows: 
Regulation weighted by foreign exposures (= all exposures of the banks outside the home 
country) 
ExpP%,&'	(where	l = 0, 1, 2) = Foreign exposure-weighted regulation  
Home country regulation (home country = country of the foreign parent bank) 
HomeP5,&'	(where	l = 0, 1, 2) = Home country regulation with 0, 1, and 2 lags  
Destination country regulation (destination country = country to which the loan goes) 
DestP5,&'	(where	l = 0, 1, 2)	= Destination country regulation with 0, 1, and 2 lags 
See Buch and Goldberg (2017) for more details on the construction of regulatory measures. 
Table 4.2 provides summary statistics for changes in these instruments. We see that most 
changes occur for reserve requirements on local and foreign currency deposits followed by 
capital requirements. A tightening of standards occurred more often than a loosening.  
Our sample is rather dominated by advanced economies (60% of the underlying 
observations in the Inward A and Outward specifications, 90% of the underlying observations 
in the Inward B specification). However, we observe relatively more regulatory changes in 
emerging market economies for the regulatory instruments that are significant in the 
regression analysis. This holds particularly true for foreign and local reserve requirements. 
4.2.3 Data on the business and financial cycles 
Another part of the dataset focuses on macroeconomic conditions and was provided by the 
BIS. It allows us to control for the current state of the business (output gap) and financial 
(credit-to-GDP gap) cycles when assessing regulatory spillovers (BIS 2014; Drehmann, 
Borio, and Tsatsaronis, 2011). This is important given that changes in regulation often take 
place in response to economic and financial conditions while their implementation might, in 
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turn, affect economic outcomes. For example, Cerutti et al. (2017a) analyse a new IMF 
database on prudential policies for a sample of 119 countries over the 2000-2013 period and 
establish that the use of these policies is linked to developments in credit and housing 
markets.  
4.2.4 Stylized facts 
 [Fact 1: The degree of internationalization is heterogeneous across German banks.] 
A large percentage of German banks maintain international activities (Buch et al., 2011a). 
Figure 4.1 shows that German banks have recently increased their foreign loan supply relative 
to assets (lower left panel), whereas this cannot be observed for domestic lending (upper right 
panel). On average, German banks are net lenders regarding their intragroup positions (lower 
right panel). Hence, on average, they distribute liquidity to their foreign subsidiaries rather 
than absorbing liquidity from them.  
The size of international activities of German banks and thus presumably their potential to 
generate cross-border spillovers of regulation varies with the banks’ business models: notably, 
large German banks conduct a relatively high amount of their business abroad (Fiorentino et 
al., 2010). Table 4.3 shows correlations of banks’ total, domestic, and foreign loan shares with 
balance sheet characteristics. Besides the relevance of bank size, it can be seen that German 
banks’ capital and core deposits ratios correlate positively with the share of domestic loans to 
assets, whereas this finding is less pronounced or even reversed for the share of foreign loans 
to assets. We will therefore test whether banks’ balance sheet characteristics affect their 
responses to regulatory changes abroad and at home (Section 4.3.1). 
Heterogeneity in international activities also comes into play if we look at foreign loans by 
bank group relative to total foreign lending by German banks. For example, in Q3:2013, 
around 60% of foreign loans granted by German banks can be attributed to the “large 
commercial banks”, around 20% to the “head institutes of savings banks and credit unions”, 
but only 6% to “other commercial banks” and less than 1% to “savings banks and credit 
unions” (Table 4.4). The average bank size in the latter two banking groups is significantly 
smaller compared to the former two banking groups, such that the result is consistent with the 
relevance of bank size for the conduct of international activities (Table 4.5). Furthermore, 
comparing large commercial banks and head institutes of savings banks and credit unions to 
banks in the other banking groups reveals that they have, on average, a lower capital ratio and 
illiquid assets ratio, they are net lenders regarding their intragroup positions and financed to a 
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lower degree by core deposits. These differences in exposure to foreign activities as well as 
business models might thus impact the transmission of prudential changes. 
[Fact 2: (Inter)national activities of German banks include loans to different sectors.] 
Heterogeneity also exists regarding the sectoral breakdown of lending. For example, 
German banks’ domestic loan supply comprises 56 percent of total assets: 14 percent directed 
to banks, 37 percent to the non-bank private sector (i.e. non-financial firms and households), 
and 5 percent to the public sector (Table 4.6). If changes in prudential regulation occur, 
banks’ responses might vary depending on the loan type. We analyse this issue further in 
robustness tests (Section 4.3.1). Also, the sectoral composition of loans differs between types 
of German banks’ foreign affiliates. A relatively high share of local (=foreign) lending by 
foreign branches is directed toward the non-bank private sector. In contrast, foreign 
subsidiaries have similar shares of local lending exposures to banks and the non-bank private 
sector. Both foreign branches and subsidiaries maintain a relatively high share of home 
country (=domestic) loans to banks, most likely reflecting internal capital market activities.  
 [Fact 3: Foreign affiliates of German banks include both branches and subsidiaries.] 
German banks maintain both foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches in a large number 
of different counterparty countries. In an extended analysis on the impact of the 
organizational structure, we cover around 40 destination countries with approximately 170 
subsidiaries and 190 aggregates of branches. 9 Foreign subsidiaries are assumed to respond 
differently to host country regulation than foreign branches. For example, German banks’ 
foreign branches, which are under home country regulation, can expand/reduce their activities 
compared to domestic banks in the host country if the latter face a tighter/looser regulatory 
environment. In Section 4.3.2, we thus analyse whether foreign branches respond differently 
to a tightening or loosening of host country policies compared to foreign subsidiaries of 
German banks. 
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 Note that, as described in the data section, we do not have data on individual branches but the aggregate of 
branches per German parent bank and host country. For example, if the German parent bank A has two branches 
in the US, we have information on the sum of these two branches. 
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4.3 Empirical methodology and results 
This section presents the baseline estimations for inward and outward transmission of 
prudential instruments (Section 4.3.1). We extend our analysis and ask whether banks adjust 
their loan growth differently depending on their organizational form in Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 Baseline analysis of inward and outward transmission of prudential policies 
In the following, we provide a description of the baseline empirical model to study inward 
and outward transmission and comment on the results. The analysis closely follows the 
approach described in Buch and Goldberg (2017).  
In each specification 1 to 3, we include our variable of interest, a prudential policy change, 
both contemporaneously as well as its two lags. Furthermore, the prudential policy is 
interacted with banks’ balance sheet characteristics showing how banks with different 
(structural) balance sheet characteristics adjust their loan growth in response to changes in 
regulation. In regression Tables 4.7 to 4.16, for the sake of brevity, the reported coefficients 
are the sum of the contemporaneous term and its two lags, with the corresponding p-value of 
the F-statistics for joint significance in square brackets. 
As the prudential instrument enters individually as well as in the interaction effects with 
bank variables, we calculate a marginal effect (at the average) for both, the contemporaneous 
changes as well as for the sum of contemporaneous and lagged changes. These marginal 
effects give the effects of regulation for the average bank and are reported at the bottom of 
each Table. Baseline regression models include time and bank fixed effects. 
Specification 1: Exposure-weighted inward transmission of regulation (Table 4.7). 
 ∆Y%,& = α< + (αExpP%,&	 + 	α>ExpP%,& + α?ExpP%,&>) + aAX%,& + (	βExpP%,& ∙ X%,& +
β>ExpP%,& ∙ X%,& + β?ExpP%,&> ∙ X%,&) + f% + f& + ϵ%,& (1) 
where ∆Y%,& is the log change in the domestic loans of bank b at time t. Xb,t-1 is a vector of 
control variables that captures the degree to which a bank is exposed to changes in regulation 
through ex ante balance sheet composition as described in Section 4.2.1. The prudential 
policy changes are captured by ExpP, that is an index of exposure-weighted prudential 
policies outside the home country. We control for time-invariant heterogeneity at the bank 
level by including bank fixed effects fb. Time fixed effects ft capture global developments that 
affect all banks contemporaneously. 
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The interaction terms of the prudential instrument with banks’ balance sheet characteristics 
shows how banks with different (structural) balance sheet characteristics adjust their loan 
growth in response to changes in regulation. As the baseline regression model includes time 
and bank fixed effects, the coefficient of the interaction term measures how the structure of 
banks’ balance sheets affects the response of bank lending to changes in regulation.  
This approach helps with identification in two dimensions. First, we estimate lending 
responses (i.e. log changes in outstanding loans) at the bank-level with respect to a change in 
regulatory policies at the country-level. Assuming that an individual bank does not drive 
adjustments in regulatory policies, this reduces endogeneity concerns. Second, we interact 
changes in regulatory policies with balance sheet characteristics. Like this, we can account for 
the fact that banks’ reactions to regulatory policy can be heterogeneous depending on their 
business model. For example, banks’ internationalization pattern as well as liquidity and 
capital buffers might determine to which extent a bank is affected by changes in regulatory 
instruments.10 
Results for specification 1 are shown in Table 4.7; we see that the exposure-weighted 
index of changes in the overall prudential index increases domestic loan growth for the 
average bank (see marginal effects at the bottom of Table 4.7). While this effect is significant 
contemporaneously, it becomes insignificant in the medium run, if we add the effects for the 
first and second lag to a joint effect. One reason for the lack of medium-run effects can be that 
most of the changes in instruments are clustered in 2012 and 2013. The result on the 
prudential index is driven by two instruments, capital requirements and loan to value ratios. 
For the latter, we also see a significant effect for the average bank over current and two lags. 
In quantitative terms, the current effect of the loan to value ratio is also strongest: Given a 
tightening of the policy, loan growth rates increase on average by 15.2% which corresponds 
to an increase of the median loan growth rate (0.27% per quarter) by 0.04 percentage points in 
that quarter. Loan to value ratios have been used actively by emerging market economies over 
our sample period and have been both tightened and loosened. This provides a solid ground 
for the empirical analysis.  
Differences in bank characteristics do not seem to consistently affect the response to 
regulatory changes abroad. The positive effect in case of the prudential index is weakened for 
banks with higher net intragroup positions; banks’ response to a tightening in the instrument 
is more than four times weaker if the net intragroup funding ratio increases by one standard 
                                                          
10
 For a more detailed discussion about identification issues, see Buch and Goldberg (2016). 
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deviation. This might be because foreign affiliates have less scope to provide intragroup 
funding to the German parent bank given tighter regulation. 
Specification 2: Inward transmission of home prudential policy via foreign affiliates 
(Table 4.8). 
∆Y%,5,& = α< + (αHomeP5,& + α>HomeP5,& + α?HomeP5,&>) + αAX%,& + αGZ5,& +
	(βHomeP5,& ∙ X%,& + β>HomeP5,& ∙ X%,& + β?HomeP5,&> ∙ X%,&) + f% + f& + ϵ%,5,&         
(2) 
where	∆Y%,& is the log change in the loans to Germany of a foreign affiliate bank b located 
in Germany with a foreign parent from country j at time t. 11 The vector of bank control 
variables Xb,t-1 is the same as above. The prudential policy changes are captured by HomeP, 
reflecting prudential policy in the home country that is the country of the parent bank of the 
foreign-owned affiliate located in Germany. Z5,&  represents the cycle variables for home 
country j.  
Results on specification (2) are shown in Table 4.8. For the average foreign bank (see 
marginal effects at the bottom of the Table), home country policy is of importance for sector-
specific capital buffers, loan to value ratios and reserve requirements on local currency 
deposits. The latter two instruments have been used mainly by emerging market countries in 
our sample. An increase in these instruments reduces the host (i.e. German) loan growth by 
foreign affiliates located in Germany. The economic magnitude of the current effect is 
strongest for sector-specific capital buffers: Given a tightening of the policy, on average loan 
growth rates decrease by 17.4% which corresponds to a decrease in the median loan growth 
rate (1.43% per quarter) by 0.25 percentage points.  
This decrease in loan growth can be caused by foreign parents drawing on resources of 
their foreign affiliates to fulfill higher reserve or capital requirements and to maintain lending 
at home. The effect is, for example, less pronounced for illiquid banks which might have less 
scope to transfer liquidity to their parent bank. Also larger and better-capitalized banks are 
affected less severely, possibly due to higher buffers which allow them to maintain loan 
growth. Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, especially reductions in loan 
growth in response to activity based measures like loan to value ratios might be problematic 
from the perspective of the German regulator in case domestic and foreign financial cycles do 
                                                          
11
 Ideally, we would like to distinguish between foreign-owned affiliates that are subject to German (i.e. host) 
country regulation and those that are subject to home country regulation. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us 
to do so. However, regulatory changes in the home country might be important for both types of foreign 
affiliates due to the internal capital market and the influence of the parent bank. 
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not coincide. Second, a foreign affiliate located in Germany is not independent from home 
country regulation, in particular tighter regulation in its parent bank’s country does not make 
it more attractive to increase loan growth in Germany.12 
Regarding the financial and business cycle, we find that an upswing in the financial cycle 
of the home country has positive effects on loan growth of foreign affiliates located in 
Germany. In sum, this suggests that foreign affiliates are not independent of developments in 
the country in which their parent bank is located. Regulatory changes and macroeconomic 
developments alike are mirrored in their lending activities within the host country.  
Specification 3: Outward transmission of destination country prudential policy (Table 
4.9). 
∆Y%,5,& = α< + αDestP5,& + α>DestP5,& + α?DestP5,&> + 	αAX%,& + αGZ5,& + (βDestP5,& ∙
X%,& + β>DestP5,& ∙ X%,& + β?DestP5,&> ∙ X%,&)		 + f5 + f&	+	f%+	ε%,5,&                               
(3) 
where ∆Y%,5,& is the log change in the loans of a German bank b to a foreign country j at 
time t.  The prudential policy changes are captured by DestP, reflecting prudential changes in 
the destination country j of the loan by bank b. All other variables are defined in parallel to 
specifications (2) and (3). Again we interpret the effect of the regulatory index by computing 
its marginal effect for the average bank. 
Results in Table 4.9 reveal that a tightening in the prudential index of the destination 
country reduces loan growth of the average German bank to this country. Hence, stricter 
policies in the destination country spill over to German banks even though these are not 
always directly subject to the change in regulation. The significant result for the prudential 
index is driven in particular by changes in reserve requirements. For local reserve 
requirements, banks do not only react in the short-run as can be observed for the prudential 
index, the concentration ratio or foreign reserve requirements. Also, the cumulated effect over 
the current and following two quarters is negative and significant. Our results thus suggest 
that reserve requirements which have been used mostly by emerging market countries, have 
indeed been successful in dampening lending inflows. An increase in reserve requirements 
imposes additional costs on funding, which might in turn be passed on to borrowers by 
                                                          
12
 Interestingly, a tightening in concentration ratios in the home market has the opposite effect, namely an 
increase in loan growth to the host (i.e. German) market. With tighter concentration ratios, banks might seek to 
increase diversification across regions. However, changes in this instrument go back to only two countries (the 
Netherlands and France) such that these results should be taken with care. 
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increasing loan rates and hence dampening credit growth. To simultaneously reduce the 
country’s attractiveness for foreign capital inflows, an increase in reserve requirements can be 
accompanied by expansive monetary policy, which translates into lower returns for foreign 
investors. 
A tightening of local reserve requirements relates on average to a short-run decline in loan 
growth rates by 0.41 percentage points. The negative effect is smaller for banks with more 
liquid assets, possibly because holding the required reserves may be less costly for these 
banks, but reinforced for banks that obtain higher net intragroup funding. 
Finally, macroeconomic developments in the destination country matter for German banks’ 
international loan portfolio. An upturn in the business and financial cycles causes a positive 
response in loan growth. This suggests that German banks expand across borders during 
economic and financial upswings in the respective destination country. 
Robustness tests 
We test the robustness of our results to including country-time fixed effects. They control 
for unobserved time-varying factors at the destination country level such as demand effects. 
With destination country-time fixed effects we are no longer able to estimate the 
unconditional impact of regulatory changes on bank lending, but can still identify the bank-
specific effects of regulatory changes based on the interactions effects. The results are robust 
(Table 4.10). 
A second robustness tests exploits the granularity of our data and conducts regressions in 
which the dependent variable is broken down by loans to banks, to the non-bank private 
sector, and the public sector. The sector breakdown shows that responses to prudential 
measures vary across loan sectors and specifications which might explain why we observe 
only few significant results for total loan growth. For inward transmission through foreign 
exposures, our results are strongest for loan growth to banks and less pronounced to the non-
bank private sector (Tables 4.11-4.12). Loan growth to the public sector in Germany is 
negatively affected by a tightening in reserve requirements (local and foreign currency) in 
foreign countries (Table 4.13). For outward transmission, the negative effect of a tightening in 
local-currency reserve requirements on German banks’ total international lending is 
confirmed contemporaneously and in the medium run for loan growth towards the non-bank 
private sector, as well as in the short-run towards the bank sector (Tables 4.14-4.15). 
Finally, we test the robustness of our results to excluding small exposures of a bank to a 
foreign country as this might reflect idiosyncratic business outside the scope of our model 
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(not reported). Results remain robust when we exclude the 1% or 5% smallest destination 
country-bank positions and when we change the clustering of the standard errors. 
4.3.2 Exploration of the banks‘ organizational structure 
This Section explores whether foreign affiliates differ in their lending behavior in response 
to prudential instruments due to their organizational form. We focus on outward transmission 
distinguish between lending by foreign subsidiaries and by foreign branches of German 
banks. Foreign branches and subsidiaries might be affected differently by changes in 
prudential instruments in the home and the host country (Danisewicz, Reinhardt, and 
Sowerbutts, 2015). For institution-based instruments, such as capital requirements or 
concentration limits, branches tend to be subject to home country regulation whereas 
subsidiaries have to comply with host country regulation. We use this variation across bank 
and instrument types to analyse banks’ differential responses.  
Our approach is similar to specification (3) but the sample pools across foreign branches 
and foreign subsidiaries of German banks. This reduces our sample size relative to Table 4.9 
as we exclude all banks that do not own foreign affiliates but only lend cross-border. We 
allow for heterogeneous effects of cycle variables, of regulation and of the interaction of 
regulation with bank variables by interacting them with an indicator variable that equals one 
in case of a foreign subsidiary. At the bottom of Table 4.16, we report the marginal effects of 
the prudential instruments for branches and subsidiaries, where the latter consists of the joint 
effect of the baseline category (=branch) plus the interaction effect.  
We find that the average foreign subsidiary reduces loan growth contemporaneously 
following a tightening in the prudential index, sector-specific capital buffers and loan to value 
ratios. A tightening in foreign reserve requirements leads to a reduction in loan growth of 
foreign subsidiaries in the medium run. While foreign subsidiaries are thus constrained by 
host country regulation, we only find weaker evidence for foreign branches. A tightening in 
concentration ratios leads to a reduction in loan growth in the short run, while a tightening in 
the prudential index leads to an increase in loan growth in the medium run (finding significant 
at 10% level only). Bank characteristics other than the organizational structure seem to play a 
less important role in the response of foreign affiliates to regulatory changes. Overall, we find 
that foreign subsidiaries react more strongly to host country regulation. Foreign branches do 
not generate regulatory leakages by increasing loan growth after a tightening in host country 
regulation.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
Global banks may generate cross-border spillovers of the regulatory stance if they adjust 
their international loan portfolio in response to foreign and domestic regulation. While 
prudential instruments like reserve requirements or loan to value ratios have mostly been 
implemented by emerging market countries, in recent times also advanced countries increase 
their macroprudential toolkit to target financial stability. For countries like Germany with a 
highly internationalized banking system, concerns about regulatory spillovers are a topic of 
utmost importance. Therefore policy discussions and coordination are conducted at the 
European level at the ESRB. This macroprudential body has recently recommended 
monitoring cross-border effects of macroprudential instruments on an annual basis (ESRB 
2015). Our study may inform this current policy debate by analyzing the inward and outward 
transmission of regulation for German banks. 
Overall, while we find evidence for cross-border spillovers of regulation, there is no 
general conclusion that holds for all types of policy instruments and banks. Instead, 
heterogeneity between banks, loan types and specification matters.  
Foreign regulatory changes spill over to loan growth in Germany through both, foreign-
owned banks located in Germany as well as German-owned banks which maintain 
international activities. Foreign-owned banks located in Germany reduce their local loan 
growth following a tightening of sector-specific capital buffers, local reserve requirements 
and loan to value ratios in their parent bank’s country. This finding suggests that regulatory 
pressure can have indirect effects on foreign affiliates located in Germany if their parent bank 
draws resources from them in order to fulfill tighter requirements in the home country. 
German-owned banks also transmit changes in foreign countries’ regulatory stance to German 
borrowers. A tightening of foreign regulation leads to an increase in domestic loan growth. 
Furthermore, we find that German banks reduce foreign loan growth given a tightening in 
prudential instruments in the destination country. However, these negative responses abate 
rather quickly, except for local reserve requirements. Thus, our results suggest that reserve 
requirements have been effective in dampening lending inflows by German banks into foreign 
economies. 
Finally, transmission occurs not only because of regulatory changes but also because of 
economic developments. This is reflected by the fact that business and financial cycles matter 
for lending decisions: foreign subsidiaries located in Germany increase loan growth in the 
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host country in response to an upturn in the financial cycle of their home country. Also, 
German banks’ international lending behavior is procyclical in the sense that loan growth 
increases in response to an upturn in the financial and business cycles of the destination 
country. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.A Data 
 
Data Description 
To analyse the effect of changes in prudential instruments on banks’ international activities, 
we use three main data sources. First, bank-specific data are obtained from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Second, information on prudential instruments come from the “IBRN Prudential 
Instruments Database” introduced in Cerutti et al. (2017a). Variables on the business and 
financial cycle are provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
External position report 
Since 2003, all German banks have been required to report their foreign assets and liabilities 
(in thousands of euro) on a monthly basis and broken down by sector, destination country, and 
asset class. Foreign subsidiaries of German banks provide a report on their external positions 
by entity whereas foreign branches of German banks located in the same host country provide 
a joint report. A detailed description of the reporting can be found in Fiorentino et al. (2010). 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides information on the variables used in this chapter. 
Macroeconomic variables 
Prudential instruments: Data are obtained from Cerutti et al. (2017a) and available for more 
than 60 countries over the period 2000-2014. The instruments in the database include sector-
specific capital requirements (i.e. real state credit, consumer credit, and other), countercyclical 
capital buffers, interbank exposure limits, concentration limits, loan-to-value ratio limits, 
general capital requirements, and reserve requirements. A tightening is coded by 1, a 
loosening by -1, and zero otherwise. 
Business cycle: The state of the business cycle is approximated by the output gap (BIS 2014). 
Financial cycle: The state of the financial cycle is estimated by the credit-to-GDP gap (BIS 
2014).  
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Construction of Balance Sheet Variables  
Independent Variables 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
Illiquid Assets Ratio (Loans and advances to banks plus loans and advances 
to non-banks, including received bills) / Assets (in %) 
Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
Core Deposits Ratio Savings deposits / Assets (in %) Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
Capital Ratio Equity capital / Assets (in %) Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
Net Intragroup Funding (Liabilities minus claims of the parent bank vis-à-vis 
foreign affiliates, summed across all affiliates per 
parent bank)/Liabilities (in %)  
Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
Log Total Assets Log (balance sheet total) Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
International Activity Ratio (Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities) / (Total assets 
plus total liabilities) (in %) 
Monthly balance sheet 
statistics (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) 
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4.B Figures and Tables 
Figure 4.1: Domestic and Foreign Lending Activities of German Banks 
This Figure gives the evolution of German banks’ loan supply. Data are observed quarterly from 
Q1:2002-Q4:2013. The figure shows unweighted averages across the sample of German bank holding 
companies. Descriptive statistics are shown for banks’ loan-to-asset ratios (in %), the breakdown into 
domestic versus foreign loans to assets (in %) as well as the net intragroup funding (net due) variable 
that measures, from the perspective of a bank’s headquarters, total net internal borrowing, that is 
liabilities minus claims of the parent bank vis-à-vis all foreign affiliates of the parent bank relative to 
total liabilities (in %) (Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Balance Sheet Statistic).  
 
 
  
Chapter 4: Cross-border spillovers of regulation 
175 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics on Bank Characteristics and Loan Growth 
This Table provides summary statistics for bank balance sheet and lending data for the inward and outward transmission data 
set. For Inward A and B we report log changes of domestic loans, i.e. to Germany, on an aggregate basis as well as split by 
counterparty sector. For Outward transmission, we report log changes of loans in each destination country, again on an 
aggregate basis as well as split by counterparty sector. Data are observed quarterly from Q1:2002-Q4:2013. Banking data 
comes from on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics and the External Position Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank and is 
reported at the group level (inward A and outward sample) as well as at the level of the individual bank (inward B sample). 
The net intragroup funding variable measures, from the perspective of a bank’s head office, total net internal borrowing vis-à-
vis all its related domestic and international offices.  
  
All Banks (Inward A) All Banks (Inward B) All Banks  (Outward) 
(bank-quarter obs=3852) (bank-quarter obs=2591) (bank-quarter-destinationcountry 
 obs=182379) 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Balance sheet data       
          
Dependent Variables 
 
     
 
  
∆ Domestic  Loans 0.18 0.14 10.51 1.25 0.64 26.11    
∆ Destination Country Loans       -0.58 0.00 21.13 
∆ Loans to banks -0.23 -0.13 26.66 -0.51 0.00 38.76 -0.19 0.00 19.12 
∆ Loans to non-bank private sector 0.20 0.21 9.74 0.69 0.35 20.93 -0.49 0.00 16.29 
∆ Loans to public sector -0.80 -0.35 20.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.59 0.00 0.00 0.18 
       
Independent Variables 
 
  
   
Log Total Assets 23.49 23.60 1.87 21.99 21.96 1.55 23.44 23.54 1.89 
Capital Ratio (%) 4.38 3.90 3.00 6.51 4.97 6.98 4.53 3.86 4.41 
Illiquid Assets Ratio (%) 68.85 70.19 15.89 81.52 89.69 20.04 68.39 70.10 16.43 
International Activity (%) 6.48 3.30 7.46 na na na 6.16 2.98 7.38 
Net Intragroup Funding/Liabilities (%) -0.22 0.00 3.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.24 0.00 3.32 
Core Deposits Ratio (%) 23.55 15.11 24.18 19.77 8.48 24.20 24.75 15.15 25.55 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Changes in Prudential Instruments 
This Table shows summary statistics on changes in prudential instruments for banks located in Germany over the 2002-2013 
period. Data on the eight instruments comes from the “Prudential Instruments Database” developed by Cerutti et al. (2017b) 
and is on the quarter level. The number of changes in prudential instruments is reported on several dimensions, i.e. on the 
country-time level and on the bank-time level. The last column of each Table shows the ratio of prudential changes to total 
observations (i.e. the share of non-zero observations). The column “Exposure weighted observations” is based on the 
underlying data on prudential changes in foreign countries (columns “base data”). The reported data are based on the 
regression sample. “na” indicates that no data was available for this instrument. Source: IBRN. 
Inward: Specification A 
  
Base Data (Before Aggregating to Exposure-Weighted 
Measures) 
Exposure-
Weighted 
Observation
s 
Instrument 
# of Country-
Time Changes 
# of 
Country-
Time 
Changes 
(Tightening) 
# of 
Country-
Time 
Changes 
(Loosening
) 
# of 
Bank-
Time 
Changes 
Proportion 
that is non-
zero 
Proportion in 
ExpP_t that 
is non-zero 
Prudential index 441 305 136 3,623 0.166 0.952 
General capital requirements 66 66 0 880 0.024 0.209 
Sector specific capital buffer 62 47 15 2,299 0.023 0.526 
Loan-to-value ratio limits 83 62 21 2,833 0.031 0.657 
Reserve requirements: 
Foreign 121 79 42 3,623 0.046 0.778 
Reserve requirements: Local 215 104 111 3,623 0.081 0.871 
Interbank exposure limit 18 17 1 838 0.007 0.193 
Concentration ratio 28 26 2 1,623 0.011 0.368 
 
Inwards: Specification B 
 
Policy Changes in Home Country 
Instrument 
# of Country-Time 
Changes 
# of Country-Time 
Changes 
(Tightening) 
# of Country-
Time Changes 
(Loosening) 
# of 
Bank-
Time 
Changes 
Proportion 
that is 
non-zero 
Prudential index 131 102 29 304 0.120 
General capital requirements 24 24 0 69 0.027 
Sector specific capital buffer 17 16 1 24 0.009 
Loan-to-value ratio limits 28 22 6 68 0.027 
Reserve requirements: Foreign 32 25 7 48 0.019 
Reserve requirements: Local 73 39 34 144 0.057 
Interbank exposure limit 9 9 0 18 0.007 
Concentration ratio 10 10 0 42 0.017 
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Table 4.2 continued  
Outward Transmission of Policy to Destination Country 
  Policy Changes in Destination Country 
Instrument 
# of Country-Time 
Changes 
# of Country-Time 
Changes 
(Tightening) 
# of Country-
Time Changes 
(Loosening) 
# of 
Bank-
Country-
Time 
Changes 
Proportion 
that is 
non-zero 
Prudential index 390 267 123 29,347 0.161 
General capital requirements 61 61 0 4,393 0.024 
Sector specific capital buffer  58 43 15 4,331 0.024 
Loan-to-value ratio limits 80 60 20 5,898 0.032 
Reserve requirements: Foreign 99 62 37 7,615 0.042 
Reserve requirements: Local 185 82 103 14,136 0.078 
Interbank exposure limit 17 16 1 1,264 0.007 
Concentration ratio 26 23 3 1,959 0.011 
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Table 4.3: Correlations Between Loan Shares and Balance Sheet Characteristics 
This Table shows correlations between banks’ loan-to-asset ratios and balance sheet data. Data are observed quarterly from 
Q1:2002-Q4:2013. Banking data comes from on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank and is 
reported at the (consolidated) group level. Descriptive statistics are shown for banks' loan-to-asset ratios (in %) and the 
breakdown into domestic versus foreign loans to assets (in %). Balance sheet characteristics are as defined in Table 4.1 in the 
Appendix. 
All Banks (Inward A) 
(n=3852) 
Variable Loans/Assets (%) Domestic Loans/Assets (%) Foreign Loans/Assets (%) 
Correlation with balance sheet variable (for each bank b and quarter t) 
Independent Variables 
Total Assets (thd Euro) -0.24 -0.38 0.31 
Capital Ratio (%) 0.20 0.16 -0.01 
Illiquid Assets Ratio (%) 0.93 0.68 0.06 
International Activity (%) -0.02 -0.59 0.94 
Net Intragroup Funding/Liabilities (%) -0.09 0.12 -0.31 
Core Deposits Ratio (%) -0.10 0.14 -0.35 
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Table 4.4: Shares of Banking Groups in Lending 
This Table provides summary statistics for lending data by banking group. Data are shown for the period Q4:2013. Banking 
data comes from on the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Column (1) shows the banking 
group’s total loans relative to total loans of all banks in the sample (in %). Column (2) shows the ratio of the banking group’s 
domestic loans in total domestic loans of all banks in the sample (in %). Column (3) shows the ratio of the banking group’s 
foreign loans in total foreign loans of all banks in the sample (in %). The last column shows the percentage share of 
observations attributed to each banking group. 
  
All Banks (Inward A) 
by banking group in 2013Q4 
Variable Total loans Domestic loans Foreign loans Observations 
  Loans by banking group to total loans, by loan type (%) % of total 
    
Share of Each Banking group 
 
  
Large commercial banks 37.37 22.78 60.95 5.71 
Other commercial banks 7.82 8.77 6.30 32.86 
Head institutes of savings banks and  credit unions 29.01 33.23 22.20 15.71 
Savings banks 2.22 3.47 0.19 10.00 
Credit unions 1.69 2.69 0.07 17.14 
Mortgage banks 8.98 10.18 7.05 12.86 
Building societies 3.43 5.26 0.48 5.71 
All banking groups 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 4.5: Bank Characteristics by Banking Group 
This Table provides summary statistics by banking group. Data are shown for the period Q4:2013. Banking data comes from 
the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank and is reported at the level of the individual bank. We 
depict the mean for various variables as specified in the column head across all banks in a banking group. 
  
All Banks (Inward A) 
mean, by banking group in 2013Q4 
Variable 
Assets 
(billion 
Euro) 
Foreign 
loan 
share 
Domestic 
loan share 
Capital 
Ratio 
(%) 
Illiquid 
Assets Ratio 
(%) 
International 
Activity (%) 
Net Intragroup 
Funding/Liabilities 
(%) 
Core 
Deposits 
Ratio (%) 
    
Banking group 
 
  
Large commercial banks 611.00 21.58 30.19 3.33 51.94 14.95 -1.93 29.66 
Other commercial banks 11.40 16.39 50.26 11.18 66.65 11.87 -0.31 36.33 
Head institutes of 
savings banks and credit 
unions 
128.00 17.61 44.97 4.12 62.60 11.19 -0.39 9.40 
Savings banks 13.40 1.81 66.73 4.95 68.56 0.92 0.01 62.56 
Credit unions 6.07 2.59 63.70 5.07 66.29 1.49 0.17 63.74 
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Table 4.6: Domestic and Foreign Loan Shares and Sectoral Breakdown 
This Table provides summary statistics for lending data. Data are observed quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013. Banking data 
comes from the Monthly Balance Sheet Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank and is reported at the (consolidated) group 
level (inward A sample). For German banks’ foreign branches, data are not reported by individual branch but aggregated by 
destination country and parent bank. For foreign subsidiaries, data are reported at the level of the individual subsidiary. 
Descriptive statistics are shown for banks’ loan-to-asset ratios (in %) and the breakdown into domestic versus foreign loans 
to assets (in %) as well as the sectoral split differentiating between loans to banks, to non-bank private sector and to the 
public sector. 
  
All Banks (Inward A) Foreign Branches Foreign Subsidiaries 
(n=3852) (n=9615) (n=6263) 
Variable Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Balance sheet data               
          
Dependent Variables 
  
 
  
 
  
Total  Loans/Assets (%) 66.19 66.25 16.60 65.87 75.05 31.40 66.05 74.04 29.19 
Domestic Loans/Assets (%) 56.00 56.83 21.59 20.31 6.80 28.10 16.07 4.01 24.22 
Foreign Loans/Assets (%) 10.19 4.71 13.26 45.56 40.92 35.19 49.98 50.03 32.98 
Domestic Loans/Assets (%) by sector 
      
to banks 14.03 10.21 13.72 20.37 6.20 28.06 12.33 1.83 22.01 
to non-bank private 
sector 36.66 34.47 24.10 1.77 0.00 7.69 3.84 0.02 10.27 
to public sector 5.10 2.24 6.93 0.23 0.00 1.83 0.15 0.00 1.04 
Foreign Loans/Assets (%) by sector 
        
to banks 2.29 0.28 5.09 6.90 0.00 17.93 23.70 13.69 26.17 
to non-bank private 
sector 7.40 1.96 11.17 41.82 34.22 34.02 26.89 13.24 28.99 
to public sector 0.51 0.00 1.73 1.18 0.00 6.71 1.15 0.00 4.23 
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Table 4.7: Inward Transmission of Policy Through Domestic Banks’ International 
Exposures 
This Table reports the effects of changes in regulation and bank characteristics and their interactions on log changes in total 
loans. The data are observed quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of domestic bank holding companies whereas we 
use consolidated data. Foreign-exposure-weighted regulation ExpP is calculated as the weighted average of changes in 
foreign regulation where the weights are the total assets and liabilities of the bank in the respective foreign country. For ExpP 
and its interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two lags, with the 
corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables see Appendix, 
Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All specifications 
include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by bank. P-values are reported 
in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
ExpP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
ExpP= 
Capital 
Requireme
nts 
ExpP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
ExpP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Foreign 
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Local 
ExpP= 
Concentrati
on Ratios 
                
Foreign-Exposure-Weighted Regulation 
(ExpP) 
-4.417 73.107 -145.850 132.524 -260.478 -64.081 62.442 
 
[0.909] [0.258] [0.170] [0.139] [0.431] [0.272] [0.423] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -5.922*** -5.634*** -5.632*** -5.637*** -5.466*** -5.634*** -5.803*** 
[0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.591** -0.475* -0.488* -0.473* -0.409* -0.472* -0.595** 
[0.035] [0.086] [0.073] [0.097] [0.097] [0.085] [0.034] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.189*** -0.182*** -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.187*** -0.172*** -0.190*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
International Activity_t-1 0.142* 0.121 0.179** 0.114 0.131* 0.124* 0.143* 
[0.056] [0.139] [0.017] [0.170] [0.053] [0.088] [0.050] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 -0.311 -0.398** -0.386 -0.365 -0.419* -0.380* -0.327 
[0.158] [0.047] [0.115] [0.108] [0.064] [0.080] [0.125] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 -0.032 -0.026 -0.029 -0.005 -0.017 -0.023 -0.024 
[0.510] [0.588] [0.529] [0.901] [0.716] [0.616] [0.614] 
Log Total Assets * ExpP 0.133 -2.111 4.534 -2.528 12.148 0.616 -1.900 
 
[0.919] [0.390] [0.267] [0.376] [0.396] [0.778] [0.534] 
Capital Ratio * ExpP 3.105 -0.719 2.091 -3.811 17.859* 4.391 4.602** 
 
[0.155] [0.772] [0.484] [0.203] [0.051] [0.175] [0.011] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio * ExpP -0.170 -0.313 0.478 -0.641 -2.032 0.383* -0.531 
 
[0.357] [0.248] [0.355] [0.223] [0.115] [0.077] [0.108] 
International Activity* ExpP -0.260 0.268 -2.095*** 0.662 0.675 -0.396 -0.350 
 
[0.468] [0.685] [0.005] [0.428] [0.767] [0.207] [0.455] 
Net Intragroup Funding * ExpP -1.383*** -0.402 3.542 -1.034 22.045* 0.919 -5.552*** 
 
[0.005] [0.721] [0.220] [0.355] [0.054] [0.573] [0.000] 
Core Deposits Ratio * ExpP 0.053 0.090 0.166 -0.089 -0.264 -0.034 -0.263 
  
[0.594] [0.467] [0.345] [0.708] [0.756] [0.814] [0.211] 
Observations 3,757 3,757 3,757 3,757 3,757 3,757 3,757 
R-squared 0.062 0.070 0.057 0.064 0.086 0.063 0.054 
Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.052 0.038 0.045 0.068 0.045 0.035 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  ExpP (Contemporaneous 
and Lagged Indicator) 
0.405 2.722 -7.636 14.785** -44.407 -7.674 -5.984 
[0.874] [0.446] [0.217] [0.012] [0.141] [0.206] [0.364] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of ExpP 3.754** 5.523*** -5.078 15.173*** -21.458 1.745 -0.163 [0.014] [0.002] [0.232] [0.001] [0.244] [0.604] [0.966] 
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Table 4.8: Inward Transmission of Policy via Foreign-Owned Affiliates  
This Table reports the effects of changes in regulation and bank characteristics and their interactions on log changes in total 
loans. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel for foreign-owned affiliates located in Germany. HomeP 
refers to changes in regulation in the home (i.e. parent bank) country of foreign affiliates located in Germany. For the 
marginal effect of HomeP as well as HomeP interaction effects the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous 
term and two lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on 
the variables see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column 
headline. All specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by 
home country. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
HomeP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
HomeP= 
Capital 
Requiremen
ts 
HomeP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
HomeP= 
Loan To 
Value Ratio  
HomeP= 
Reserve 
Requiremen
t Foreign 
HomeP= 
Reserve 
Requiremen
t Local 
HomeP= 
Concentrati
on Ratios 
                
Home Country Regulation HomeP_t -41.624 22.788 -286.785** -64.058 193.626 -10.774 -11.312 
[0.563] [0.579] [0.012] [0.293] [0.294] [0.810] [0.938] 
Home Country Regulation HomeP_t-1 -48.934** -14.234 129.751 93.210* -253.897*** 
-
121.710*** 
-11.289 
[0.028] [0.771] [0.481] [0.072] [0.004] [0.006] [0.869] 
Home Country Regulation HomeP_t-2  -11.523 -3.113 -116.128 -83.172*** -56.095 37.359 3.800 
 
[0.675] [0.932] [0.366] [0.006] [0.267] [0.346] [0.871] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -5.309*** -4.731*** -5.057*** -5.064*** -4.768*** -4.939*** -4.665*** 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 0.143 0.224** 0.207** 0.184* 0.206* 0.186* 0.207** 
[0.233] [0.041] [0.047] [0.098] [0.067] [0.094] [0.046] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.126* -0.083 -0.103* -0.095 -0.105* -0.111** -0.094* 
[0.055] [0.163] [0.079] [0.119] [0.061] [0.042] [0.088] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 -0.143 -0.131 -0.189 -0.266 -0.294 -0.266 -0.271 
[0.663] [0.684] [0.532] [0.359] [0.253] [0.332] [0.312] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.020 0.034 0.035 0.022 0.039 0.028 0.035 
 
[0.808] [0.663] [0.655] [0.773] [0.609] [0.714] [0.656] 
BIS Financial Cycle (Home country) 0.094** 0.098** 0.093* 0.094** 0.081* 0.086* 0.090** 
 
[0.046] [0.032] [0.056] [0.020] [0.088] [0.053] [0.044] 
BIS Business Cycle (Home country) 0.650 0.582 0.713 0.780 0.451 0.523 0.561 
 
[0.302] [0.343] [0.230] [0.227] [0.462] [0.410] [0.358] 
Log Total Assets * HomeP 3.593*** 0.853*** 5.225*** 0.730*** 2.212*** 2.452*** 2.797*** 
 
[0.234] [0.732] [0.258] [0.777] [0.611] [0.033] [0.396] 
Capital Ratio * HomeP 0.783*** -0.599*** 1.709*** 1.156*** -0.128*** 0.904*** -1.049*** 
 
[0.115] [0.542] [0.375] [0.454] [0.922] [0.034] [0.158] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio * HomeP 0.117*** -0.264*** 1.648*** 0.058*** 0.843*** 0.373*** -0.481*** 
 
[0.542] [0.187] [0.052] [0.867] [0.110] [0.016] [0.145] 
Net Intragroup Funding * HomeP -4.497*** -7.707*** 11.750*** -5.000*** -19.778*** 7.533*** 4.072*** 
 
[0.015] [0.099] [0.524] [0.098] [0.686] [0.267] [0.243] 
Core Deposits Ratio * HomeP 0.160*** 0.188*** -1.439*** 0.638*** 0.340*** -0.129*** 0.129*** 
 
[0.170] [0.238] [0.001] [0.061] [0.586] [0.472] [0.022] 
Observations 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 2,466 
R-squared 0.091 0.081 0.084 0.094 0.084 0.094 0.080 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.039 0.029 0.039 0.024 
Number of Banks 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  HomeP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged 
Indicator) 
-5.334* 2.510 -41.154*** -13.187* 6.892 -7.485 -0.814 
[0.069] [0.746] [0.000] [0.075] [0.442] [0.145] [0.837] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
HomeP 
-3.886 0.469 -17.384** -9.863 -9.303 -8.850* 5.191*** 
[0.233] [0.901] [0.011] [0.101] [0.523] [0.083] [0.004] 
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Table 4.9: Outward Transmission of Policy to Destination Country 
This Table reports the effects of changes in destination country regulation and bank characteristics on log changes in total 
loans by destination country. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of bank holding companies whereas 
we use consolidated data. DestP refers to the changes in regulation in the destination country of the loan. For the marginal 
effect of DestP as well as DestP interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two 
lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables 
see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All 
specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by destination 
country. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DestP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
DestP= 
Capital 
Requireme
nts 
DestP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
DestP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Foreign 
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Local 
DestP= 
Concentrati
on Ratios 
                
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t 6.609*** 28.453*** 2.199 8.388 2.940 2.842 -2.739 
 
[0.007] [0.000] [0.692] [0.227] [0.345] [0.293] [0.446] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-1 -5.333** 4.961 -3.519 -4.265 -3.742 -5.977* 3.078 
 
[0.038] [0.504] [0.273] [0.557] [0.157] [0.053] [0.562] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-2 -2.903 17.253*** -12.359*** -4.044 -4.829 -1.215 -7.128 
[0.204] [0.004] [0.005] [0.555] [0.114] [0.588] [0.459] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -0.187 -0.171 -0.191 -0.188 -0.187 -0.180 -0.184 
[0.263] [0.318] [0.257] [0.261] [0.270] [0.287] [0.274] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
[0.543] [0.517] [0.546] [0.514] [0.563] [0.594] [0.568] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
[0.557] [0.408] [0.496] [0.561] [0.552] [0.477] [0.542] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.043** -0.034* -0.040** -0.038* -0.039** -0.037* -0.038* 
[0.034] [0.080] [0.043] [0.054] [0.044] [0.056] [0.054] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 0.072 0.051 0.074 0.066 0.073 0.070 0.074 
[0.120] [0.255] [0.111] [0.156] [0.116] [0.131] [0.114] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 
[0.358] [0.447] [0.363] [0.361] [0.365] [0.339] [0.382] 
BIS Financial Cycle (Destination country) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
[0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
BIS Business Cycle (Destination country) 0.081** 0.082** 0.082** 0.079** 0.083** 0.082** 0.082** 
 
[0.024] [0.022] [0.024] [0.026] [0.023] [0.020] [0.022] 
Log Total Assets * DestP 0.069 -1.996*** 0.460** 0.038 0.277 0.223 0.305 
 
[0.721] [0.000] [0.014] [0.948] [0.162] [0.310] [0.488] 
Capital Ratio * DestP 0.023 -0.151** 0.046 0.027 0.018 0.060 0.091 
 
[0.575] [0.028] [0.472] [0.805] [0.593] [0.260] [0.748] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP -0.006 -0.024 0.033 -0.011 -0.026* -0.027*** -0.026 
 
[0.468] [0.549] [0.290] [0.611] [0.077] [0.001] [0.659] 
International Activity * DestP 0.042 -0.019 0.087* 0.047 0.054 0.048 0.011 
 
[0.144] [0.804] [0.096] [0.505] [0.183] [0.148] [0.932] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP 0.014 0.096 0.001 0.334** -0.004 -0.094** 0.037 
 
[0.751] [0.531] [0.994] [0.042] [0.891] [0.026] [0.831] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP 0.004 -0.043 0.012 0.004 0.020** 0.004 0.041 
 
[0.697] [0.172] [0.452] [0.906] [0.012] [0.756] [0.155] 
Observations 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Number of Destination Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Destination Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  DestP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged Indicator) 
0.060 0.350 0.371 0.628 0.011 -0.293** 0.043 
[0.749] [0.560] [0.290] [0.230] [0.975] [0.042] [0.962] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
DestP 
-0.269** 0.176 -0.110 0.129 -0.326* -0.407** -0.667* 
[0.039] [0.581] [0.742] [0.675] [0.060] [0.013] [0.063] 
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Table 4.10 : Outward Transmission of Policy to Destination Country  
Using County-Time Fixed Effects 
This Table reports the effects of changes in destination country regulation and bank characteristics on log changes in total 
loans by destination country. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of bank holding companies whereas 
we use consolidated data. DestP refers to the changes in regulation in the destination country of the loan. Due to the inclusion 
of twoway country-time fixed effects, the destination country policy and the cycle variables are not included on a standalone 
basis. For the marginal effect of DestP interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and 
two lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the 
variables see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. 
All specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by destination 
country. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DestP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
DestP= 
Capital 
Requirements 
DestP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
DestP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Foreign 
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Local 
DestP= 
Concentration 
Ratios 
                
Log Total Assets_t-1 -0.189 -0.172 -0.194 -0.191 -0.188 -0.183 -0.186 
[0.265] [0.321] [0.255] [0.261] [0.272] [0.286] [0.276] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
[0.537] [0.537] [0.550] [0.519] [0.572] [0.610] [0.591] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
[0.549] [0.402] [0.492] [0.561] [0.547] [0.479] [0.531] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.042** -0.033* -0.039** -0.038* -0.039** -0.037* -0.038* 
[0.039] [0.085] [0.048] [0.059] [0.050] [0.062] [0.061] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 0.070 0.049 0.073 0.064 0.072 0.068 0.072 
[0.134] [0.285] [0.124] [0.169] [0.128] [0.144] [0.128] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
[0.343] [0.432] [0.352] [0.350] [0.353] [0.329] [0.366] 
Log Total Assets * DestP 0.061 -1.993*** 0.504*** 0.043 0.266 0.209 0.216 
 
[0.759] [0.000] [0.007] [0.942] [0.188] [0.360] [0.618] 
Tier1 Ratio * DestP 0.029 -0.148** 0.057 0.041 0.028 0.065 0.064 
 
[0.517] [0.044] [0.375] [0.727] [0.441] [0.242] [0.821] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP -0.005 -0.022 0.033 -0.015 -0.024* -0.027*** -0.019 
 
[0.566] [0.586] [0.281] [0.503] [0.093] [0.002] [0.758] 
International Activity * DestP 0.040 -0.012 0.097* 0.049 0.041 0.041 0.017 
 
[0.205] [0.873] [0.097] [0.489] [0.301] [0.254] [0.900] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP 0.017 0.111 0.012 0.328* -0.004 -0.097** 0.065 
 
[0.717] [0.469] [0.940] [0.052] [0.879] [0.019] [0.705] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP 0.003 -0.042 0.015 0.006 0.018** 0.002 0.040 
 
[0.736] [0.182] [0.363] [0.864] [0.028] [0.873] [0.177] 
Observations 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 177,777 
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Number of banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Destination country-time fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.11: Inward Transmission of Policy Through Domestic Banks’ International 
Exposures – Loans to Banks 
This Table reports the effects of changes in regulation and bank characteristics and their interactions on log changes in loans 
to banks. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of domestic bank holding companies whereas we use 
consolidated data. Foreign-exposure-weighted regulation ExpP is calculated as the weighted average of changes in foreign 
regulation where the weights are the total assets and liabilities of the bank in the respective foreign country. For ExpP and its 
interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two lags, with the corresponding p-
value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each 
column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All specifications include fixed effects 
as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by bank. P-values are reported in square brackets. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
ExpP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
ExpP= 
Capital 
Requireme
nts 
ExpP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
ExpP= 
Loan To 
Value Ratio  
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Foreign 
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Local 
ExpP= 
Concentrati
on Ratios 
                
Foreign exposure weighted regulation 
(ExpP) -116.369* -123.038 -183.879 80.562 -319.768 42.987 -667.961** 
 
[0.065] [0.235] [0.639] [0.738] [0.471] [0.711] [0.035] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -10.484*** -10.606*** -10.363*** -10.346*** -10.462*** -10.387*** -10.709*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.728 -0.724* -0.646 -0.657 -0.636 -0.700 -0.774 
[0.126] [0.090] [0.152] [0.147] [0.124] [0.105] [0.114] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.376*** -0.345*** -0.358*** -0.363*** -0.367*** -0.344*** -0.369*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.071 -0.066 0.005 -0.022 -0.028 -0.037 -0.071 
[0.602] [0.641] [0.973] [0.878] [0.843] [0.811] [0.638] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 -0.649 -0.720* -0.618 -0.549 -0.550 -0.536 -0.580 
[0.246] [0.087] [0.251] [0.201] [0.246] [0.149] [0.241] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.094 0.085 0.079 0.105 0.092 0.085 0.074 
[0.275] [0.347] [0.376] [0.207] [0.291] [0.351] [0.392] 
Log Total Assets * ExpP 3.584 3.901 6.038 -4.911 6.492 -4.868 22.131** 
 
[0.171] [0.315] [0.703] [0.620] [0.687] [0.282] [0.043] 
Capital Ratio * ExpP -1.074 -1.142 -4.098 -6.316 9.056 -0.612 7.874* 
 
[0.706] [0.769] [0.561] [0.546] [0.562] [0.837] [0.054] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio * ExpP 0.534* 0.274 0.897 1.389 0.809 0.842* 1.423 
 
[0.096] [0.558] [0.351] [0.184] [0.716] [0.056] [0.321] 
International Activity* ExpP 0.984* 1.906** -1.903 1.979 2.220 0.093 3.295** 
 
[0.090] [0.044] [0.279] [0.296] [0.334] [0.880] [0.017] 
Net Intragroup Funding * ExpP 1.882 3.834** 6.001 3.390 4.933 2.803 2.301 
 
[0.387] [0.035] [0.194] [0.510] [0.880] [0.420] [0.604] 
Core Deposits Ratio * ExpP 0.299 0.384 0.352 -0.309 1.736 0.035 1.157 
 
[0.135] [0.204] [0.507] [0.578] [0.245] [0.894] [0.127] 
Observations 3,525 3,525 3,525 3,525 3,525 3,525 3,525 
R-squared 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.041 0.038 0.036 
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.016 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  ExpP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged 
Indicator) 
12.778* 2.898 -1.616 37.808*** -19.701 -15.483 30.699 
[0.062] [0.786] [0.906] [0.004] [0.598] [0.202] [0.225] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
ExpP 14.457*** 2.781 12.492 39.451*** 7.424 12.389 22.135** 
  
[0.006] [0.745] [0.205] [0.000] [0.778] [0.203] [0.027] 
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Table 4.12: Inward Transmission of Policy Through Domestic Banks’ International 
Exposures – Loans to Non-bank Private Sector 
This Table reports the effects of changes in regulation and bank characteristics and their interactions on log changes in loans 
to the Non-bank Private Sector. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of domestic bank holding 
companies whereas we use consolidated data. Foreign-exposure-weighted regulation ExpP is calculated as the weighted 
average of changes in foreign regulation where the weights are the total assets and liabilities of the bank in the respective 
foreign country. For ExpP and its interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two 
lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables 
see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All 
specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by bank. P-values 
are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
ExpP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
ExpP= 
Capital 
Requirement
s 
ExpP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
ExpP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requiremen
t Foreign 
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requiremen
t Local 
ExpP= 
Concentratio
n Ratios 
                
Foreign exposure weighted regulation 
(ExpP) 
67.950**
* 
104.942*** 299.331*
* 
87.659 22.765 40.687 -92.970 
 
[0.009] [0.006] [0.046] [0.151] [0.911] [0.340] [0.269] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -0.217 -0.369 -0.132 -0.209 0.031 -0.003 -0.048 
[0.863] [0.767] [0.926] [0.873] [0.982] [0.998] [0.972] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 0.628 0.487 0.513 0.472 0.513 0.499 0.640 
[0.160] [0.279] [0.261] [0.301] [0.229] [0.281] [0.172] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.085** -0.080** -0.087** -0.084** -0.084** -0.076** -0.070* 
[0.019] [0.031] [0.032] [0.030] [0.030] [0.044] [0.057] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.020 -0.037 -0.045 -0.004 -0.027 -0.025 -0.015 
[0.844] [0.736] [0.679] [0.970] [0.779] [0.807] [0.874] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 0.018 -0.100 -0.046 -0.022 -0.072 -0.087 0.013 
[0.912] [0.569] [0.813] [0.903] [0.688] [0.627] [0.937] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 -0.011 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
[0.760] [0.870] [0.907] [0.902] [0.977] [0.934] [0.883] 
Log Total Assets * ExpP -2.959** -3.961** -13.430** -1.087 -1.117 -2.934 5.306 
 
[0.014] [0.015] [0.040] [0.634] [0.897] [0.108] [0.173] 
Capital Ratio * ExpP -2.306 -2.699 -5.217 -4.640* -11.522 1.525 -1.896 
 
[0.118] [0.216] [0.137] [0.057] [0.258] [0.287] [0.322] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio * ExpP 0.155 -0.016 0.698* -0.405 0.193 0.306*** -0.425 
 
[0.229] [0.940] [0.089] [0.232] [0.603] [0.001] [0.115] 
International Activity* ExpP -0.079 0.510 1.265 -1.727** 1.890** 0.291 -0.491 
 
[0.689] [0.285] [0.333] [0.016] [0.044] [0.294] [0.496] 
Net Intragroup Funding * ExpP -0.318 0.748 0.185 -2.503** 25.440** -0.896 -1.765** 
 
[0.457] [0.284] [0.909] [0.025] [0.020] [0.114] [0.021] 
Core Deposits Ratio * ExpP 0.056 0.074 -0.143 -0.052 0.687 -0.125 0.497* 
 
[0.516] [0.519] [0.517] [0.759] [0.301] [0.300] [0.082] 
Observations 3,742 3,742 3,742 3,742 3,742 3,742 3,742 
R-squared 0.042 0.037 0.040 0.050 0.048 0.040 0.042 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023 0.019 0.021 0.031 0.029 0.021 0.023 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  ExpP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged Indicator) -0.004 3.905 13.987* 2.273 -17.863 -1.389 3.058 
[0.999] [0.336] [0.068] [0.628] [0.341] [0.670] [0.641] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of ExpP -1.269 4.425* -1.650 -2.741 -15.135* -1.803 0.076 
  
[0.298] [0.065] [0.664] [0.330] [0.083] [0.446] [0.978] 
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Table 4.13: Inward Transmission of Policy Through Domestic Banks’ 
International Exposures – Loans to Public Sector 
This Table reports the effects of changes in regulation and bank characteristics and their interactions on log changes in loans to 
the Public Sector. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of domestic bank holding companies whereas we 
use consolidated data. Foreign-exposure-weighted regulation ExpP is calculated as the weighted average of changes in foreign 
regulation where the weights are the total assets and liabilities of the bank in the respective foreign country. For ExpP and its 
interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two lags, with the corresponding p-value 
of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column 
gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All specifications include fixed effects as specified 
in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by bank. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
ExpP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
ExpP= 
Capital 
Requireme
nts 
ExpP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
ExpP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Foreign 
ExpP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Local 
ExpP= 
Concentrati
on Ratios 
Foreign exposure weighted regulation 
(ExpP) -102.544** -92.489 -443.104* -186.596 -313.007 25.469 81.569 
 
[0.041] [0.184] [0.080] [0.196] [0.433] [0.708] [0.656] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -3.253* -2.833 -3.445* -2.713 -3.172* -3.149* -3.083* 
[0.074] [0.129] [0.060] [0.131] [0.077] [0.084] [0.087] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.508 -0.495 -0.606 -0.510 -0.516 -0.501 -0.555 
[0.338] [0.345] [0.275] [0.334] [0.339] [0.337] [0.302] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.007 0.007 -0.041 -0.001 -0.031 -0.018 -0.007 
[0.923] [0.923] [0.560] [0.992] [0.656] [0.810] [0.924] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.156 -0.129 -0.239 -0.200 -0.209 -0.209 -0.210 
[0.273] [0.381] [0.116] [0.169] [0.149] [0.160] [0.147] 
Intragroup Funding_t-1 -0.398 -0.488 -0.497* -0.440 -0.464 -0.554* -0.449 
[0.179] [0.136] [0.093] [0.144] [0.123] [0.074] [0.136] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 -0.048 -0.039 -0.042 -0.010 -0.041 -0.034 -0.042 
[0.782] [0.826] [0.807] [0.958] [0.814] [0.845] [0.810] 
Log Total Assets * ExpP 4.769** 6.137** 7.504 6.046 12.576 -1.529 -1.400 
 
[0.021] [0.031] [0.370] [0.255] [0.471] [0.605] [0.874] 
Capital Ratio * ExpP 0.427 0.734 6.990 -5.617 16.822 -1.368 3.148 
 
[0.834] [0.776] [0.197] [0.388] [0.442] [0.431] [0.322] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio * ExpP -0.098 -0.557* 2.842** 1.051 -3.304 -0.061 -0.891 
 
[0.672] [0.089] [0.018] [0.197] [0.114] [0.817] [0.330] 
International Activity* ExpP -0.812* -1.074 1.367 0.897 4.459 -0.435 -0.204 
 
[0.062] [0.135] [0.261] [0.432] [0.221] [0.313] [0.851] 
Intragroup Fundin * ExpP -0.429 1.352 5.069 4.397 17.059 -2.374 5.720 
 
[0.661] [0.535] [0.193] [0.481] [0.771] [0.183] [0.404] 
Core Deposits Ratio * ExpP 0.233 0.175 1.198** -0.170 1.308 0.065 0.407 
  [0.177] [0.536] [0.021] [0.691] [0.679] [0.766] [0.617] 
Observations 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 3,233 
R-squared 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.031 0.024 0.024 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.002 
Number of banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  ExpP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged 
Indicator) 
5.536 14.345* -5.365 7.670 -119.611*** -21.667** 6.712 
[0.209] [0.078] [0.616] [0.473] [0.002] [0.014] [0.708] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
ExpP 
1.113 2.079 7.611 13.107* -25.891 -18.918*** -5.892 
[0.712] [0.634] [0.430] [0.077] [0.276] [0.000] [0.483] 
  
Chapter 4: Cross-border spillovers of regulation 
189 
Table 4.14: Outward Transmission of Policy to Destination Country – Loans to Banks 
This Table reports the effects of changes in destination country regulation and bank characteristics on log changes in loans to 
banks by destination country. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of bank holding companies whereas 
we use consolidated data. DestP refers to the changes in regulation in the destination country of the loan. For the marginal 
effect of DestP as well as DestP interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two 
lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables 
see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All 
specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are clustered by destination 
country. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DestP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
DestP= 
Capital 
Requirements 
DestP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
DestP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Foreign 
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Local 
DestP= 
Concentration 
Ratios 
                
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t 2.762 9.205* 7.705** 4.950 0.142 1.569 -9.874 
 
[0.172] [0.080] [0.036] [0.298] [0.944] [0.433] [0.159] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-1 -2.965 0.271 -5.965* -3.069 -0.437 -5.808** 5.885 
 
[0.190] [0.963] [0.066] [0.596] [0.852] [0.038] [0.472] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-2 -1.708 6.975 -2.735 2.006 -2.526 -1.206 -7.485 
[0.376] [0.155] [0.474] [0.712] [0.280] [0.498] [0.293] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -0.065 -0.050 -0.064 -0.061 -0.065 -0.060 -0.065 
[0.569] [0.666] [0.584] [0.600] [0.574] [0.607] [0.577] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018* -0.016 -0.017 -0.018* -0.018* 
[0.143] [0.138] [0.095] [0.128] [0.101] [0.097] [0.093] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
[0.457] [0.555] [0.438] [0.466] [0.443] [0.490] [0.466] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 
[0.756] [0.771] [0.954] [0.982] [0.987] [0.869] [0.862] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 0.133*** 0.124** 0.135*** 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 
[0.008] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
[0.371] [0.413] [0.376] [0.337] [0.340] [0.330] [0.364] 
BIS Financial Cycle (Destination country) 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
BIS Business Cycle (Destination country) 0.056* 0.059* 0.059* 0.057* 0.060* 0.059* 0.059* 
 
[0.078] [0.062] [0.059] [0.069] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] 
Log Total Assets * DestP 0.063 -0.687 -0.004 -0.168 0.142 0.227 0.413 
 
[0.618] [0.101] [0.984] [0.660] [0.433] [0.173] [0.431] 
Capital Ratio * DestP -0.014 -0.060 -0.009 -0.094 -0.012 0.014 0.146 
 
[0.555] [0.226] [0.779] [0.248] [0.637] [0.595] [0.248] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP 0.002 0.021 -0.008 0.006 -0.015 -0.008 0.020 
 
[0.854] [0.512] [0.769] [0.815] [0.117] [0.355] [0.639] 
International Activity * DestP 0.063* 0.175 0.123 0.251* -0.038* 0.012 -0.128 
 
[0.085] [0.161] [0.308] [0.085] [0.093] [0.690] [0.437] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP 0.007 -0.013 0.028** 0.000 0.007 0.009 0.014 
 
[0.145] [0.402] [0.036] [0.995] [0.369] [0.163] [0.603] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP 0.064*** -0.012 0.157*** 0.096 0.074* 0.064** -0.093 
 
[0.009] [0.877] [0.003] [0.198] [0.063] [0.020] [0.271] 
Observations 171,216 171,216 171,216 171,216 171,216 171,216 171,216 
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Number of Destination Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Destination Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  DestP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged Indicator) 
0.148 1.080** -0.061 0.432 0.065 -0.013 0.029 
[0.341] [0.016] [0.883] [0.277] [0.789] [0.927] [0.964] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
DestP -0.100 0.355 -0.157 0.086 -0.193 -0.222* -0.597 
  
[0.381] [0.230] [0.556] [0.709] [0.131] [0.058] [0.114] 
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Table 4.15: Outward Transmission of Policy– Loans to the Non-bank Private Sector 
This Table reports the effects of changes in destination country regulation and bank characteristics on log changes in loans to 
the Non-bank Sector by destination country. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of bank holding 
companies whereas we use consolidated data. DestP refers to the changes in regulation in the destination country of the loan. 
For the marginal effect of DestP as well as DestP interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the 
contemporaneous term and two lags, with the corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. 
For more details on the variables see Appendix, Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified 
in the column headline. All specifications include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Standard errors are 
clustered by destination country. P-values are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DestP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
DestP= 
Capital 
Requirements 
DestP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
DestP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Foreign 
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requirement 
Local 
DestP= 
Concentration 
Ratios 
                
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t 3.803* 13.116** 0.660 4.332 2.766 2.669 1.567 
 
[0.073] [0.010] [0.869] [0.250] [0.406] [0.383] [0.640] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-1 -3.647* 3.475 -3.489 -2.011 -5.629** -4.580* 3.581 
 
[0.060] [0.540] [0.369] [0.622] [0.027] [0.087] [0.405] 
Destination Country Regulation DestP_t-2 -0.778 15.508*** -8.780** -7.435 -2.388 0.294 -3.633 
[0.713] [0.005] [0.010] [0.132] [0.331] [0.893] [0.656] 
Log Total Assets_t-1 -0.203 -0.208 -0.210 -0.206 -0.204 -0.201 -0.201 
[0.139] [0.142] [0.131] [0.135] [0.141] [0.149] [0.149] 
Capital Ratio_t-1 -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
[0.387] [0.341] [0.426] [0.377] [0.437] [0.474] [0.435] 
Illiquid Assets
 
Ratio_t-1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009* -0.008 -0.008* -0.009* -0.008 
[0.116] [0.123] [0.087] [0.105] [0.098] [0.083] [0.103] 
International Activity_t-1 -0.040** -0.038** -0.040** -0.038** -0.040** -0.040** -0.040** 
[0.023] [0.022] [0.018] [0.026] [0.018] [0.018] [0.020] 
Net Intragroup Funding_t-1 -0.014 -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 -0.017 -0.020 -0.017 
[0.613] [0.433] [0.556] [0.461] [0.528] [0.463] [0.543] 
Core Deposits Ratio_t-1 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
[0.735] [0.856] [0.737] [0.785] [0.780] [0.750] [0.796] 
BIS Financial Cycle (Destination country) 0.010* 0.010* 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 
 
[0.072] [0.067] [0.075] [0.072] [0.075] [0.077] [0.074] 
BIS Business Cycle (Destination country) 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 
 
[0.156] [0.186] [0.195] [0.190] [0.190] [0.187] [0.186] 
Log Total Assets * DestP 0.048 -1.141*** 0.453*** 0.225 0.241 0.103 -0.037 
 [0.762] [0.003] [0.007] [0.556] [0.122] [0.613] [0.936] 
Capital Ratio * DestP 0.037 -0.056 0.042 0.083 0.044 0.067 0.119 
 
[0.357] [0.336] [0.515] [0.421] [0.137] [0.257] [0.556] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP -0.010 -0.075** 0.023 -0.004 -0.011 -0.021** -0.015 
 
[0.191] [0.032] [0.291] [0.819] [0.332] [0.012] [0.623] 
International Activity * DestP -0.053 -0.189 -0.043 0.162* -0.027 -0.077** -0.069 
 
[0.112] [0.121] [0.651] [0.069] [0.487] [0.012] [0.662] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP -0.002 -0.021 -0.013 0.006 0.011* -0.004 0.017 
 
[0.837] [0.396] [0.454] [0.821] [0.063] [0.736] [0.691] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP -0.012 -0.033 -0.012 -0.043 -0.040* 0.025 -0.069 
 
[0.650] [0.511] [0.826] [0.390] [0.067] [0.416] [0.559] 
Observations 176,099 176,099 176,099 176,099 176,099 176,099 176,099 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Number of Destination Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Number of Banks 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Destination Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  DestP 
(Contemporaneous and Lagged Indicator) 
-0.101 -0.729 0.356 0.110 -0.140 -0.267* 0.160 
[0.522] [0.110] [0.197] [0.813] [0.628] [0.091] [0.778] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of 
DestP -0.196** 0.000 -0.028 0.001 -0.288 -0.337*** -0.324 
  
[0.041] [1.000] [0.897] [0.998] [0.134] [0.003] [0.343] 
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Table 4.16: Outward Transmission of Policy to Destination Country – Foreign Branches 
vs. Subsidiaries 
This Table reports the effects of changes in host country regulation and bank characteristics on log changes in local lending 
of German banks’ foreign branches and subsidiaries. The data are quarterly from Q1:2002- Q4:2013 for a panel of foreign 
affiliates of German banks. Branch-level data are aggregated across all branches of one parent bank per destination country. 
Coefficients referring to subsidiaries show the total effect by aggregating the coefficients of the baseline category (Branches) 
and the subsidiary specific interaction effect and reporting their joint significance. DestP refers to the changes in regulation in 
the destination country of the loan, which is the host country in this specification. For the marginal effect of DestP as well as 
DestP interaction effects, the reported coefficient is the sum of the contemporaneous term and two lags, with the 
corresponding p-value of the F-statistic for joint significance reported below. For more details on the variables see Appendix, 
Table 4.1. Each column gives the result for the regulatory measure specified in the column headline. All specifications 
include fixed effects as specified in the lower part of the Table. Bank explanatory variables, cycle variables, prudential 
instruments are included in the regressions but not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the host country level. P-values 
are reported in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
DestP= 
Prudential 
IndexC 
DestP= 
Capital 
Requireme
nts 
DestP= 
Sector-
Specific 
Capital 
Buffer 
DestP= 
Loan To 
Value 
Ratio  
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Foreign 
DestP= 
Reserve 
Requireme
nt Local 
DestP= 
Concentrat
ion Ratios 
Log Total Assets * DestP (Branches) -5.848** -9.772 -2.097 -1.138 5.093 2.902 -15.680* 
 
[0.042] [0.230] [0.827] [0.836] [0.583] [0.404] [0.062] 
Capital Ratio * DestP (Branches) -1.448** -1.133 -0.796 -0.117 2.546 -0.446 -2.930*** 
 
[0.043] [0.555] [0.737] [0.910] [0.110] [0.596] [0.003] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP (Branches) 0.229 -0.195 0.410 0.470 -1.995*** 0.735** 0.778 
 
[0.249] [0.484] [0.602] [0.107] [0.001] [0.038] [0.184] 
International Activity * DestP (Branches) -0.097 -0.014 -0.733 -0.163 0.239 -0.096 -1.951 
 
[0.615] [0.982] [0.573] [0.559] [0.616] [0.708] [0.301] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP (Branches) -0.119 -0.287 0.228 -0.073 0.368* -0.203 0.065 
 
[0.351] [0.193] [0.298] [0.615] [0.072] [0.510] [0.888] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP (Branches) -0.341 -0.348 -0.223 -0.930 -0.974*** -0.054 -2.501*** 
 
[0.281] [0.562] [0.844] [0.171] [0.008] [0.898] [0.000] 
Log Total Assets * DestP (Subsidiaries) 0.236 -1.592 -0.181 -1.962 2.053 -1.669 12.099 
 
[0.895] [0.774] [0.927] [0.761] [0.504] [0.558] [0.243] 
Capital Ratio * DestP (Subsidiaries) 0.294 0.117 -0.308 0.809 0.882 0.485 1.969 
 
[0.367] [0.838] [0.756] [0.515] [0.290] [0.474] [0.112] 
Illiquid Assets Ratio * DestP (Subsidiaries) 0.329 -0.786 -0.043 0.794 -0.343 0.850 0.876 
 
[0.253] [0.366] [0.807] [0.456] [0.129] [0.149] [0.537] 
International Activity * DestP (Subsidiaries) -0.023 1.213 -0.352* 0.029 0.960** -0.572 1.583 
 
[0.928] [0.321] [0.084] [0.972] [0.012] [0.344] [0.215] 
Net Intragroup Funding * DestP (Subsidiaries) 0.253 0.392 0.298 0.252 0.601** 0.023 0.848 
 
[0.182] [0.218] [0.320] [0.390] [0.018] [0.925] [0.376] 
Core Deposits Ratio * DestP (Subsidiaries) 0.314 0.353 0.250* -0.111 0.047 0.245 1.200* 
 
[0.147] [0.692] [0.083] [0.813] [0.824] [0.491] [0.090] 
Observations 9,273 9,273 9,273 9,273 9,273 9,273 9,273 
R-squared 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.023 
Adjusted R-squared 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.013 
Number of Host Countries 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Number of Banks 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Marginal Effect of  DestP (Contemporaneous 
and Lagged Indicator) (Branches) 
11.209* 12.910 10.439 0.856 14.393 11.649 -2.724 
[0.092] [0.176] [0.604] [0.927] [0.533] [0.230] [0.782] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of DestP 
(Branches) 
2.523 6.508 3.360 4.876 21.345 3.151 -19.115*** 
[0.468] [0.112] [0.660] [0.335] [0.150] [0.490] [0.000] 
Marginal Effect of  DestP (Contemporaneous 
and Lagged Indicator) (Subsidiaries) 
-6.495 -27.280 6.958 -13.781 -31.083** 5.997 -74.528 
[0.358] [0.206] [0.305] [0.557] [0.015] [0.714] [0.116] 
Contemporaneous Marginal Effect of DestP 
(Subsidiaries) 
-12.384*** -16.168 -11.815*** -27.211** -19.162 2.026 -7.676 
[0.000] [0.149] [0.005] [0.020] [0.140] [0.810] [0.316] 
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During the European sovereign debt crisis, implicit government bailout guarantees for 
banks and financial institutions’ large government debt holdings, among other factors, have 
spurred negative feedback effects between sovereign risk and risks in the financial system. 
This so-called “sovereign-bank-nexus” has threatened financial stability in Europe. This thesis 
contributed to the research on spillovers from sovereign risk to the financial system, on banks’ 
demand for government bonds, and on cross-border spillovers of national prudential 
measures. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis studied the determinants of German banks’ government bond 
holdings and the effects of these holdings on bank risk. One lesson from this paper was that 
banks select themselves into holding government debt and that about 15% of German banks 
never participated in government bonds markets (during the period 2005-2013). Another 
lesson was that macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals of sovereigns did not play a role in 
German banks’ investment decisions before the global financial crisis, but only afterwards. 
Also, German commercial banks, in particular, were affected by their cross-border holdings of 
risky government debt after the outbreak of the European debt crisis. 
Chapter 2 tested whether moral suasion by regional (“Länder”) governments could explain 
German banks’ preference for home over other state bonds. The Chapter showed that a bank 
had higher holdings of home state bonds if the home state was in a weaker fiscal situation and 
the bank was directly owned by the state or was controlled by state politicians as members of 
its supervisory board. Banks located in other states had lower bond holdings of weak states. 
The results implied that political linkages such as public ownership of banks or membership 
of politicians in banks’ supervisory boards played a role in banks’ investment decisions, even 
in a relatively fiscally strong country like Germany.  
Chapter 3 considered the effects of sovereign risk on different sectors of the economy, with 
a focus on insurance companies. The results suggested that the vulnerability of insurers to an 
increase in domestic sovereign risk was not significantly different from the vulnerability of 
banks but larger than that of non-financial companies. This difference to non-financial 
companies was attributed to systemically important insurers. Similar to the results on banks in 
Chapter 1, insurers were also affected by foreign sovereign risk through their cross-border 
holdings of government bonds. 
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Chapter 4 analyzed cross-border spillovers of regulation through German banks’ local and 
global lending activities. The findings emphasized that a tightening in foreign regulation may 
spill to the German lending market through two channels, the presence of foreign-owned 
affiliate in Germany and the international activities of German-owned global banks. In 
addition, the banks’ organizational structure and the regulatory perimeter mattered for the 
lending response of German banks’ foreign affiliates to host country regulation. 
Overall, this thesis has implications for the design and evaluation of regulation, for the 
political economy of banking and for cross-border spillovers of risks and regulation. An 
overarching lesson from the thesis is that granular, micro-level data is key to identifying the 
incentives and vulnerabilities of financial institutions.  
The thesis highlights a shortcoming of current banking and insurance regulations which 
assume that domestic sovereign bonds are risk free. The empirical analysis showed that 
accounting-based and market-based measures for banks’ and insurers’ default risk are 
increased by the riskiness of these institutions’ sovereign bond portfolios. However, in 
European banking regulation, sovereign bonds that are issued by European member states in 
domestic currency are granted a zero risk weight and are exempted from large exposure limits 
(Article 114(4) and Article 400 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)). Also, bank 
liquidity regulations grant a preferential treatment to EU sovereign bonds. Under European 
insurance regulation, the Solvency II framework, EEA sovereign bonds are exempted from 
the credit and concentration risk modules for the calculation of solvency capital requirements 
(Solvency II, Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/35). This preferential treatment of sovereign 
debt relative to private debt may crowd out lending to the private sector (see Bonner, 2015, 
for a study on the banking case) and leave the financial system unprotected against a rise in 
sovereign risk. Policy makers are therefore discussing potential changes to the regulatory 
treatment of sovereign debt (BCBS, 2015; ESRB, 2015). 
Another topic of this thesis is that the political setting may impact the investment decisions 
of private firms beyond explicit regulations. Politics are particularly relevant for financial 
firms since governments simultaneously borrow from, regulate, and provide financial 
backstops to domestic financial institutions. Depending on the federal structure of political 
systems, these connections between governments and banks may be closer at the regional than 
at the central level. Evidence for moral suasion in Germany may hence be uncovered only at 
the regional government level, not at the aggregated country level (Ongena, Popov, and van 
Horen, 2016). The mutual dependence between governments and domestic banks may give 
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rise to moral hazard on both sides and has been one reason for the establishment of the 
European Banking Union (Farhi and Tirole, 2016).  
The thesis has implications for the evaluation of regulatory reforms. Since the global 
financial crisis, the banking regulatory framework has been adjusted in numerous ways, 
including through higher capital and liquidity requirements and the implementation of 
macroprudential instruments that target systemic risks. The interactions of regulatory changes 
with other policies such as monetary and fiscal policy as well as the responses by regulated 
and unregulated entities are complex and evolving over time. Therefore, the effectiveness and 
costs of (regulatory) policies need to be evaluated in a comprehensive and transparent 
approach. This thesis contributes to a broad, multi-country research project conducted by the 
International Banking Research Network (IRBN) that studies the spillovers of regulation 
across borders. The thesis provides evidence for the German banking system and has 
implications for the effectiveness of regulations. Another conclusion is that microprudential 
characteristics such as a bank’s capital and liquidity buffer are important for the effects of 
macroprudential policies. 
Overall, the thesis focused on the volume of banks’ activities and thereby contributed to 
the literature on prices in government bond markets. The results highlighted the differences in 
incentives between types of market participants, for instance home versus other investors. 
Understanding the incentives of market participants is crucial for understanding market 
outcomes and how policies interact with them. A common misconception in academic and 
policy discussions is that “the market” has coherent beliefs or expectations as if it was one 
person (Shin, 2015). In fact, market prices are being driven by many market participants that 
may have different incentives and beliefs and jointly determine the effects of policies (Shin, 
2015). In terms of research, a next step could be to integrate the volume and the price 
perspectives and study the price setting behavior at the investor level. There are however 
constraints to data availability that will need to be addressed. 
Another interesting extension of this thesis would be to study cross-sector spillovers of 
regulation through non-bank financial intermediaries that are outside the bank regulatory 
perimeter. When regulation for the banking sector tightens, non-banks may benefit from a 
competitive advantage and take over some of the banking activities. The scope and 
implications of these cross-sector shifts in financial intermediation are a worthwhile avenue 
for future research. 
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More generally, researchers and policymakers so far concentrated on understanding and re-
regulating banking activities mainly. Insight into the role of non-bank financial intermediaries 
for financial stability is more limited at this stage. This thesis makes a first step in addressing 
this gap by including insurance companies in the analysis of sovereign risk transmission. 
Going forward, the interaction between banks, non-banks and the real economy needs to be 
studied further.  
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